THE  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR. 


EEPOET 


CONGRESSIONAL  COMMITTEE 


ON  TITK  OPERATIONS  OF  THE 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


CAUSES  OF  ITS  INACTION  AND  ILL  SUCCESS. 


ITS  SEVEEAL  CA.MPA.iaiSrS. 


WHY  M'CLELLAN  WAS  REMOVED. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 


REMOVAL  OF  BDRN8IDE. 


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No.  154  Nassau  Street,  N.  Y, 


REPORT  OF  THE  CONGRESSIONAL  COMMITTEE 

OK 

THE  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR. 


Mr.  Wade,  from  the  Joint  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  submitted  the  following  re- 
port, with  the  accompanying  testimony: 

CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR. 

In  December,  1861,  a  joint  committee  of  the  two 
houses  of  Congress,  consisting  of  three  members  of 
the  Senate  and  four  members  of  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  was  appointed,  with  instructions  to  in- 
quire into  the  conduct  of  the  present  war. 

Tour  Committee  proceeded  to  the  discharge  of  the 
duty  devolved  upou  them,  and  have  labored  zeal- 
ously, and  they  trust,  faithfully,  for  that  purpose. 
As  evidence  of  that,  they  would  refer  to  the  large 
mass  of  testimony  taken  by  them,  upon  many  sub- 
jects, and  herewith  reported. 

The  subject  of  inquiry  referred  to  them  was  one 
of  the  utmost  importance  and  magnitude.  Upon 
"  the  conduct  of  the  present  war"  depended  the 
issue  of  the  experiment  inaugurated  by  our  fathers, 
after  so  much  expenditure  of  blood  and  treasure — 
the  establishment  of  a  natiou  founded  upon  the  ca- 
pacity of  man  for  self-government.  The  nation  was 
engaged  in  a  coutest  for  its  very  existence;  a  rebel- 
lion, unparalleled  in  history,  threatened  the  over- 
throw of  our  free  institutions,  and  the  most  prompt 
and  vigorous  measures  were  demanded  by  every 
consideration  of  honor,  patriotism,  and  a  due  regard 
for  the  prosperity  and  happiness  of  the  people. 

Your  Committee  could  perceive  no  necessity  for 
recommending  any  particular  legislation  to  Con- 
gress. Its  previous  course  showed  that  no  such  re- 
commendation was  required.  When  Congress  met 
the  preceding  July,  fresh  from  the  people — called 
upon  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  the  Government 
and  the  maioteuance  of  the  national  honor  and  ex- 
istence— the  representatives  of  the  people  gave  full 
evidence  that  they  comprehended  the  duty  devolved 
upon  them,  and  had  the  courage  and  will  to  fully 
discharge  it.  The  administration  called  by  the  peo- 
ple to  tue  head  of  the  Government,  in  this  the  most 
critical  period  of  the  nation's  history,  was  more 
promptly  and  fully  supported  tban  that  of  any 
other  Government  of  wbich  history  has  pre- 
served any  record.  The  call  of  the  President  for 
money  and  meu  had  been  more  than  complied 
with;  no  legislation  wbich  he  had  deemed 
necessary  had  been  denied  by  Congress,  and  the 
people  had  most  nobly  and  generously  supported  and 
sustained  what  their  representatives  had  promised 
in  their  name.  Tiie  same  Congress,  fresh  from  their 
constituents,  had  again  met,  and  there  could  be  no 
doubt  that,  as  they  had  before  acted,  so  would  they 
continue  to  act.  It  needs  but  to  re'er  to  the  history 
of  the  Congress  just  closed,  it*  prompt  and  thorough 
action,  clothing  the  Executive  with  tbe  fullest 
power,  placing  at  his  disposal  all  the  resources  of 
men  aud  money  which,  this  nation  possessed,  to 
prove  that  your  Committee  judged  rightly  that  Con- 


gress needed  no  prompting  from  them  to  do  its  en- 
tire duty. 

Not  upon  those  whose  duty  it  was  to  provide  the 
means  necessary  to  put  down  the  Rebellion,  but 
upon  those  whose  duty  it  was  to  rightfully  apply 
those  means,  and  the  agents  they  employed  for  that 
purpose,  rested  the  blame,  if  any,  that  the  hopes  of 
the  nation  have  not  been  realized,  and  its  expecta- 
tions have  so  long  been  disapooiuted. 

Your  Committee  therefore  concluded  that  they 
would  best  perform  their  duty  by  endeavoring  to 
obtain  such  information  in  respect  to  the  conduct  of 
the  war  as  would  best  enable  them  to  advise  what 
mistakes  had  been  made  in  the  past,  and  the  proper 
course  to  be  pursued  in  the  future;  to  obtain  such 
information  as  the  many  and  laborious  duties  of  the 
President,  and  his  Cabinet  prevented  them  from  ac- 
quiring, and  to  lay  it  before  them  with  such  recom- 
mendations and  suggestions  as  seemed  to  be  most 
imperatively  demanded;  and  the  journal  of  tue  pro- 
ceedings of  your  Committee  shows  that,  for  a  long 
time,  they  were  in  constant  communication  with  the 
President  and  his  Cabinet,  and  neglected  no  oppor- 
tunity of  at  once  laving  before  them  the  information 
acquired  by  them  in  tbe  course  of  their  investi- 
gations. 

Many  specific  subjects  of  investigation  presented 
themselves  for  the  consideration  ot  your  Committee, 
any  one  of  which  might  well  require  the  action  of  a 
committee  for  itself;  and  all  of  which,  if  lullj  in- 
vestigated, would  demand  the  attention  of  alt  the 
representatives  in  Congress.  It  was  apparent  from 
the  first  that  your  Committee  would  be  compelled  to 
confine  their  attention  to  a  few  of  the  more  prom- 
inent subjects  of  inquiry;  to  those  the  investigation 
of  which  would  best  enable  them  to  comprehend 
the  causes  and  necessity,  if  any,  for  the  delay  and 
inaction  characterizing  the  operations  of  our  armies 
in  the  field. 

And  while  each  of  those  subjects  has  received 
from  them  the  attention  whic!i  its  importance 
merited,  so  far  as  they  were  able  to  give  it,  the  at- 
tention of  your  Committee  has  been  turned  more 
particularly  to  the  history  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac. In  the  history  of  that  arm)-  is  to  be  found  all 
that  is  necessary  to  enable  your  Committee  to  report 
upon  "  the  conduct  of  the  war.  '  Had  that  aimy 
fulfilled  all  that  a  generous  and  confiding  people 
were  justified  in  expecting  from  it,  this  rebellion 
had  long  since  been  crushed,  and  the  blessiugs  of 
peace  restored  to  this  nation.  The  failure  of  that 
army  to  fulfill  those  expectations  has  prolonged  this 
contest  to  the  present  time,  with  all  its  expenditure 
of  hie  and  treasure,  for  it  has  to  a  great  extent  neu- 
tralized, if  not  entirely  destroyed,  the  legitimate 
fruits  which  would  otherwise  have  been  reaped 
from  our  glorious  victories  in  the  Wesst. 

Therefore,  while  your  Committee  have  not  failed 
to  take  the  testimony  of  witnesses  in  relation  to  mil- 
itary operations  in  other  parts  of  the  country,  and 
also  upon  various  subjects  to  which  their  attention 
has  been  specially  directed  by  Congress  and  the 
War  Department  since  the  Committee  was  first  ap- 
pointed, the  principal  part  of  the  testimony  taken 


SEYMOUR  DURST 


by  cbem  relates  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and 
those  subjects  more  immediately  connected  with  its 
operations.  They  have  taken  the  testimony  of  nearly 
200 witnesses,  almost  entirely  men  in  tne  military 
service  of  the  Government,  including  about  100 
generals. 

The  disaster  at  Bull  Ren  in  July.  1S61,  was  fully 
investigated  by  your  Committee,  a6  being  the  first 
conflict  of  the  national  troops  with  armed  treason 
upon  the  field  of  baU'e;  und  also  because  the  troops 
there  engaged  formed  the  nucleus  aroond  which  has 
since  been  collected  the  vast  aud  magnificent  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  The  result  of  then  investigation 
your  Committee  eubnit  in  a  separate  report. 

Your  Commttee  Lave  also  investigated  the  disaster 
at  Ball's  Bloff,  that  battle  being  the  first  conflict  of 
any  extent  in  which  any  of  the  troops  of  the  army 
of  "the  Potomac  were  engaged  after  its  re-organiza- 
tioD.  A  separate  report  of  that  disaster  is  also  sub- 
mitted. 

Immediately  upon  the  organization  of  your  Com- 
mittee, and  before  pr o<  ceding  to  the  taking  of  any 
testimony,  they  addressed  to  Gen.  McClellan,  who", 
by  the  retirement  of  Gen.  Scott,  had  become  Gen- 
eral-in-Chief  of  the  Army,  the  iollowing  communi- 
cation : 

'•  Washington,  D.  C,  Dec.  21,  1861. 
"  Sir:  You  Bre  rware  that  a  Joint  Committee  has  been  ap- 
pointed by  the  Senate  and  Kouse  of  Representatives  to  in- 
quire into  tUe  '  conduct  of  the  war.'  Onr  Committee,  at  a 
mee  ting  held  this  moinii-g,  uueirimously  c  xpressad  a  desire, 
before  proceeding  in  their  official  duties,  to  have  an  interview 
with  j on  at  our  room  at  the  Capitol,  at  such  time  as  may  suit 
your  convenience,  in  view  of  your  pressing  engagements. 

"  Our  place  of  met  tit  c  is  tile  room  of  the  Committee  on 
Territories  of  the  Sei.stt-. 
*'  I  remain,  very  respec  tfully,  vour?, 

T'B.  F.  WADE,  Chairman. 
*  ilsj.-Gen.  Geo.  F.  McClellan.  GeLerd  Commanding 
Army  United  States." 

While  fully  appreciating  the  dignity  and  power 
with  which  they  were  clothed  by  the  concurrent 
action  of  both  bouses  of  Congress,  they  deemed  it 
but  ust  to  award  to  his  position  the  consideration  of 
asking  him  to  confer  with  them  in  relation  to  the 
best  method  of  fulfilling  those  expectations  which 
the  people  had  a  right  <o  hone  for  from  an  adminis- 
tration upon  which  they  bad,  through  their  repre 
eent&tives,  conferred  such  plenary  powers.  A  refer- 
?nae  to  the  journal  of  yonr  committee  -will  show  that 
ifl-bealth  prevented  Gen.  McClellan  from  immedi- 
ately complying  with  this  invitation.  The  necessi- 
ties of  the  case,  however,  were  so  preesiug  and 
urgent  that  your  committee  concluded  to  proceed  at 
once  to  the  taking  of  testimony. 

ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 
Soon  after  the  battle  of  Bull  Bun,  in  July,  1861, 
Gen.  McDowell  was  superseded,  and  Gen.  McClel- 
lan was  called  by  the  President  to  the  command  of 
the  army  of  the  Potomac.  The  campaign  in  Western 
Virginia,  the  credit  of  which  had  been  generally 
ascribed  to  Gen.  McClellan;  the  favor  with  which  it 
was  understood  he  was  regarded  by  Gen.  Scott,  then 
general-in-chief  of  the  army  of  the  United  States; 
even  his  comparative  youth,  holding  out  the  promise 
of  active  and  rigorous  measures;  all  these  considera- 
tions tended  to  infuse  hope  into  the  public  mind,  and 
to  remove  the  gloom  and  despondency  which  had 
followed  the  disastrous  Issue  of  the  campaign  just 
ended. 

Every  energy  of  the  Government  and  all  the  re- 
sources of  a  generous  and  patriotic  people  were  freely 
and  lavishly  placed  at  thedispoeal  of  Gen.  McClellan 
to  enable  him  to  gather  together  another  army  and 
put  it  in  the  most  complete  state  of  efficiency,  so  that 
offensive  operations  might  be  resumed  at  the  earliest 
practicable"  moment.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac 
became  the  object  of  special  care  to  every  depart- 
ment of  the  Government,  and  all  other"  military 
movements  and  organizations  were  made  subordinate 
to  the  one  great  purpose  of  collecting  at  Washington, 
and  organizing  there,  an  army  which  should  over- 
power the  forces  of  the  enemy,  and  forever 
crush  out  any  hope  of  success  which  the 
liebebj  might  cherish.    Even  when  the  army  of 


the  Potomac  had  attained  di-nensions  never  before 
contemplated  ia  the  course  of  military  operations 
upon  this  continent,  aud  seldom,  if  ever,  equaled  in 
modern  times,  no  portion  of  its  rapidly  increasing 
numbers  was  permitted  to  be  diverted,  even  for  a 
brief  period,  to  the  accomplishment  of  other  enter- 
prises. The  generals  ia  charge  of  the  various  expe- 
ditions from  time  to  time  inaugurated,  and  from 
which  so  much  benefit  was  anticipated — Gen.  But- 
ler, Gen.  Sherman,  Gen.  Burnside,  and  others — 
were  compelled  to  look  elsewhere  for  the  troops  to 
compose  their  commands,  to  rely  upon  the  continued 
patriotism  of  the  people,  and  the  zsal  of  the  Execu- 
tives of  the  various  States  for  the  raising  of  those 
regiments  which  would  enable  them  to  depart  for 
the  fields  of  duty  assigned  to  them.  No  considera- 
tion was  for  a  moment  allowed  to  diminish  or  impair 
the  efficiency  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  the 
unexampled  spectacle  was  presented  to  other  nations, 
who  were  intently  watching  the  course  of  events  in 
this  country,  of  the  larges  t  army  of  the  present  cen- 
tury being  raised  entirely  by  voluntary  enlistments 
in  the  brief  period  of  a  tew  months. 

When  Congress  assembled  in  this  city,  in  the  be- 
ginning of  December,  1861,  so  successful  had  been 
the  exertions  of  the  authorities,  and  so  zealously  had 
the  people  responded  to  their  country's  call,  that  the 
consolidated  morning  reports,  furnished  your  Com- 
mittee by  the  Adjutant  General  of  the  aiiny,  show- 
ed that,  exclusive  of  the  command  of  Gen.  Dix,  at 
Baltimore,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  consisted  of 
about  185,000  men. 

During  the  time  this  large  army  had  been  collect- 
ing and  organizing,  nothing  of  importance  had  trans- 
pired in  connection  with  it,  except  the  closing  of  the 
navigation  of  the  Potomac  by  the  Kebels,  which 
your  Committee  treat  of  more  at  length  in  another 
part  of  this  report,  and  the  melancholy  disaster  of 
Ball  s  Bluff,  which  is  made  the  subject  of  a  separate 
report. 

The  weather  during  the  Fall  season,  and  for  some 
weeks  after  the  convening  of  Congress,  continued 
unusually  favorable  for  active  military  operations. 
As  month  after  month  passed  without  anything 
being  done  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  people 
became  more  and  more  anxious  for  the  announcement 
that  the  work  of  preparation  bad  been  completed 
and  active  operation  would  soon  be  commenced. 

From  the  testimony  before  your  Committee  it  ap- 
peared that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  well 
armed  and  equipped,  and  had  reached  a  high  etate 
of  discipline  by  the  last  of  September  or  tjie  firBt  of 
October.  The  men  were  ready  and  eager  to  com- 
mence active  operations.  The  generals  in  command 
of  the  various  divisions  were  opposed  to  going  into 
winter  quarters,  and  the  most  of  them  declared  they 
had  no  expectation  of  doing  so. 

CORPS  ORGANIZATION. 
In  reference  to  the  proper  organization  of  so  large 
an  army  as  that  about  Washington,  in  order  that  it 
might  be  the  batter  able  to  act  most  effectively  in 
the  field,  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses  examined 
upon  that  poiut  is  remarkably  uuanimous.  The 
generals  moat  familiar  with  the  subject  seemed  to 
regard  of  the  utmost  importance  ths  division  of  the 
army  into  corps  d'armee,  and  that,  too,  in  time  for 
the  instruction  of  the  troops  in  the  movements 
necessary  to  render  such  an  organization  the  most 
effective.  Tour  Committee  deemed  it  60  vitally 
necessary  that  they  repeatedly  brought  the  subject 
to  the  attention  of  the  authorities,  and  urged  its 
immediate  adoption  with  all  the  arguments  in  their 
power.  The  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War 
concurred  with  them  in  the  necessity  of  such  a 
measure;  but  it  did  not  seem  to  be  regarded  with 
much  favor  by  Gen.  McClellan.  Indeed,  Gen. 
McClellan  stated  to  your  Committee,  at  the  time  ot 
their  conference  with  him.  that,  although  it  might 
at  some  time  be  expedient  to  divide  the  army  into 
army  corps,  the  subject  was  one  of  great  difficulty. 
He  said  it  was  a  delicate  matter  to  appoint  major- 
generals  before  they  had  been  tried  by  actual 
service,    and     had     shown    their    fitness  to 


5 


be  selected  to  command  30,000  or  40,000 
men.  A  major-general  coald  not  be  stowed 
away  in  a  pigeon-hole,  if  he  should  prove  iucompe- 
tent,  so  easily  as  a  brigadier-general.  He  proposed, 
therefore,  to  himself  manage  ibis  entire  army  in 
some  battle  or  campaign,  and  then  Belect  from  the 
brigadier-geuerals  in  it  such  as  prove  themselves 
competent  for  higher  commiuds.  Consequently, 
the  divieion  of  the  army  into  army  corps  was  not 
even  begun  uutil  after  the  movement  of  the  army  in 
March  had  commenced,  and  then  only  in  pursuance 
of  the  direct  and  repeated  orders  of  the  President. 

Gen.  McClellan,  however,  continued  to  oppose 
the  organization  of  the  army  into  army  corp"s,  as 
will  be  seen  from  the  following  dispatch  to  him 
from  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  May  9,  1862: 

"  The  President  is  unwilling  to  have  the  army  corps  organ- 
ization broken  up,  but  also  uuwilling  that  the  commanding 
general  shall  be  trammeled  and  enjbana«6ed  in  actual  skir- 
mishing, collision  with  the  euemy,  and  on  the  eve  of  an  ex- 
pected great  battle.  You,  therefore,  may  temporarily  suspend 
that  orgauizatiou  in  the  army  uuder  your  immediate  com- 
mand, and  adopt  any  you  Bee  tit,  uutil  further  orders.  He  also 
writes  you  privately." 

The  provisional  corps  of  Gen.  Fitz-John  Porter 
and  Geu.  Franklin  were  thereupon  formed  by  re- 
ducing the  other  corps  from  three  to  two  divisions. 

STRENGTH  OF  THE  ENEMY. 
Your  Committee  endeavored  to  obtain  as  accurate 
information  as  possible  in  relation  to  the  strength 
and  position  of  the  enemy  in  front  of  Washington. 
The  testimony  of  tbe  officers  in  our  army  here  upon 
that  point,  however,  was  far  from  satisfactory. 
Early  in  December  an  order  had  been  issued  from 
headquarters  prohibiting  the  commanders  in  the 
front  from  examining  any  persons  who  should  come 
into  our  lines  from  toe  direction  of  tbe  euemy,  but 
all  such  persons  were  to  be  sent,  without  examina- 
tion, to  tne  headquarters  of  the  army.  Restrictions 
were  also  placed  upon  the  movements  of  scouts. 
The  result  was,  that  the  Generals  examined  appeared 
to  be  almost  entirely  ignorant  of  the  force  of  the 
enemy  opposed  to  them,  having  only  such  informa- 
tion as  they  were  allowed  to  obtain  at  headquarters. 
The  strength  of  the  enemy  was  variously  estimated 
at  from  70,000  to  210,000  men.  Those  who  formed 
the  highest  estimate  based  their  opinion  upon  in- 
formation received  at  headquarters.  As  to  the 
strength  of  the  enemy's  position,  the  general  im- 
pression seemed  to  be  founded  upon  information  ob- 
tained from  the  same  source,  that  it  was  exceedingly 
formidable.  Subsequent  events  have  proved  that 
the  force  of  the  enemy  was  below  even  the  lowest  of 
these  estimates,  and  the  strength  of  their  fortifica- 
tions very  greatly  overestimated. 

DEFENSES  OF  WASHINGTON. 

Your  Committee  also  sought  to  ascertain  what 
number  of  men  could  be  spared  from  this  army  for 
offensive  operations  elsewhere,  assuming  that  the 
works  of  the  enemy  in  front  were  of  such  a  charac- 
ter that  it  would  not  be  advisable  to  move  directly 
upon  them.  The  estimate  of  the  force  necessary  to 
be  left  in  and  around  Washington  to  act  entirely  on 
the  defensive,  to  render  tbe  capital  secure  agaiuet 
any  attack  of  the  enemy,  as  stated  bv  the  witnesses 
examined  upon  that  poiut,  was  froin  50.000  to  80,000 
men,  leaving  100,000  or  upward  that  could  be  used 
for  expeditions  at  other  points. 

In  connection  with  the  same  subject,  your  Com- 
mittee inquired  in  reference  to  what  had  been  done 
to  render  .the  fortifications  here,  which  had  been 
constructed  at  such  expense  and  with  so  great  labor, 
most  effective  for  the  defense  of  Washington.  Your 
Committee  are  constrained  to  say  that  adequate 
provision  never  was  made  to  properly  man  those 
fortifications  and  exercise  men  in  the  management  of 
the  guns.  Several  of  the  witnesses  testified  that 
they  had  repeatedly  called  the  attention  of  the 
authorities  to  the  matter,  but  without  success.  And 
when  the  movement  of  the  army  commenced  in 
March,  the  lew  regiments  that  had  been  placed  in 
the  forts  and  partially  instructed  in  the  use  of  the 
guns,  were  almost  entirely  withdrawn,  leaving  tbe 


fortifications  to  be  manned  by  raw  and  inexperienced 
troops. 

THE  BLOCKADE  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

The  subject  of*  the  obstruction  of  the  navigation 
of  the  Potomac  naturally  demanded  the  considera- 
tion of  your  Committee.  Upon  that  point  your 
Committee  would  call  tbe  attention  of  Congress  to 
the  testimony  of  Capt.  G.  V.  Fox,  Assistant  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy.  Upon  reference  to  his  testimony, 
it  will  appear  that,  in  J une,  1861,  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment proposed  to  the  War  Department  that  meas- 
ures be  adopted  to  take  possession  of  Matthias 
Point,  in  order  to  secure  the  navigation  of  the  Po- 
tomac from  any  danger  of  being  interrupted.  From 
some  cause,  no  steps  were  then  taken  for  that  pur- 
pose. The  subject  was  again  brought  to  the  atten- 
tion of  the  War  Department  by  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment in  the  month  of  August,  shortly  after  the  bat- 
tlb  of  Bull  Run.  Nothiug,  however,  was  done  at 
that  time  in  regard  to  it. 

lu  October,  18G1,  the  Navy  Department  again 
urged  the  matter  upon  the  consideration  of  the  War 
Department.  The  Port  Royal  expedition  was  then 
in  preparation,  and  would  soon  be  ready  to  start. 
The  Navy  Department  represented  that  it  would  be 
absolutely  necessary  to  send  with  that  expedition, 
in  order  to  insure  its  success,  the  greater  portion  of 
the  Potomac  flotilla,  because,  being  very  powerful 
vessels,  of  light  draught,  with  their  machinery  pro- 
tected, they  were  better  fitted  for  that  service  than 
any  other  vessels  in  the  possession  of  the  Navy 
Department;  and  if  anything  was  to  b8  done  by 
them  to  secure  the  uninterrupted  navigation  of  the 
Potomac,  it  must  be  done  before  they  left.  It  was 
proposed  to  the  President  ana  the  War  Department 
that  the  gunboats  should  take  and  destroy  the  Rebel 
batteries  which  had  then  begun  to  make  their  ap- 
pearance upon  the  river,  and  which  even  then  en- 
dangered the  safety  of  vessels  passing  up  and  down 
the  Potomac.  Wnen  that  had  been  done,  it  waa 
proposed  that  a  sufficient  number  of  troops  should  be 
landed  at  Matthias  Point,  &c,  to  intrench  them- 
selves, under  the  protection  of  the  gunboats, 
until  they  should  be  able,  with  the  assistance  of 
the  smaller  boats  of  the  Potomac  flotilla,  to  hold 
their  position  against  any  force  the  enemy  would  be 
likely  to  brmg  against  them.  It  was  represented 
that  unless  some  such  steps  were  taken  the  departure 
of  those  vessels  upon  the  Port  Royal  expedition 
would  be  the  signal  for  the  closing  of  the  navgation 
of  the  Potomac,  which  representation  the  result 
proved  to  be  correct.  As  was  well  urged  by  the  Navy 
Department,  the  whole  question  amounted  simply  to 
this :  Would  the  army  cooperate  with  the  navy  in 
securing  the  unobstructed  navigation  of  the  Potomac, 
or,  by  withhoiaing  that  cooperation  at  that  time, 
permit  so  important  a  channel  of  communication  to 
be  closed. 

WHY  IT  WAS  NOT  RAISED. 

After  repeated  efforts,  Gen.  McClellan  promised 
that  4,000  men  should  be  ready  at  a  time  named  to 
proceed  down  the  river.  The  Navy  Department 
provided  the  necessary  transports  for  the  troops,  and 
Capt.  Craven,  commanding  the  Potomac  flotilla, 
upon  being  notified  to  that  effect,  collected  at 
Mathias  Point  all  the  boats  of  his  flotilla  at  the  time 
named.  The  troops  did  not  arrive,  and  the  Navy 
Department  was  informed  of  the  fact  by  Capt. 
Craven.  Assistant  Secretary  Fox,  upon  inquiring 
of  Gen.  McClellan  why  the  troops  had  not  been  sent 
according  to  agreement,  was  informed  by  him  that 
his  engineers  were  of  the  opinion  that  so  large  a 
body  of  troops  could  not  be  landed,  and  therefore  he 
had" concluded  not  to  send  them.  Capt.  Fox  replied 
that  the  landing  of  the  troops  was  a  matter  of  which 
the  Navy  Department  had  charge ;  that  they  had 
provided  the  necessary  means  to  accomplish  the  land- 
ing successfully;  that  no  inquiry  had  been  made  of 
them  in  regard  to  that  matter,  and  no  notification 
that  the  troops  were  not  to  be  sent. 

It  was  then  agreed  that  the  troops  should  be  Bent 
tbe  next  night.   Capt.  Craven  waa  again  notified, 


6 


and  again  had  bis  flotilla  in  readiness  for  the  arrival 
of  the  troops.  But  no  troops  were  sent  down  at 
that  time,  nor  were  any  ever  sent  down  for  that 
purpose. 

Capt.  Fox,  in  answer  to  the  inquiry  of  the  Com- 
mittee as  to  what  reason  was  assigned  for  not  send- 
ing the  troops  according  to  the  second  agreement,  re- 
plied that  the  only  reason,  so  far  as  he  could  ascer- 
tain, was,  that  Gen.  McClellan  feared  it  might  bring 
on  a  general  engagement. 

The  President  ,  who  had  united  with  the  Navy  De- 
partment in  urging  their  proposition,  first  upon  Gen. 
Scott  and  then  upon  Gen.  McClellan,  manifested 
great  disappointment  when  he  learned  that  the  plan 
had  failed  in  consequence  of  the  troops  not  being 
sent.  And  Capt.  Craven  threw  up  his  command  on 
the  Potomac  and  applied  to  be  sent  to  sea,  saying 
that,  by  remaining  here  and  doing  nothing,  he  was 
but  losing  his  own  reputation,  as  the  blame  for  per- 
mitting the  Potomac  to  be  blockaded  would  be  im- 
puted to  him  and  the  flotilla  under  his  command. 

Upon  the  failure  of  this  plan  of  the  Navy  De- 

{mrtinent  the  effec  ive  vessels  of  the  Potomac  flotilla 
eft  upon  the  Port  Koyal  expedition.  The  navi- 
gation of  the  river  was  almost  immediately  there- 
after closed,  and  remained  closed  until  the  Rebels 
voluntarily  evacuated  their  batteries  in  the  March 
following,  no  steps  having  been  taken,  in  tne  mean- 
time, for  reopening  communication  by  that  route. 

ORDERS  TO  MOVE. 
On  the  19th  of  January,  1862,  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Army  and  Navy,  issued  orders  for  a  geueial  niove- 
mt>nt  of  all  the  armies  of  the  United  States,  one  re- 
sult of  which  was  the  series  of  victories  at  Port 
Henry,  Fort  Donelson,  &c,  which  60  electrified  the 
country  and  revived  tue  hopes  of  every  loyal  man 
in  the  Lnd. 

LINE  OF  OPERATIONS. 
After  this  long  period  of  inactioa  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  the  Presideut  of  the  United  States,  on 
the  31st  of  January,  1862,   issued  the  following 
order : 

"  Executive  Mansion,  Washington,  Jan.  31,  1362.' 
"  President's  Special  War  Order  .No.  1. 

"  Ordered,  that  ah  the  disposable  force  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  alter  providing  saiely  for  the  defense  of  Washing- 
ton, be  formed  into  an  expedition  for  the  immediate  object  of 
seizing  and  occupying  a  point  upon  the  railroad  soutuwest- 
ward  of  what  is  know  n  as  Manassas  Junction  ;  ah  details  to 
be  in  the  discretion  of  the  General-in-Chief,  and  tno  ex- 
pedition to  move  before  or  on  tlit,  22d  day  of  February  next. 

"  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN." 

To  this  order  Gen.  McClellan  wrote  an  elaborate 
reply  of  the  same  date,  objecting  to  tne  plan  theitin 
indicated  as  involving  "  the  error  of  dividing  our 
army  by  a  very  difficult  obstacle  (the  Occoquan) 
and  by  a  distauce  too  fc.reat  to  enable  the  two  por- 
tions to  support  each  other,  should  either  be  at- 
tacked by  tne  masses  of  tne  enemy,  while  the  other 
is  held  iu  check.''  He  then  proceeded  to  argue  in 
favor  of  a  movement  by  way  of  the  Rappahannock 
or  Fortress  Monroe,  giving  the  preference  to  tne 
Rappahannock  route.  He  stated  that  30  days  would 
be  required  to  provide  the  necessary  means  of  trans- 
portation. He  stated  that  he  regarded  "success  as 
certain,  by  all  the  chances  of  war,"  by  the  route  he 
proposed,  while  it  was  "  by  no  meaus  certain  that 
we  can  oeat  them  [the  enemy]  at  Manassas." 

To  this  the  Presideut  made  the  following  reply: 
"Executive  Mansion,  Washington,  Feb.  3,  1862. 

"My  Dear  Sib:  You  and  I  have  distinct  and  different 
plans  for  a  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac — yours  to 
be  down  the  Chesapeake,  up  tiie  Rappahannock  to  Urbanna, 
and  across  laud  to  the  terminus  of  the  railroad  on  York  River; 
mine  to  move  directly  to  a  point  on  the  railroad  southwest 
of  Manassas.  If  you  will  give  me  satisfactory  auswers  to  the 
following  questions  1  shill  gladly  }ield  my  plan  to  yours: 

"  1.  Does  not  your  plin  involve  a  greatly  larger  expenditure 
of  time  and  m  niey  than  mil  e  1 

"  2.  Wherein  is  a  victory  more  certain  by  your  plan  than 
mine? 

"  3.  Wherein  is  a  victory  more  valuable  by  your  plan  than 
mine  ? 

"4.  In  fact,  would  i:  not  be  less  valuable  in  this,  that  it 
would  brean  no  great  line  of  the  enemy's  communication, 
while  mine  would? 


"  5.  In  case  of  disaster,  would  not  a  safe  retreat  be  mor« 
difficult  by  your  plan  than  by  mine  ? 

"  Yours,  truly,  "  A  LINCOLN. 

"  Major-Gen.  McClellan." 

Your  Committee  have  no  evidence,  either  oral  or 
documentary,  of  the  discussions  that  ensued  or  the 
arguments  that  were  submitted  to  the  consideration 
of  the  President  that  led  him  to  relinquish  his  own 
line  of  operations  and  consent  to  the  one  proposed 
by  Gen.  McClellan,  except  the  result  of  a  council  of 
war,  held  iu  February,  1862.  That  council — the 
first,  so  far  as  your  Committee  have  been  able  to 
ascertain,  ever  balled  by  Gen.  McClellan,  and  then 
by  the  direction  of  the  President— was  composed  of 
twelve  generalp,  as  follows:  McDowell,  Sumner, 
Heintzelman,  Keyes,  Fitz-John  Porter,  Franklin, 
W.  F.  Smith,  McCall,  Blenker,  Andrew  Porter, 
Barnard,  and  Naglee  (from  Gen.  Hooker's  Division). 

To  them  wTas  submitted  the  question  whether  they 
would  indorse  the  line  of  operations  which  Gen. 
McClellan  desired  to  adopt.  The  result  of  the  de- 
liberation was  a  vote  of  eight  to  four  in  favor- 
of  the  movement  by  way  of  Annapolis,  and  thence 
down  the  Chesapeake  Bay,  up  the  Rappahannock, 
landing  at  Urbanna,  and  across  the  country  to  Rich- 
mond. The  four  Generals  who  voted  against  the 
proposed  movement  were  Gens.  McDowell,  Sumner, 
Heintzelman  and  Barnard.  Gen.  Keyes  voted  for 
it  with  the  qualification  that  no  change  should  be 
made  until  the  enemy  were  driven  from  their  batte- 
ries on  the  Potomac. 

At  this  point  it  may  be  well  to  consider  the  prin- 
cipal arguments  for  and  against  the  movement  upon 
Richmond  direct  from  Washington,  and  the  move- 
ment by  way  of  the  Lower  Chesapeake,  including 
that  first  proposed  by  way  of  the*  Rappahannock 
river,  and  the  one  fiually  adopted  by  way  of  For- 
tress Monroe  and  the  peninsula. 

In  expressing  opinions  upon  this  and  other  sub- 
jects relating  more  immediately  to  military  opera- 
tions in  the  field,  your  Committee  do  not  undertake 
to  form  and  express  opinions  of  their  own,  but 
content  themselves  witn  setting  forth  those  ex- 
pressed in  their  testimony  by  military  men  whose 
education  and  experience  entitle  them  to  speak  con- 
fidently upon  those  subjects  pertaining  to  their  pro- 
fession. 

WHY  THE  DIRECT  ROUTE  WAS  BEST. 
The  arguments  in  favor  of  the  direct  and  against 
the  lower  route  to  Richmond  were  many  and 
weighty.  Some  of  them  are  most  tersely  expressed 
in  the  letter  of  the  President  to  Gen.  McClellan,  of 
February  3,  1862,  before  referred  to.  Beside  those, 
the  direct  movement  enabled  the  largest  amount  of 
tioops  to  operate  actively  iu  the  field,  as  the  army 
in  its  movement  immediately  covered  Washington, 
and  thereby  rendered  the  presence  of  a  larae  foice 
here  unnecessary.  By  the  adoption  of  the  lower 
route  a  division  of  the  army  was  rendered  impera- 
tive, in  order  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  the  Capital 
against  any  attack  from  the  enemy.  Thus,  to  use 
the  language  of  Gen.  McClellan  himseif,  in  refer- 
ence to  the  movement  proposed  against  the  enemy 
while  at  Manassas,  "  committing  the  error  of  divid- 
ing our  army  by  a  very  difficult  obstacle,  and  by  a 
distance  too  great  to  enable  the  two  portions  to  sup- 
port each  other,  should  either  be  attacked  by  tue 
masses  of  the  enemy  while  the  other  is  held  in 
check." 

,  Tne  army  in  moving  direct  from  Washington 
avoided  all  the  delays  and  disorder  consequent  upon 
the  embarkation  aad  disembarkation  of  so  large  a 
force  with  all  its  materiel.  And  by  investing  Rich- 
mond on  the  north  and  north-west,  we  cut  them  off 
from  one  of  their  great  sources  of  supply,  the  Shen- 
andoah Valley,  and  at  the  same  time  prevented  their 
raids  through  that  region  of  couutry,  which  so  par- 
alyzed all  efforts  to  send  the  few  troops  left  in 
Washington  to  the  assistance  of  the  army  on  the 
peninsula. 

Gen.  McClellan  states  in  his  testimony  that  by 
adopting  the  route  by  way  of  Annapolis  and  the 
Rappahannock,  he  hoped,  if  proper  eecreey  was  pre- 


7 


served,  to  he  able  to  reach  the  vicinity  of  Richmond 
before  the  Rebel  army  at  Manassis  could  be  concen- 
trated there  for  its  defense.  Whatever  probability 
there  may  have  beeu  for  the  realization  of  such  a 
hope  at  the  time  the  Rappahanuock  route  was  de- 
cided upon,  it  was  entirely  removed  when  the  enemy 
evacuated  Manassas,  before  any  actual  movement 
was  made  by  our  army.  And  Gen.  McClellan  at 
once  relinquished  the  Rappahannock  route,  and  de- 
cided, with  the  concurrence  of  his  corps  command- 
ers, to  g)  by  way  of  Yorktown  and  the  peninsula. 

Que  great  objection  to  the  peninsula,  route,  as  in- 
dicated by  the  testimony  of  all  the  witnesst-s  who 
testify  upon  that  point,  including  Gen.  McClellan 
himself,  was  the  to'al  want  of  information  in  refer- 
ence to  the  nature  of  the  country  there,  the  kind  and 
condition  of  the  roads,  the  preparations  for  defense, 
&c.  The  difficulties  and  embarrassments  our  army 
labored  under  from  the  begiuniug  of  that  campaign, 
from  that  want  of  information,  are  very  evident 
from  the  testimony. 

DECISION  OF  THE  COUNCIL. 
The  decision  of  the  couucil  of  twelve  Generals  in 
February  was  to  move  by  way  of  Annapolis  and 
thence  to  the  Rappahannock.  The  question  of 
reopeniug  the  navigation  of  the  Potomac, 
by  driving  tne  enemy  from  their  batteries 
upon  the  river,  was  discussed.  It  was,  however, 
finally  decided  that  the  enemy  should  be  left  in  pos- 
session of  their  batteries,  and  the  movement  should 
be  made  without  disturbing  them.  This  is  proven 
by  the  testimony,  and  also  by  the  second  paragraph 

•of  the  order  of  the  President,  dated  March  8,  1862, 

.as  follows: 

"Executive  Mansion,  March  8,  1862. 
"  President's  General  War  Order  No.  3. 

u  Ordered,  That  no  change  of  the  b<tse  of  operations  of  the 
Army  of  the  i'o'.omac  sha:l  bo  male  without  leaviug in  and 
about  Washington  such  a  force  as,  in  thu  opinion  of  the  Gene- 
ral-m-Ctiiet  aud  the  Commanders  of  all  the  A/my  Corps,  shall 
leave  thf  "aid  city  entirely  seoure. 

"  That  no  more  than  two  Army  Corps  (about  fifty  thousand 
troops)  ot  said  Army  ot  the  i'o'oin.ic  snail  be  moved  en  route 
for  a  new  base  of  operations  until  the  navigation  of  the  I'oto- 
macfroui  Washington  to  the  Chesapeake  liay  shall  b&  freed 
from  the  enemy's  ba  teries  and  Other  obstructions,  or  until  the 
President  shall  hereafter  give  express  permission. 

"That  any  moveinnt  aforesaid  en  route  tor  anew  base  oi 
opera  ions,  which  ui*y  be  ordered  by  the  General-in-Chief, 
end  which  may  be  intended  to  move  upon  the  Chtsapeake 
Hay,  shall  begin  to  move  upon  the  B*y  as  early  as  the  18th 
March  insl.,  and  the  General-in-Chief  shall  be  responsible 
that  it  so  move  a3  early  as  that  day. 

"  Ordeied,  Tnat  tbo  Army  ana  Navy  co-operate  in  an  im- 
mediate etl  >it  to  crpture  the  enemy's  batteries  upon  the 
Potomac  between  Washington  and  the  Chesapeake  Bay. 

"  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN 

"  L.  Thomas,  Adjt.-Gen." 

Before  the  movement  by  way  of  Annapolis  could 
he  t-xecuted,  the  enemy  abandoned  their  batteries 
upon  the  Potomac,  and  evacuated  their  position  at 
Centre ville  and  Manassas,  retiring  to  the  line  of  the 
Rappahannock. 

MOVEMENT  OF  THE  ARMY. 

When  Gen.  McUiellan,  then  in  the  City  of  Wash- 
ington, he>:rd  th \t  the  enemy  had  evacuated  Manas- 
sas, he  proceeded  across  the  river  aud  ordered  a 
general  movement  of  the  wholo  army  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  position  lately  occupied  <>y  the  euemy. 
The  army  moved  on  the  niornnig  of  the  10th  of 
March,  the  greater  part  of  ir.  proceeding  no  further 
than  .  Fairfax  Court-iimse.  A  small  force  of  the 
army  proceeded  to  Manassas  aud  beyond  to  the  line 
of  the  Rappahannock,  ascertaining  that  the  euemy 
had  retired  beyond  tnat  ri/er  and  destroyed  tne  rail- 
road bridge  across  it. 

On  the  1Mb  of  March  Gen.  McClellan  ordered,  by 
telegraph,  the  transports  from  Annapolis  to  Wash- 
ington (Alexandria  /),  to  embavk  the  army  trom 
there,  and  informed  the  Department  that  ne  pro- 
posed to  occupy  Manassas  with  a  portion  of  Gen. 
Banks's  command,  and  throw  all  the  force  he  could 
Concentrate  upon  the  line  previouhly  determined 
Upon.  Subseauent  events  in  the  vailey  of  the  Shen- 
andoah, tevniinaling,  for  a  time,  in  the  battle  of 
Winchester  of  M*rcb  23,  prevented  the  force  under 
Gen.  Banks  from  leaving  tnat  valley. 


ANOTHER  COUNCIL. 
On  the  13th  of  March  Gen.  McClellan  convened  at 
Fairfax  Court-Uouae  a  couu  il  of  war,  consisting  of 
four  of  the  five  commanders  of  army  corps  (Gen. 
Banks  being  absent),  and  informed  them  that  he 
proposed  to  abandon  his  plan  of  movement  by  way 
of  the  Rappahannock,  and  submitted  to  them  instead 
a  plan  of  movement  by  way  of  York  and  James 
Rivers.  The  result  of  the  deliberations  of  that  coun- 
cil was  as  follows: 

H  BA  DCJTTARTHRS  ARMT  OP  TH  K  FoTOMAC,  ) 

Fairfax  Court-Housr,  March  13,  1862.  5 
"  A  council  of  the  Generals  commanding  army  corps  at  the 
headquarters  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were  of  the 
opinion: 

l' First  :  That  the  enemy,  having  retreated  from  Manassas 
to  Gordonsville.  behind  the  Rappahannock  and  the  Rapidan, 
it  is  the  opinion  of  the  generals  commanding  army  corps  that 
the  operations  to  be  oarried  on  will  be  best  undertaken  from 
Old  Point  Comfort,  between  the  York  and  James  Rivers,  upon 
Richmond;  provided,  fir^t,  that  th<5  enemy's'vessel,  the  Mer- 
limac,  can  b«  neutralized  ;  second,  the  means  of  tranportation 
sufficient  for  an  immediate  transfer  of  the  force  to  its  new 
base  can  be  ready  at  Washington  and  Alexandria  to  move 
down  the  Potomac;  third,  that  a  naval  auxiliary  force  can  be 
had  to  silence  or  aid  in  silencing  the  enemy's  batteries  in 
York  River;  fourth,  that  the  force  to  be  left  to  cover  Wash- 
ington shall  be  such  as  to  give  an  entire  feelins  of  security  for 
its  sifety  from  menace.  Uuauimous. 

"  Second:  If  the  foregoing  cannot  be,  the  army  should  then 
be  moved  against  the  enemy  behind  the  Rappahannock  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment,  and  the  means  for  reconstructing 
bridges,  repairine  railroads,  and  stocking  them  with  material 
sufficient  for  supplying  the  army,  should  at  once  be  collected 
for  ooth  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  and  the  Acquia  and  Rich- 
mond Railroads.  Unanimous. 

"Note — That  with  the  forts  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Po- 
tomac fully  garrisoned,  and  those  on  the  left  bank  occu- 
pied, a  covering  force  in  front  of  the  Virginia  line  of  25,000 
men  would  suffice,  (Keyes,  Heintzeiman  and  McDowell.)  A 
total  of  40,01)0  men  for  the  defense  of  the  city  would  suffice, 
(Sumner.)" 

The  same  day  Gen.  McClellan  informed  the  War 
Department  that  "the  Council  of  Commanders  of 
Army  Corps  have  unanimously  agreed  upon  a  plan 
of  operations,  and  Gen.  McDowell  will  at  once  pro- 
ceed with  it  to  Washington  and  lay  it  before  you." 

To  this  the  Secretary  of  War  replied:  "What- 
ever plan  has  been  agreed  upon  proceed  at  once  to 
execute,  without  losing  an  hour  for  my  approval." 
THE  PRESIDENT'S  ORDERS. 

The  plan  of  operations  was  submitted  to  the  Presi- 
dent on  the  same  day,  and  he  approved  the  same; 
but  gave  the  following  directions  as  to  its  execution: 

"  First:  Leave  such  force  at  Manassas  junction  as  shall 
make  it  entirely  certain  that  the  enemy  shall  not  repossess 
himself  of  that  position  and  line  of  communication. 

"  Sec'  nd  :  Leave  Washington  secure. 

"  Tliird  :  Move,  the  remainder  of  the  force  down  the  Poto- 
mac, choosing  a  naw  base  at  Fortress  Monroe,  or  anywhere 
between  here  and  there;  or,  at  all  events,  move  such  re- 
mainder of  the  army  at  once,  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  by  some 
route." 

EMBARKATION  OF  THE  ARMY. 
The  army  was  directed  to  return  to  Alexandria  to 
be  embarked  for  the  peninsula;  previous  to  their 
embarkation  all  the  corps  to  he  concentrated  upon 
the  division  nearest  Alexandria.  The  transporta- 
tion not  proving  sufficient  for  immediate  embarka- 
tion, the  troops  were,  for  several  days,  exposed  to 
the  rains  which  then  set  in,  being  deprived  of  their 
former  camping  accommodations,  although,  in  many 
instances,  not  far  distant  from  them,  baying  only 
shelter  tents  to  protect  them  from  the  iaclemency  of 
the  weather. 

To  Gen.  McDowell  was  at  first  assigned  the  ad- 
vance ot  the  expedition.  Bat  when  it  was  found 
that  there  was  not  transportation  enough  to  emoark 
at  once  his  satire  corps,  he  consented,  in  order  to 
utii  ze  what  \yas  there,  to  allow  his  troops  to  remain 
until  such  time  as  they  eould  be  moved  together, 
with  the  understanding  that  the  troops  preceding 
him  should  not  operate  upon  bis  proposed  field  of 
labor.  The  result,  however,  was,  that  the  corps  of 
Gen.  McDowell  was  put  off  till  the  last,  which,  in 
pursuance  of  subsequent  orders,  led  to  his  corps 
being  retained  here  ior  the  defense  of  Washington. 

HOW  WASHINGTON    WAS    LEFT  UNDEFENDED. 

By  reference  to  the  President's  general  war  order, 
No  .3  of  March  3,  1862,  it  will  be  seen  that  no 


ft 


change  of  base  of  operations  of  the  army  of  the  Po- 
tomac was  to  be  made  without  leaving  in  and  about 
Washington  such  a  force  as  in  the  opinion  not  only 
of  Gen.  McClellan,  but  of  '*tbe  commauders  of  all 
the  army  corps,"  \va6  sufficient  to  render  the  capital 
entirely  secure.  And  by  reference  to  the  report  of 
the  council  of  war  held  at  Fairfax  Coart- House,  on 
the  13th  of  March.  1862,  consisting  of  Gens.  McDow- 
ell, Sumner,  Heinizelman,  and  Keyes,  it  will  be 
seen  that  three  members  of  that  council  deemed 
necessary  for  the  safety  of  Washington  "  that  the 
forts  on  the  right  bant  of  the  Potomac  should  be 
fully  garrisoned;  those  on  the  left  bank  occupied, 
and  a  covering  force  of  25,000  men."  The  other 
General  (Sumner)  deemed  40,000  men  in  all  sufficient. 

Notwithstanding  this  order  of  the  President,  and 
the  decision  of  the  council,  when  Gen.  McClellan 
himself  lefjp  Alexandria  for  the  peninsula,  he  sent 
back  orders,  without  conference  with  the  command- 
ers of  corps,  for  all  the  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac, but  that  of  Gen.  Ba?iks,  to  embark  at  once 
for  the  peninsula.  Just  orevious  to  leaving,  Gen. 
McClellan  addressed  the  following  communication  to 
the  Adjutant-  General  of  the  army : 

"  Headquarters  Army  of  thb  Potomac,  ~> 
"  Steamer  Commodore,  April  1,  1862.  * 

"  General:  I  have  to  request  that  you  will  lay  the  follow- 
ing recommendation  before  the  Honorable  Secretary  of  War: 

"The  approximate  nurnbers^and  positions  left  near  and  in 
rear  ot  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  are  about  as  follows: 

"  Gen.  Dix  has,  after  guarding  the  railroads  under  his 
charge,  Bufficreut  troops  to  give  him  5.000  for  the  defense  of 
Baltimore,  and  1,988  available  for  the  Eastern  Shore,  Annapo- 
lis, &.c.  Fort  Delaware  is  jvery  well  garrisoned  by  about  400 
men. 

*'  The  garrisons  of  the  forts  around  Washington  amount  to 
10.000  meD  ;  other  disposable  troops,  with  Gen.  WadBworth, 
beirg  about  11,400. 

"The  troops  employed  in  guarding  the  railways  in  Mary- 
land amount  to  some  3,359  men.  Those  it  is  designed  to  re- 
lieve, being  old  reziments.  by  dismounted  cavalry,  and  to  send 
them  forward  to  Manassa9. 

"  Gen.  Abercoaibie  occupies  Warrenton  with  a  force  which, 
including  Col.  Geary  at  White  Plains,  and  the  cavalry  to  be  at 
his  disposal,  will  amount  to  some  7,730  men,  with  12  pieces  of 
artillery. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  request  that  all  the  troops  organized 
for  service  in  Pennsylvania  aDd  in  New-York,  and  in  many  of 
the  Eastern  States,  may  be  ordered  to  Washington.  1  learn 
from  Gov.  Curtin  that  there  are  some  3,500  men  now  ready  in 
Pennsylvania.  This  force  I  should  be  glad  to  have  sent  at 
once  to  ManasBas.  Four  thousand  men  from  Gen.  Wads- 
worth  I  desire  to  be  ordered  to  Manassas.  These  troops,  with 
the  railroad  guards  above  alluded  to,  will  make  up  a  force, 
under  Gen.  Abercombie,  to  something  like  18,639. 

"  It  is  my  design  to  push  Gen.  blenker's  division  from 
Warrentoa  upon  Strasburg.  He  should  remain  at  Strasburg, 
too,  to  allow  matters  to  assume  a  dehnite  form  in  that  region 
beforo  proceeding  to  his  ultimate  destination. 

"  The  troops  in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah  will  thus  be, 
including  Blenker's  division,  10.1.28  strong,  with  24  pieces  of 
artillery.  Bauks's  filth  corps,  which  embraces  Gen.  Shields's, 
19,687  strong,  with  41  guns;  some  3,652  disposable  cavalry, 
and  the  railroad  guards,  about  2,100  men,  amount  to  about 
35,157  men. 

:*  It  is  designed  to  relieve  Gen.  Hooker  by  some  regiment 
— say  850  men,  leaving,  with  500  cavalry,  1,350  men  "on  tiie 
Lower  Potomac. 
"  To  recapitulate: 

"  At  Warrenton  there  is  to  be   7,780  men. 

At  Manassas  there  is  to  be  10.859  men. 

"  In  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah  35.467  men. 

"  On  the  Lower  Potomac   1.350  men. 

"  In  all  54,456  men. 

"  There  will  thus  be  left  for  the  garrisons  snd  the  front  of 
Washington,  under  Gen.  vVadsworth,  18,000  men,  exclusive 
of  the  batteries  under  instruction. 

"  The  troops  organizing,  or  ready  for  service  in  New-York, 
I  learn  will  probably  number  more  than  4,000.  These  should 
be  assembled  at  Washington,  subject  to  disposition  where 
most  needed.    1  am,  very  respectfully,  vour  obedient  servant, 

"GEORGE  B.  McCLELLAN,  Major-Gen.  Commanding. 

"  Brig-Gen.  Thomas,  Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army." 

This  statement,  to  use  the  expression  of  one  of  the 
witnesses,  was  ''very  indefinite."  Gen.  Wads- 
worth,  who  had  been  ordered  to  take  charge  of  the 
defenses  of  Washington,  upon  learning  the  disposi- 
tions of  troops  proposed  by  Gen.  McClellan,  and 
feeling  the  great  importance  of  the  trust  committed 
to  his  charge,  and  the  total  inadequacy  of  the  means 
provided  him  for  that  purpose,  addressed  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  the  following  communication: 


"  HEADQTJARTER8  MILITARY  DISTRICT  OF  WACHINGTOK,  ) 

"  Washington.  D.  C,  April  2,  1862  5 
"  Sir:  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  condensed 
statements  of  the  forces  left  under  my  command  for  the  de- 
fenses of  Washington: 

Infant-y  15,335 

Artillery   4,294 

Cavalry,  six  companies  only  mounted,   '84« 

Total  20,477 

Deduct  sick  and  hi  arrest  and  eonfinemeat   1,455 

Total  present  for  duty  19,022 

"I  have  no  mounted  light  artillery  under  my  command. 
"  Several  companies  of  the  reserve  artillery  of  the  Army  of 

the  Potomac  are  still  here,  but  not  under  my  command  or  fit 

tor  service. 

"  From  this  force  I  am  ordered  by  Gen.  McClellan  to  detail 
two  regiments  (good  one9)  to  join  Richardson's  division 
(Sumner's  corps)  as  it  paBses  through  Alexandria ;  one  regi- 
ment to  replace  the  37th  New-York  Volunteers  in  Heintzel- 
man's  old  division ;  one  regiment  to  relieve  a  regiment  of 
Hooker's  division  at  Budd'a  ferry — total,  4  regiments. 

"  I  am  further  ordered  tbis  morning  by  telegraph  to  send 
4,000  men  to  relieve  Gen.  Sumner  at  Manassas  and  Warren- 
ton, that  he  may  embark  forthwith. 

"  In  regard  to  the  character  and  efficiency  of  the  troops  under 
my  command,  I  have  to  state  that  nearly  all  the  force  it  new 
anfl  imperfectly  disciplined;  that  several  of  the  regiments  are 
in  a  very  disorganized  condition  from  various  causes,  which 
it  is  not  necessary  to  state  here;  several  regiments  having 
been  relieved  from  brigades,  which  have  gone  into  the  field, 
in  consequence  of  their  unfitness  for  service— the  best  regi- 
ments remaining  having  been  selected  to  take  their  place. 

"  Two  heavy  arillery  regiments,  and  one  infantry  regi- 
ment, which  had  been  drilled  for  some  months  iu  artillery 
service,  have  been  withdrawn  from  the  forts  on  the  south  side 
of  the  Potomac,  and  I  have  only  been  able  to  fill  their  places 
with  very  new  infantry  regiments,  entirely  unacquainted 
with  the  duties  of  that  arm,  and  of  little  or  no  value  in  their 
pre.-ent  position. 

"  I  am  not  informed  a?  to  the  position  which  Major-Gen. 
Banks  is  directed  to  take ;  but  at  this  time  he  is,  as  1  under- 
stand, on  the  other  side  of  the  Bull  Run  mountains,  leaving 
my  command  to  cover  the  front,  from  the  Manassas  Gap 
(about  20  miles  beyond  Manassas)  to  Acquia  Creek. 

"  I  deem  it  my  duty  to  state  that,  looking  at  the  numerical 
strength  aud  character  of  the  force  under  my  command,  it  is 
in  my  judgment  entirely  inadequate  to,  and  unfit  for,  the  im- 
portant duty  to  which  it  is  assigned.  I  regard  it  very  im- 
probable that  the  enemy  will  assail  us  at  thi*  point,  but  thie 
belief  is  based  upon  the  hope  that  they  may  be  promptly  en- 
gaged elsewhere,  and  may  not  learn  the  number  and  the  char- 
acter of  tae  force  left  here. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  be  vonr  obedient  servant, 
"  JAS.  S.  WADSWORTH, 

"  Brig.-Gen.  and  Military  Governor. 

"  Hon.  Secretary  op  War." 

Those  communications  were  brought  to  the  con- 
sideration of  the  President  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 
The  subject  was  at  once  referred  to  the  Adjutant- 
General  of  the  Army,  and  Major-Gen.  E.  A.  Hitch- 
cock, with  instructions  to  report  at  once  whether 
the  orders  of  the  President  had  been  complied  with. 

Their  report  is  as  follows: 

"  Washington.  D.  C,  April  2,  1862—7:40  o'clock. 

"  In  compliance  with  your  instructions,  I  bava  examined 
the  papers  submitted  to  me,  and  have  the  honor  to  make  the 
followir.g  report: 

"  First:  The  President's  war  order,  No.  3,  dated  March  8, 
requires  that  on  taking  up  any  new  base  ot  operations,  the 
City  of  Washington  snail  be  left  entirely  secure.  The  other 
points  of  the  order  it  is  unnecessary  to  consider,  as  the 
enemy,  since  its  date,  have  abandoned  their  positions  and 
batteries  on  the  Potomac,  and  retired  behind  the  Rappa- 
hannock. 

"  Seco?id  :  The  council  cf  general  officers  held  at  Fairfax 
Court-House,  March  13,  took  place  after  the  enemy  had 
retired  from  Manassas  and  destroyed  the  railroad  in  their 
rear.  The  council  decided  unanimously  to  take  up  a  new 
ba?e  of  operations  from  Fort  Monroe,  and  three  of  the  gen- 
erals—a majority — decided  that  the  force  necessary  to  be 
left  should  be  sufficient  to  fully  garrison  the  forts  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Potomac,  and  'to  occupy'  those  on  the  left 
bank,  with  a  covering  force  of  25,000.  It  is.  we  thiuk,  the 
judgment  of  officers,  that  some  30,000  men  would  be  necessary 
thus  to  man  these  forts,  which,  with  the  number  of  the  cover- 
ing force,  would  rr  ake  a  total  of  55,000. 

•'Third:  The  President's  directions  of  March  13  to  Gen. 
McClellan  direct,  first,  to  leave  such  a  force  at  Manassas 
Junction  as  shall  make  it  entirely  certain  that  the  enemy 
may  not  repossess  it ;  second,  that  W  ashington  shall  be  left 
entirely  secure;  third,  that  the  remainder  of  tne  army  move 
down  the  Potomac,  or  move  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  In 
regard  to  occupying  Manassas  Junction,  as  the  enemy  have 
destroyed  the  railroads  leading  to  it,  it  may  be  fair  to  a* snme 
that  they  have  no  intention  of  returning  for  the  reoccupation 
of  their  late  position,  and  therefore  no  very  large  force  would 
be  necessary  to  hold  that  position. 

"Fourth:  Major-General  McClellan's  report  to  the  Adju- 
tant-General, of  April  1,  after  giving  the  several  positions  #f 
the  troops  proposed  to  be  left  for  the  defense  of  Washington, 


0 


gives  a  representation  as  follows:  At  Warreuton  there  is 
to  be  7,7<i0;  at  Manatsaa,  siy,  10,059;  iu  the  valley  of 
the  Shenandoah,  33,467;  on  the  Lower  Potomac, 
1,350.  Total  in  all,  55,150.  And  there  would 
be  left  for  the  garrisons  and  the  front  of  Washington,  under 
Gen.  VVadsworth,  some  18,000.  In  the  above  enumeration, 
Gen.  Banks's  Army  Corps  ia  included ;  but  whether  this  corps, 
operating  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  should  be  regarded  a*  a 
part  of  tiie  force  available  for  the  protection  of  the  imme- 
diate front  of  Washington,  the  undersigned  express  no 
opinion. 

"  Fifth:  Gen.  Wadsworth's  roport  of  April  2d  gives  his 
force  as  follows:  infantry,  15,335;  artillery,  4,491;  civalry, 
858 — six  coruniuies  only  being  mounted,    Total,  20,477. 

"  Deduct  sick,  in  arrest  and  confinement,  1,455.  Total  for 
duty,  19.022. 

"From  this  force  Gen.  Wadsworth  is  directed  to  detach 
two  good  regiments  to  Richardson's  division,  Sumner's  corps, 
which  should  be  deducted  from  his  command,  one  regiment 
to  reptece  the  37th  New- York,  in  Heintzelmm's  old  division, 
and  one  to  relieve  a  regiment  of  Hooker's  division  at  Budd's 
Ferry — total,  four  regiment*. 

"  It  is  also  ordered  to  send  4,000  men  to  relieve  Sumner  at 
Manassas  and  Warreuton.  Gen.  Wadsworth  represents  that 
he  ha*  no  mounted  light  artillery  under  bis  command  ;  states 
that  there  were  several  companies  of  reserve  artillery  still 
here,  but  not  under  his  command,  or  fit  for  service. 

"  Gen.  Wadsworth  further  reports  that  nearly  all  the  force 
is  new  and  imperfectly  disciplined  ;  that  several  of  the  regi- 
ments are  in  a  very  disorganized  condition,  some  of  them  hav- 
ing been  relieved  from  brigades  which  have  gone  into  the 
field,  in  consequence  of  their  unfitness  for  service,  the  best 
regiments  remaining  having  been  selected  to  take  their  place  ; 
two  heavy  artillery  regiments  and  one  infautry  regiment, 
which  had  been  drilled  for  months  in  artillery  service,  having 
been  withdrawn  from  the  forts  on  the  south  side  of  the  Poto- 
mac, and  their  places  supplied  with  new  infantry  regiments, 
entirely  unacquainted  with  the  duties  of  that  arm,  and  of  lit- 
tle or  no  value  in  their  present  position.  If  there  was  need 
of  a  military  force  for  the  safety  of  the  City  of  Washington 
within  its  own  limits,  that  referred  to  in  the  report  of  Gen. 
Wadsworth  would  seem  to  be  entirely  inadequate. 

"In  view  of  the  opinion  expressed  by  the  council  of  the 
commanders  of  army  corps  of  the  force  necessary  for  the  de- 
fense of  the  capital,  though  not  numerically  stated,  and  of  the 
force  represented  by  Gen.  McClellan  as  left  for  that  purpose, 
we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  requirements  of  the  President, 
that  the  city  shall  be  left  'entirely  secure.'  not  only  in  the 
opiuion  of  the  geueral-in-chief,  but  that  of  the  '  commanders 
of  the  army  corps  '  also,  has  not  been  fully  complied  with. 

"  All  of  which  is  respectfully  submitted. 

•'  L.  THOMAS,  Adjt.-Gen. 

"  E.  A.  HITCHCOCK,  Msj.-Gen.  U.  S.  A." 

THE  .PRESIDENT  PROTECTS  THE  CAPITAL. 
The  day  after  this  report  was  written,  the  Presi- 
dent directed  the  Secretary  of  War  to  order  one  corps 
of  ihe  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  remain  in  front  of 
Washington  until  further  orders.  The  corps  of  Gen. 
McDowell,  being  the  only  corps  remaiuiug  intact 
here,  was  selected  to  remain,  without  the  knowledge 
of  Gen.  McDowell,  he  being  engaged,  at  the  time  of 
receiving  this  order,  in  making  preparations  to  im- 
mediately follow  the  rest  of  the  army  to  the  penin- 
sula. 

THE  PENINSULA  CAMPAIGN. 

Gen.  Heintzelman,  v^o  commanded  the  first 
troops  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac  that  landed  on  the 
peninsula,  arrived  at  Portress  Monroe  on  the  23d  of 
March,  two  weeks  after  the  evacuation  of  Manassas. 
He  had  orders  to  encamp  as  near  Portress  Monroe 
as  possible,  in  order  that  the  enemy  should  have  no 
idea  of  the  direction  iu  which  the  army  was  to 
move,  whether  toward  Yorktown  or  Norfolk.  Gen. 
Heintzelman  states  that  shortly  after  landing  he  ob- 
tained information  that  the  enemy  had  not  more 
than  10,000  troops  at  Yorktown  and  on  the  Peninsu- 
la, and  is  satisfied  that  he  could  have  advanced  and 
isolated  Yorktown,  in  which  case  there  would  have 
been  no  serious  obstacle  in  the  way  of  proceeding  di- 
rectly to  Richmond.  On  the  27th  of  March  be  sent 
out  reconnoitering  parties  as  far  as  Big  Bethel  and 
Watt's  Creek,  and  went  near  the  Half  way  House, 
where  about  400  of  the  enemy,  and  a  little*  artillery 
were  seen.  He  telegraphed  to  Gen.  McCieliau  what 
he  was  doing,  aud  received  a  dispatch,  in  reply,  that 
he  (Gen.  McClellan)  hoped  that  nothing  had  been 
done  to  <jive  the  enemy  information  of  the  line  of 
operations  of  the  army.  The  reconnoissauce  was 
then  withdrawn. 

Troops  continued  to  arrive  at  Fortress  Monroe, 
and  on  the  2d  of  Aprh  Gen.  McClellan  himself  ar- 
rived. On  the  4th  of  April  the  army  commenced  its 
movement  in  the  direction  of  Yorktown,  and  on  the 


5th  appeared  before  the  enemy's  lines.  Gen.  ? Mc- 
Clellan states  that  he  moved  from  Portress  Monroe 
sooner  than  he  otherwise  would  have  done,  upon 
hearing  that  the  enemy  were  sending  down  re-en- 
forcements. 

DELAY  BEFORE  YORKTOWN. 
All  the  testimony  goes  to  prove  tint  when  our 
troops  first  landed  on  the  Peninsula  the  force  of  the 
enemy  there  consisted  of  Magruder's  command,  vari- 
ously estimated  at  from  7,000  to  12,000  men,  except 
by  Gen.  McClellan,  who  estimates  it  from  15,00 J  to 
20,000.  The  Hon.  Lemuel  J.  Bowden,  United  States 
Senator  from  Virginia — then  living  within  the  Rebel 
lines,  near  Williamsburg — testifies  that  the  Rebels 
did  not  determine  to  re-enforce  Magruder  until  it 
was  apparent  that  our  forces  intended  to  stop  be- 
fore Yorktown  and  commence  a  regular  siege  of  the 
place.  It  is  now  evident,  whatever  may  have  been 
the  opinion  of  our  officers  at  the  time,  tbat  our  forces, 
when  they  first  appeared  before  Yorktown,  could 
have  pierced  the  line  of  works  across  Ike  Peninsula 
there  without  much  difficulty,  isolating  Yorktown, 
and  cutting  off  re-enforcements,  when  theplace  must 
have  fallen  in  a  very  short  time.  Some  of  oar  Gene- 
rals expected  and  desired  that  that  should  be  done. 
Gen.  Heintzelman  forwarded  to  Gen.  McClelUn  the 
application  of  Gen.  Hamilton,  commanding  a  divi- 
sion, for  permission  to  force  the  enemy's  lines.  No 
answer  was  received  to  the  application. 

HOW  MANY  TROOPS  M'CLELLAX  HAD. 
Instead  ol  that,  however,  a  siege  was  determined 
upon,  contrary  to  the  desire  of  the  President,  who, 
as  early  as  the  9th  of  April,  wrote  to  Gen.  McClel- 
lan as  follows: 

"There  is  a  curious  mystery  about  the  number  of  troops 
now  with  you.  I  telegraphed  you  on  the  6th,  urging  that  you 
had  over  100,000  with  jou.  I  had  just  obtained  from  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  a  statement,  taken,  as  he  said,  from  your  own 
returns,  making  103,000  then  with  you  and  euMroute  to  you. 
You  now  say  that  you  will  have  not  85,000,  when  all  en  route 
to  you  shall  have  reached  you.  How  can  this  discrepancy  of 
25,000  be  accounted  for  ?  As  to  Geu.  Wool's  command,  I  un- 
derstand it  is  doiog  for  yoa  precisely  what  a  like  number  of 
your  own  would  have  to  do  if  that  command  was  away. 

"  I  suppose  the  whole  force  which  has  gone  forward  to  yoo 
is  with  you  by  this  time,  and  if  so,  I  thiuK.  it  is  the  precise 
time  for  you  to  strike  a  blow.  By  delay  the  enemy  will 
steadily  gain  on  you— that  is,  he  will  gain  faster  by  fortifica- 
tions and  re-enforcements  than  you  can  by  re-enforcementa 
alone. 

"  And,  once  more,  let  me  tell  you  it  is  iadispensable  to  you 
that  you  strike  a  biow.  I  am  powerless"  to  help  this. 
You  will  do  me  the  justice  to  remember  I  always  wished  not 
going  down  tiae  bay  iu  search  of  a  field,  instead  of  fighting  at 
or  near  Manassas,  as  only  shifting  aud  not  surmounting  a  dif- 
ficulty;  that  we  should  find  the  same  enemy  and  the  same  or 
equal  intrenchmeuts  at  either  place.  The  country  willnot fail 
to  note — is  noting  now — that  the  present  hesitation  to  move 
upon  an  intrenched  position  is  but  the  story  of  Manassas  re- 
peated." 

And  the  repetition  was  made  complete  nearly  a 
month  later,  when  the  euemy,  in  the  face  of  a  su- 
perior force,  evacuated  their  works  without  loss  and 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  general  commanding 
our  army. 

M'CLELLAN  WANTS  MORE  TROOPS. 
Gen.  McClellan,  however,  did  not  deem  his  forces 
sufficient,  and  objected  very  strongly  to  the  order  of 
the  President  detaching  MeDoweli's  corps  for  the 
defense  of  Washington,  as  "  imperiling  tne  success 
of  our  cause."  He  called  again  and  again  for  re- 
enforcements,  asking  for  Franklin's  and  McCail's 
Divisions  of  McDowell's  corps,  to  be  under  com- 
mand of  Franklin ;  insisting  tnat  Franklin's  Divis- 
ion, at  least,  should  be  sent  to  him.  On  the  11th 
of  April  Franklin's  Division  was  ordered  to  Alex- 
andria to  embark  for  Fort  Monroe.  On  the  14th, 
Gen.  Franklin  reported  to  Gen.  McClellan  near 
Yorktown,  but  his  troops  remained  on  board  the 
transports  until  after  the  enemy  evacuated  the  place, 
when  they  were  ordered  to  West  Point. 

HE  WANTS  TRANSPORTATION. 
On  the  6th  of  April  Gen.  McClellan  telegraphed 
to  the  President,  "  I  have  by  no  means  the  trans- 
portation I  must  have  to  move  my  army  even  a  few 
miles; "  and  asks  that  all  his  orders  for  wagon  trains, 


10 


&c,  may  at  once  be  complied  with.  Ail  "was  sent 
to  him  as  desired,  until  even  Gen.  McDowell  found 
himself  so  stripped  of  the  transportation  designed 
for  his  corps,  that  when  he  moved  to  Fredericksburg 
it  was  with  the  greatest  difficulty  he  could  move 
supplies  for  his  small  force  from  Acquia  to  Falmouth 
until  the  railroad  was  completed. 

A  month  was  spent  before  Yorktown-,  our  army, 
in  the  opinion  of  come  of  our  ablest  officers,  becom- 
ing more  demoralized  by  the  labors  of  a  long  siege 
than  it  would  have  been  even  by  an  unsuccessful 
assault. 

The  returns  in  the  Adjntant-Geueral's  office, 
signed  by  Gen.  McClellan  and  his  Adjutant-General, 
show  that  on  the  30th  of  April,  1862,  the  forces  on 
the  Peninsula  under  Gen.  McClellan  amounted  to 
112,392  present  for  duty. 

HE  WANTS  GUNS. 

On  the  1st  of  May  the  President  telegraphs  to 
Gen.  McClellan:  "Your  call  for  Parrott  guns  from 
Washington  alarms  me,  chiefly  because  it  argnes  in- 
definite procrastination.  Is  anything  to  be  done?" 
YORKTOWN  EVACUATED — M'CLELLAN  CHA- 
GRINED. 

On  the  night  of  the  3d  and  the  morning  of  the  4th 
of  May,  the  enemy  evacuated  Yorktown  without 
loss.  One  of  the  witnesses  testifies  that  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan was  very  much  chagrined  and  mortified  at 
the  evacuation,  as  he  had  made  his  preparations  to 
open  from  Lis  latteries  on  Monday,  the  5th  of  May. 
PURSUIT  OF  THE  REBELS. 

The  evacuation  was  discovered  by  day  light  on  the 
morning  of  the  4th.  Between  10  and  11  o'clock, 
Gen.  Stoneman,  with  the  cavalry  and  sotte  Jight 
horse  artillery,  started  in  pursuit.  About  1  o'clock, 
Gen.  Hooker,  with  his  division,  le«rt  Yorktown,  with 
orders  to  bupport  Gen.  Stoneman.  Gens.  Sumner, 
Heiutzelmau  and  Keyes  also  moved  out  during  the 
day,  with  the  whole  or  portions  of  their  corps. 
About  five  miles  from  Yorktown  the  division  of  Gen. 
Hooker  was  delayed  for  some  time  in  consequence  of 
other  troops,  couiing  from  another  direction,  getting 
into  the  road  before  him. 

In  the  meantime  Gen.  Stoneman  had  overtaken 
the  rear  of  the  enemy  with  his  cavalry,  and  followed 
them  up  closely,  keeping  up  a  running  fire  all  the 
time,  until  the  enemy  reacned  their  woiks  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Williamsburg,  when  the  pursuit  was 
checked.  Gov.  Sprague  was  sent  back  to  hurry  up 
the  infantry  support  under  Gen.  Hooker.  After  Con- 
siderable delay,  finding  it  impossible  to  pass  the 
troops  ahead  of  him,  Gen.  Hooker  turned  off  and 
proceeded  by  another  road,  of  which  he  had  obtained 
information  from  some  of  the  inhabitants;  marched 
till  11  o'clock  that  night,  renewed  the  march  at  dav- 
light,  and  came  up  to  the  advanced  works  of  the 
enemy  a  li;  tie  after  7  o'clock,  about  half  a  mile  from 
Fort  Magruder,  and  at  once  engaged  ths  enemy. 
BATTLE  OF  WILLIAMSBURG. 

There  seems  to  have  been  great  misapprehension 
and  confusion  in  relation  to  the  management  of  the 
troops  at  Williamsburg.  When  the  pursuit  first 
commenced  on  Sunday,  Gen.  Heintzelman  was  in- 
structed by  Gen.  McClellan  to  take  charge  of  oper- 
ations in  front.  On  the  morning  of  Monday  orders 
were  sent  to  Gen.  Sumner  to  take" the  command; 
Gen.  McClellan  remained  behind  in  Yorktown  to 
superintend  the  sending  of  two  divisions  up  the 
York  River  to  West  Point.  A  heavy  rain  set  in  on 
Sunday,  rendering  the  roads  almost  impracticable 
for  the  passage  of  troops.  The  troops  of  the  differ- 
ent commands  became  mingled — divisions  and  brig- 
ades, to  some  extent,  were  separated  from  each 
other — and  it  seems  to  have  been  difficult  to  get  the 
troops  up  in  time. 

During  Monday  forenoon  Gen.  Hooker,  finding 
himself  hard  pressed  by  the  enemy,  ai.d  understand- 
ing that  Geu.  Sumner  had  30,000  troops  with  him, 
seut  repeatedly  for  reinforcements.  So  did  Gen. 
Stoneman  and  Gen.  Heintzelman,  but  no  reeuforce- 
ments  arrived.  Gen.  Sumner  states  that,  haviog 
sent  Gen.  Hancock  to  the  right,  he  had  at  the  center 


only  about  3,000  infantry — the  cavalry  there  not  be- 
iner  fitted  for  operations  against  the  enemy,  on  ac- 
count of  the  country  being  so  wooded.  Upon  re- 
ceiving the  call  for  reinforcements  to  be  sent  to  the 
left  to  Gen.  Hooker,  be  sent  staff  officers  to  hurry 
up  troops  from  the  rear,  his  own  corps  being  some 
ten  miles  off,  and  ordered  Kearney  to  re-enforce 
Hooker.  Re-enforcements  not  coming  up  to  Gen. 
Hooker  as  soon  as  needed,  or  perhaps  expected,  the 
Piince  de  Joinville  and  Gov.  Sprague  went  to  York- 
town  to  urge  Gen.  McClellan  to  come  up  to  the 
front,  and  take  charge  of  matters  there.  Gov. 
Sprague  arrived  at  Yorktown  about  1  o'clock,  hav- 
ing been  about  an  hour  in  going  down.  He  testifies 
that  when  Gen.  McClellan  was  told  the  condition  of 
affairs  at  the  front,  he  remarked  that  he  had  sup- 
posed "  those  in  front  could  attend  to  that  little  mat- 
ter." After  some  time  Gen.  McClellan  started  from 
Yorktown,  and  reached  the  viciuity  of  Williamsburg 
about  5  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 

HOOKER  DOES  THE  FIGHTING. 
By  that  time  Gen.  Kearnej-  had  rea  -1  ed  the 
field  and  re-enforced  Gen.  Hooker,  taking  command, 
being  the  senior  in  rank  to  Gen.  Hooker.  Gen. 
Hancock  h;,d  been  engaged  on  the  right,  but,  upon 
being  re-enforced,  had  succeeded  in  repulsing  the  en- 
emy, losing  about  forty  men.  The  principal  fighting 
was  dene  by  the  troops  under  Gen.  Hooker,  his  di- 
vision sustaining  a  loss  of  about  1,700  men.  Before 
he  was  re-enforced,  his  troops  were  obliged  to  hold 
their  position  with  the  bayonet  and  such  ammuni- 
tion as  the  men  could  obtain  from  the  bodii  s  of  those 
who  had  fallen,  the  roads  being  so  muddy  that  it 
was  impostible  to  bring  up  fresh  ammunition. 

RETREAT  AND  PURSUIT. 

That  nigbt  the  enemy  evacuated  their  position  at 
Williamsburg.  Gen.  McClellan  states  that  after  he 
arrived  on  the  fieli  he  was  so  satisfied  that  the  ene- 
my had  been  beaten  and  would  be  compelled  to  evac- 
uate their  position  that  night  or  be  takeo  at  a  great 
disadvantage,  i  hat  he  countermanded  orders  to  the 
divisions  of  Richardson  and  Sedgwick  and  sent  them 
back  to  Yorktown. 

The  next  day  the  pursuit  was  continued  for  a 
short  distance  by  Gen.  Stoneman  and  the  cavalry, 
with  a  small  body  of  infantry.  Several  of  the  Gen- 
erals testify  that,  had  the  enemy  been  promptly  fol- 
lowed up  after  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  they 
could  hove  been  followed,  right  into  Richmond — one 
of  them  says  without  firing  a  gun.  Gen.  McClel- 
lan says  that  the  roads  were  so  bad,  in  consequence 
of  the  rains,  tbat  it  was  impracticable  to  make  a 
vigorous  pursuit. 

The  battle  of  Williamsburg  appears  to  have  beea 
fought  under  many  and  serious  disadvantages. 
.No  hing  was  known  of  the  nature  of  the  country  or 
the  defensive  works  of  the  enemy  until  our  troops 
arrived  before  them;  there  was  no  controlling 
mind  in  charge  of  the  movements;  there  was  uncer- 
tainty in  regaid  to  who  was  in  command;  each  Gen- 
eral fought  as  he  considered  best  j  and,  by  tke  time 
the  General  Commanding  appeared  on  tlicfield,  the 
pi  iucipal  part  of  the  fighting  was  over. 

FURTHER  DELAY. 

Some  three  or  four  days  were  spent  at  Williams* 
burg  tor  the  purpose  of  bringing  up  supplies,  &c, 
and  then  the  line  of  march  was  taken  up  for  the 
Chickahominy.  It  was  about  the  time  "that  the 
army  left  Williamsburg  that  Norfolk  was  taken 
and  the  Merritnac  destroyed.  But  preparations  had 
been  made  before  those  events  occurred  to  have  sup- 
plies sent  up  York  River  instead  of  the  James,  and 
the  line  afterwards  followed  was  adopted.  The 
consequence  was  that  the  gunboats  were  of  little  or 
no  service  in  tbe  operations  against  Richmond,  and 
remaned  entirely  inactive,  except  in  some  opera- 
tions agaiust  Fort  Darling,  until  they  were  called 
upon  to  proteci  the  army  when,  in  July,  it  fell  back 
to  the  James  River. 

The  distance  between  Williamsburg  and  the  line 
of  operations  on  the  Chickahominy  was  from  forty 
to  fifty  miles,  and  the  army  was  most  two  weeks 


11 


in  moving  that  distance.  The  firet  troops  that 
crossed  the  Chickahominy  were  the  corps  of  General 
Keyes,  which  crossed  on  the  24  ifa  of  May,  followed 
by  "the  corps  of  Gen.  Heintzelman  on  the  25th. 
The  rest  of  onr  army  remained  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Chickahominy  until  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks, 
when  the  orps  of  Gen.  Sumner  crossed  to  the  as- 
sistance of  Gene.  Heintzelman  and  Keyes. 
MCCLELLAN  STILL  CALLING  FOR  MORE  TROOPS. 

Gen.  M'Clellan  continued  calling  for  re-enforce- 
ments, representing  that  the  force  of  the  enemy  in 
his  front  was  superior  to  his  own,  and  that  the 
force  un  ier  Gen.  McDowell  would  do  more  for  the 
protection  of  Washington,  if  sent  to  his  army,  than 
in  any  other  position  in  which  it  could  be  placed. 
In  a  letter  written  on  the  21st  of  May  he  asks  that 
Gen.  McDowell's  corp3  be  sent  to  him  by  water 
rather  than  by  land,  as  the  more  expeditions  mode, 
and  that  he  and  his  forces  be  explicitly  placed  under 
his  orders,  "in  the  ordinary  way."  He  closes  his 
letter  by  saying: 

"  I  believe  there  is  agre  it  struggle  before  this  army,  but  I 
am  neither  dismayed  nor  discouraged.  I  wish  to  strengthen 
its  force  as  much  as  I  can;  but,  in  any  event,  I  shall  fight  it 
with  all  the  skill.,  and  caution,  and  determination  that  I  pos- 
sess. And  I  trust  that  the  result  may  either  obtain  for«e  the 
permaneut  confidence  of  my  Government,  or  that  it  may  close 
my  career." 

In  reply  to  the  request  of  General  McClellan  that 
General  McDowell  should  j-un  nis  forces  by  water, 
the  President  states,  on  the  21st  of  May: 

"  McDowell  can  reach  you.  by  laud  sooner  than  he  could  get 
aboard  of  boats  if  the  boats  were  ready  at  Fredericksburg, 
uuless  his  march  shall  be  resisted,  in  which  case  the  force  re- 
sisting him  will  not  be  confronting  you  at  Richmond.  By  land 
he  will  reach  you  in  five  days  after  starting;  whereas,  by 
water,  he  would  not  roach  you  in  t*vo  weeks,  judging  by  past 
experieuje.  Franklin's  single  division  did  not  reach  you  in 
ten  days  after  I  ordered  it." 

JACKSON  IN  THE  SHENANDOAH. 
Preparations  were  accordingly  made  for  General 
McDowell  to  leave  Fredericksburg  on  the  25th  of 
May  to  join  Gen.  McClellau.  Just  at  that  time, 
however,  Jackson  commenced  his  expedition  down 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  Gen.  McDowell,  to- 
gether with  Gen.  Fremont,  from  Western  Virginia, 
was  sent  to  the  assistance  of  Gen.  Banks,  and  to  in- 
tercept Jackson  in  his  retreat.  Upon  being  informed 
of  this,  Gen.  McClellan  replied  that  the  movement 
of  Jackson  wa3  probably  intended  to  prevent  re- 
enforcements  being  sent  to  him.  The  President  re- 
plied, giving  him  full  information  as  to  the  condition 
of  affairs  in  the  valley,  and  closed  by  saying: 

•*  If  McDowell's  force  was  now  beyond  our  reach  we  should 
be  utterly  helpless.  Apprehensions  of  something  like  this, 
and  no  unwillingness  to  sustain  you,  has  always  been  my  rea- 
son for  withholding  McDowell's  force  from  you.  Please  un- 
derstand this,  and  do  the  best  yon  can  with  the  forces  yoa  now 
have" 

BATTLE  OF  SEVEN  PINES. 

On  the  31st  of  May  and  the  1st  of  June  the  bat- 
tles of  Seven  Pines  and  Fair  Oaks  were  fought.  As 
there  has  been  so  much  controversy  in  regard  to  the 
conduct  of  some  of  the  troops  engaged  in  that  bat- 
tle, your  Committee  will  refer  more  particularly  to 
the  testimony  of  Gen.  Casey,  who  commanded  the 
advanced  division,  upon  which  the  attack  was  first 
made.  Gen.  Cisey  states  that,  when  the  cacnpaign 
of  the  Peninsula  commenced,  his  division  consisted 
principally  of  raw  and  inexperienced  troops.  They 
had  Buffered  greatly  from  the  labors  and  exposures 
incident  upon  the  siege  of  Yorstown  and  the  ad- 
vance of  the  troops  up  the  Peninsula.  Some  of  them 
had  been  for  weeks  without  shelter,  being  com- 
pelled to  leave  their  camp  equipage  behind  when 
ordered  on  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  after  the  evacu- 
aton  of  Yorktown.  That  division  took  the  lead 
across  the  Chickahonmiy,  taking  up  a  position 
at  Seven  Pines,  where  it  established  itself  by  throw- 
ing up  intrenohmenta  and  cutting  abatis. 

A  few  days  before  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines,  con- 
trary to  the  advice  and  opinion  of  Gen.  Key  eg  and 
Gen.  Casey,  the  division  was  ordered  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  io  the  front,  within  six  miles  of  Richmond, 
his  pickets  extending  within  hve  miles.  They  had 
no  support  on  their  right  or  their  left,  the  remainder 
•f  the  corps  to  which  they  belonged  (Keyes's)  being 


in  their  rear.  They  at  once  commenced  digging  rifle- 
pits  and  cutting  abatis,  the  pickets  at  night  being  at- 
tacked l»v  the  enemy,  who  were  repulsed.  About 
11  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  31st  the  pickets  re- 
ported the  enemy  approaching,  and  an  aid  of  Gen. 
Johnston  was  capturedjand  brought  in  with  import- 
ant papers  upon  him,  Gen.  Casey,  with  this  aid 
and  nis  general  officer  of  the  day,  went  to  Gen. 
Keyes  and  reported  the  circumstances  to  him.  Gen. 
Keyes  testifies  that  for  some  days  before  the  attack 
he  sent  to  Gen.  McClellau  reports  of  his  condition, 
the  threatening  attitude  of  the  enemy  in  his  imme- 
diate vicinity,  and  urged  that  Gen.  Sumner  be  sent 
across  to  his  support.  This  was  not  done,  however, 
until  after  the  attack  commenced.  Reports  continued 
to  come  in  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy.  The  di- 
vision was  called  out  and  formed,  the  working  men 
called  in,  and  preparations  made  to  meet  the  coming 
attack.  Two  lines  of  battle  were  formed — one  in 
the  rifle-pits,  and  another  about  one-third  of  a  mile 
in  advance — composed  of  five  or  six  regiments  aud 
four  pices  of  artillery.  A  regiment  had  previously 
been  sent  out  to  support  the  pickets.  About  20  min- 
utes to  1  o'clock  the  enemy  commenced  the  attack 
in  force,  s  ipposed  to  amount  to  about  35,000  men, 
attacking  in  front  and  on  both  flanks.  After  fight- 
ing for  some  time,  the  enemy  continuing  to  come  on 
in  force,  the  forces  in  front  fell  back  to  the  rifle-pits, 
aud  fought  there  until  nearly  surrounded.  Re-en- 
forcements had  been  promised,  and  Gen.  Casey  had 
selected  the  position  to  which  they  were  to  be  as- 
signed; but  no  re-euforcement6  came  up  to  his  posi- 
tion until  just  before  he  was  forced  to  fall  back  f  rom 
his  second  line,  when  a  single  regiment  arrived.  Af- 
ter about  three  hours'  lighting  the  division  fell  back 
from  its  second  line  with  a  loss  of  1.433  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing.  In  the  course  of  an  hour 
after  Casey's  division  had  been  driven  back,  the  re- 
mainder of  our  forces  were  swept  back  from  a  mile 
aud  a  half  to  two  miles  from  Casey's  first  liue,  when 
the  enemy  were  checked,  and  the  fighting  ceased  for 
the  day. 

During  the  battle  Gen.  Sumner,  whose  corps  was 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Chickahomiuy,  was  ordered 
by  Gen.  McClellan  to  hold  his  forces  in  readiuess  to 
cross.  Gen.  Sumner  not  only  did  that,  but  at  once 
called  out  his  forces  and  moved  them  until  the  heads 
of  the  columns  were  at  the  bridges  ready  to  cross, 
thereby  saving  between  one  and  two  hours.  When 
the  order  came  to  cross  he  immediately  moved  his 
forces  in  the  direction  of  the  field  of  battle,  came  up 
with  and  engaged  the  enemy,  and  relieved  the  pres- 
sure upon  the  troops  engaged  upon  his  left. 

BATTLE  OF  FAIR  OAKS. 

The  next  day,  the  1st  of  June,  the  enemy  attacked 
Gen.  Sumner  st  Fair  Oaks.  Gen.  Hooker,  who  had 
been  ordere  i  forward  the  day  before  by  Gen.  Heint- 
zelman with  one-half  of  his  division,  hearing  the 
firing  of  the  enemy  upon  Gen.  Sumner's  forces,  pro- 
ceded  at  once  in  that  direction  aud  engaged  the 
enemy.  In  a  short  time  the  enemy  were  repulsed, 
and  fell  back  in  confusion.  There  waB  no  communi- 
cation between  the  forces  under  Gen.  Sumner  and 
those  under  Gen.  Heiutzeluian  (Hooker's),  but  each 
fought  as  he  deemed  beat  under  the  circumstances. 
Gen.  McClellan  was  with  the  main  part  of  the  army 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Chickahomiuy.  After  the 
fighting  was  ovtr  he  came  across  to  tie  right  bank 
of  the  river. 

HOOKER'S  RECONNOISSANCE. 

On  the  morning  of  Monday  Gen.  Heintzelman 
ordered  Gen.  Hooker  to  make  a  reconnaissance  in 
force,  which  he  did,  advancing  to  within  lour  miles 
of  Richmond,  meeting  with  no  resistance  except  a 
little  from  the  enemy's  pickets.  Upon  being  in- 
formed by  Gen.  Heiutzelmau  of  what  he  had  done, 
Gen.  McClellan  ordered  the  troops  to  be  recalled  and 
occupy  the  position  that  had  been  held  by  Casey's 
division. 

The  officers  engaged  in  that  battle,  who  have  been 
examined,  testify  that  the  army  could  have  pushed 
right  on  to  the  City  of  Richmond  with  htlle  resist- 
a?icc;  that  the  enemy  were  very  much  broken  and 
demoralized,  throwing  away  arms,  clothing,  &c, 


12 


that  mi<?ht  impede  their  flight.  Gen.  McClellan 
seems  to  have  contemplated  an  immediate  move- 
ment upon  Richmond,  for,  the  day  after  the  battle, 
June  2,  he  writes  to  the  Secretary  of  War: 

41  The  enemy  attacked  in  force  aid  with  great  spirit  yester- 
day morning,  but  are  everywhere  mo.-t  signally  repulsed  with 
great  loss.  Our  troops  charged  frequently  on  both  days,  aud 
uniformly  broke  the' enemy.  The  result  is,  that  our  left  is 
within  four  miles  of  Richmond.  I  only  wait  for  the  river  to 
fall  to  cross  with  the  reBt  of  the  force  and  ma"e  a  general  at- 
tack. Should  I  find  them  holding  firm  iu  a  very  strong  posi- 
tion, I  may  wait  for  what  troops  I  can  bring  up  from  Fort 
Monroe.  But  the  morale  of  my  troops  is  now  such  that  I  can 
venture  much.  I  do  not  fear  for  odds  against  me.  The  vic- 
tory is  complete,  aud  all  credit  is  due  to  the  gallantry  of  our 
officeisaud  men." 

The  movement  was  not  made,  however,  as  Gen. 
McClellan  states,  because  of  the  high  stage  of  water 
and  the  bad  roads. 

MORE  RE-ENFORCEMENTS. 

On  the  6th  of  June  McCall's  division  of  Gen. 
McDowell's  corps  was  ordered  to  join  the  army  on 
the  peniueula.  On  the  8th  of  June  Gen.  Mc'Clellan 
telegraphs:  "  I  shall  be  in  perfect  readiness  to  move 
forward  and  take  Richmond  the  moment  that  Mc- 
Call  reaches  here  and  the  ground  will  admit  the 
passage  of  artillery."  On  the  10th  or  11th  of  June 
McCall's  troops  commenced  arriving  at  the  White 
House. 

Preparations  continued  to  be  made  in  Washington 
to  send  down  by  laud  from  Fredericksburg  the  re- 
mainder of  Gen.  McDowell's  corps,  he  being  direct- 
ed to  co-operate  fully  with  Gen.  McClellan,  but  re- 
taining an  independent  command.  This  does  not 
appear  to  have  been  in  accordance  with  General 
McClellan's  wishes;  for,  on  the  16th  of  June,  he 
telegraphs  to  the  Secretary  of  War: 

*'  It  ought  to  be  distinctly  understood  that  McDowell  aud 
his  troo;  s  ara  completely  under  my  control.  I  received  a 
telegram  from  him  requesting  that  McCall's  division  migit  bo 
placed  so  as  to  join  liim  immediately  upon  his  arrival.  That 
request  does  m>t  breathe  the  proper  spirit;  whatever  troops 
come  to  me  must  be  disposed  of  so  as  to  do  the  most  good, 
I  do  not  feel  ?i  at  in  such  circumstances  as  those  in  which  I 
am  now  plac.  'eu.  Ml  Dowell  should  wish  the  general  in- 
terest to  be  aa  iced  tcr  the  purpose  of  increasing  his  com- 
mand. If  I  t  fully  control  all  his  troops  1  want  none  of 
them,  but  wouiu  prefer  to  fight  the  battle  with  what  I  have, 
and  let  others  be  .  ^sponsible  lor  the  results." 

On  the  ISrh  of  June,  Gen.  McClellan  telegraphs  to 
the  Secretary  ef  War  that  he  has  received  informa- 
tion from  deserters  to  the  effect  that  troops  have  left 
Richmond  to  re- enforce  Jackson;  that  the  movement 
commenced  on  the  8th ;  and  that  if  re-enforcements 
have  gone  to  Jackson,  they  are  probably  not, 
less  than  10,000  men;  that  be  cannot  vouch  for  the 
truth  of  toe  statement,  but  that  it  seems  pretty  cer- 
tain that  it  is  believed  in  Richmond  and  among  the 
Rebel  troops.  To  this  the  President  replies,  on  the 
same  day,  that  the  information  is  corroborated  by  a 
dispatch'  from  Gen.  King  at  Fredericksburg,  and  re- 
marks: "  If  this  is  true,  it  is  as  good  as  a  re- 
enforcenent  to  you  of  an  equal  force." 

On  the  same  day  Gen.  McClellan  telegraphs  to  the 
President : 

"  A  generil  eugseement  may  take  place  at  any  hour.  An 
advance  by  us  involves  a  battle  more  or  less  decisive.  The 
enemy  exhibit  at  every  point  a  readiness  to  meet  us.  They 
certainly  htve  great  numbers  and  extensive  works.  If  ten  or 
fifteen  thoustnd  men  have  left  Richmond  to  re-euforce  Jack- 
ton,  it  illustrates  their  strength  aDd  confidence.  After  to-mor- 
row we  ahall  fight  tbe  Rebel  af  my  as  soon  as  Providence  will 
permit.  We  shall  await  only  a  favorable  condition  of  the 
eaith  and  sky,  and  the  completion  of  some  necessary  pre- 
liminaries.'' 

STRENGTH  OF  THE  ARMY. 
The  returns  of  Gen.  McClellan  to  the  Adjutant- 
General's  office  give  the  following  as  the  strength  of 
the  army  on  the  peninsula  on  the  20th  of  June : 
Present  for  duty,  115.102;  special  duty,  sick  and  in 
arrest,  12,225;  absent,  29,511— total,  156,838. 

STUART'S  RAID. 
About  this  time  the  Rebel  General,  Stuart,  with 
his  cavalry,  made  his  celebrated  raid,  making  the  en- 
tire circuit  of  our  army  unharmed,  aud  discovering 
the  nature  of  our  communications  with  the  York 
Eiver. 


JACKSON  THREATENS  AN  ATTACK. 
On  the  24th  and  25th  of  June,  Gen.  McClellan 
telegraphs  the  Secretary  of  War  that  he  is  informed 
by  deserters  and  contrabands  that  Jackson  is  con- 
templating an  attack  upon  his  right  arid  rear.  As 
this  dispatch  of  Gen.  McClellan,  and  the  one  of  the 
President  in  reply,  ars  dated  immediately  previous 
to  the  "  Sfcven  days'  battle,"  they  are  given  here  in 
full. 

"  Received  8.50  p.  m. 

McClellan's  June 25—6.15  p.  m. 

"  I  have  just  returned  from  the  field,  and  find  your  dispatch 
in  regard  to  Jackson.  Several  contrabands,  just  in,  give  in- 
formation confirming  the  supposition  that  Jacksot's  advance 
is  at  or  near  Hauover  Court-Ho^se,  and  that  Beauregard  ar- 
rived, with  strong  re-enforcements,  iu  Richmond  3-esterday. 
I  incline  to  think  that  Jackson  will  attack  my  right  a'id  rear. 
The  Rebel  force  is  stated  at  200,000,  including  Jackson  and 
Beauregard.  I  shall  have  to  contend  against  vastly  superior 
odds  if  these  reports  be  true ;  but  this  army  will  do  all  in  the 
power  of  man  to  hold  their  position  and  repulse  an  attack.  I 
regret  my  great  inferiority  of  numbers,  but  feel  that  I  am  in 
no  way  responsible  for  it,  as  I  have  not  failed  to  represent  re- 
peatedly tbe  necessity  of  re  enforcements ;  that  this  was  the 
decisive  point ;  aud  that  all  the  available  means  of  the  Govern- 
ment should  be  concentrated  here.  I  will  do  all  tbat  a  gene- 
ral can  do  with  the  6pleudid  army  I  have  the  honor  to  com- 
mand ;  and  if  it  is  destroyed  by  overwhelming  numbers,  can 
at  legist  die  with  it,  and  share  its  fate.  But  if  the  result  of  the 
action  which  will  occnr  to-morrow,  or  within  a  short  time,  is 
a  disaster,  the  responsibility  cannot  be  thrown  on  my  shoul- 
ders; it  must  rest  where  it  belongs. 

"  Sines  I  commenced  this,  I  have  received  additional  intel- 
ligence confirming  the  supposition  in  regard  to  Jackson's 
movements  and  Beaureg«d's.  I  shall  probably  be  a'tacked 
to-morrow,  and  now  go  to  the  other  side  of  the  Chickabominy 
to  airange  for  the  defense  on  that  side.  I  feel  that  there  is  nc 
use  in  my  again  asking  for  re-enfo.  cements. 

"  GEO.  B.  McCLELLAN,  Major-GeneraL 

"Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton.  Secretary  of  War." 

The  answer  of  the  President  is  as  follows: 

•■  Washington.  June  26,  1862. 

"  'Sour  three  dispatches  of  yesterday  in  relation  to  the  affair, 
ending  with  the  statement  that  you  completely  succeeded  in 
making  your  point,  are  very  gratifying. 

"The  later  one  of  6i  p.  in.,  suggesting  the  probability  of 
your  being  overwhelmed  by  200,000  men.  and  talking  of  whom 
the  responsibility  will  belong  to,  pains  me  very  much.  I  give 
you  all  1  can.  and  act  on  the  presumptijn  that  you  will  do  the 
best  you  can  with  what  you  have;  while  you  continue,  ungen- 
erously I  think,  to  assume  that  I  could  give  you  more  if  I 
would.  I  have  omitted,  I  shall  omit,  no  opportunity  to  send 
vou  re-enforcements  wheuevt-r  I  possibly  can. 

"A.  LINCOLN. 

"  Major-General  McClellan." 

BATTLE  OF  MECHANTCSVILLE. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  26th  of  June,  between  2 
and  3  o'clock,  the  enemy,  in  considerable  force,  made 
a  vigorous  attack  upon  the  troops  of  Gen.  McCall'^ 
Division,  stationed  at  Mechanicsville,  consisting  of 
tbe  two  brigades  of  Seymour  and  Reynolds.  The 
action  lasted  until  nightfall,  wheu  the  enemy  were 
repulsed.  Troops  were  sent  up  by  Gen.  Porter  to 
the  assistance  of  those  engaged;  but  they  were  not 
m  the  battle,  though  some  of  them  were  in  position 
to  support  the  right  of  the  line. 

About  12  o'clock  tbat  night  the  troops  were 
ordered  to  fall  back  to  Gaines's  Mill,  which  was  ac- 
complished without  loss. 

BATTLE  OF   GAINES'S  MILL. 

On  the  27th  the  battle  of  Gaines  s  Mill  was 
fought,  principally  by  the  troops  under  Gen.  Porter. 
Our  forces  there  engaged  were  from  27,000  to  30, 000; 
the  force  of  the  enemy  being  from  two  to  three 
times  that  number.  Tbe  enemy  were  in  sucb  su- 
perior force  that,  although  our  troops  fought  with 
exceeding  bravery,  they  were  driven  back  with 
a  less  of  about  9^000  men,  in  killed,  wounded  and 
missing. 

Gen.  McClellan  was  questioned  as  to  the  policy 
of  leaving  the  right  w;ng,  consisting  of  only  about 
30,000  men,  to  meet  the  attack  of  tbe  superior  force 
of  the  enemy,  instead  of  withdrawing  it  to  the 
rioht  bank  of  the  Chickabominy  before  the  battle 
of  Gaines's  Mill.  His  testimony  on  that  point  is  as 
follows: 

"  Question.  Whatever  might  have  been  the  intentions  of 
the  enemy,  as  the  attack  was"  to  have  been  made  by  him. 
would  it  not  have  beeu  better  to  have  placed  both  wings  of 
our  army  on  the  same  side  of  the  Chickabominy  prior  to  the 
battle  of  Geinec'*  Mid  ? 

'•  Answer.  1  do  not  think  they  ought  to  have  been  brought 
to  tbe  same  side  of  the  river  before  they  actua'ly  were. 


L3 


"  Question.  What  advantage  was  gained  by  Leaving  the 
right  wing  of  our  army  to.  be  attacked  by  a  greatly  superior 
force  ? 

•'  Answer.  It  prevented  the  enemy  from  tjettinz  on  our  flank 
and  rear,  and,  in  my  opinion,  enabled  us  to  withdraw  the 
armvandits  material. 

"  Question.  Will  you  explain  what  was  done  by  the  right 
wing  of  our  army  at  or  about  the  time  the  left  was  engaged 
which  saved  our  tlvk  from  attack  and  enabled  the  army  and 
its  material  to  be  withdrawn  ? 

"Answer.  By  desperate  fighting  they  inflicted  so  great  a 
loss  on  the  enemy  as  to  check  his  movement  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  river,  and  gave  us  time  to  get  our  material  out  of  the 
way. " 

RETREAT  OF  THE  WHOLE   ARMY  DECIDED  ON. 

Duriog  the  night  after  the  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill 
all  our  forces  were  concentrated  on  the  right  hatfk  of 
the  Chickahoininy,  and  the  next  day  the  movement 
to  the  James  Kiver  was  determined  upon.  Gen. 
Heintzelmnn  testifies  tbat  the  night  after  that  battle 
he  was  seat  for  by  Gen.  McClellan ;  that  he  found 
everything  packed,  ready  to  leave;  that  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan said  there  were  two  tbiuus  to  be  done — to 
concentrate  his  forces  and  risk  all  on  a  battle,  or  to 
withdraw  to  the  James  lfiver;  that  if  he  risked  a 
battle  there,  and  was  beaten,  the  army  was  destroyed. 
Gen.  Heintzelman  advised  him  not  to  risk  a  battle 
under  such  circumstances,  for  if  that  army  was  lost 
the  cause  would  be  lost;  that  it  were  better  to  go  to 
the  James  River  and  await  re-enforcements.  Gen. 
McClellan  replied  that  he  was  of  that  opinion  him- 
self, and  that  was  determined  upon.  That  night,  at 
12:20  a.  m.,  Gen.  McClellan  telegraphs  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  that  he  (Gen.  McClellan)  is  not  responsi- 
ble for  the  result,  but  feels  that  the  Government  has 
not  sustained  his  army. 

To  this  the  President  replies,  on  the  2Sbh : 

"  If  you  have  had  a  drawn  battle,  or  a  repulse,  it  is  the 
price  we  pay  for  the  enemy  not  being  in  Wathington.  We 
protected  Washington  and  ttie  enemy  concentrated  on  you. 
Had  we  stripped  Washington  he  would  have  been  upon  us 
before  the  troops  sent  could  have  got  to  you. 

"  Save  your  army  at  all  events.  Will  send  re-enforcements 
as  fast  as  we  can.  Of  course  they  cannot  reach  you  to-day, 
to-morrow,  or  next  day." 

The  28th  of  June  passed  without  any  serious 
fighting.  Col.  B.  S.  Alexander  testifies  that  on  the 
afternoon  of  that  day  he  was  sent  for  by  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan, and  went  to  his  headquarters,  at  Savage's 
Station,  arriving  there  about  dark.  He  received  in- 
structions to  proceed  with  an  escort  to  the  James 
River,  send  back  a  sufficient  number  of  men  to  act 
as  guides  for  the  different  columns  of  the  army, 
communicate  with  the  gunboat-,  and  order  supplies 
to  be  brought  up  the  river;  to  examine  both  shores  of 
the  James  to  the  mouth  of  the  Chickahoininy,  and 
ascertain  the  landing  places;  proceed  up  the  Cbick- 
ahominy  to  the  head  of  navigation  and  ascertain 
the  places  where  the  army  could  croes,  in  case  of 
necessity,  and  then  return  to  headquarters  and  re- 
port. He  left  Savage's  Station  that  night,  and 
reached  the  James  River  the  next  afternoon.  By 
the  time  he  had  completed  his  examination  the  army 
bad  reached  the  James  River  at  Malvern, 

M'CLELLAN  PROPOSES   TO   DESTROY  HIS  BAG- 
GAGE. 

While  at  headquarters,  receiving  his  instructions, 
be  was  shown,  as  he  testifies,  a  printed  order,  not 
then  issued,  directing  the  destruction  of  the  bag- 
gage of  officers  and  men,  and  the  tents,  camps, 
equipage,  and  things  of  that  kind;  appealing:  to  the 
army  to  submit  to  this  privation,  as  it  would  be  only 
temporary— '' only  for  a  few  days."  He  remon- 
strated with  Gen.  McClellan  against  issuing  such 
an  order;  that  it  would  have  a  bad  effect,  would  de- 
moralize the  army,  as  it  would  be  telling  them  more 
plainly  than  they  could  be  told  in  any  other  way 
1hat  they  were  defeated  and  running  for  their  lives. 
The  order  was  not  issued,  aud  Gen.  McClellan  tes- 
tifies that  he  has  no  recollection  of  any  such  order. 
THE  RETREAT  TO  JAMES  RIVER. 

The  retreat  to  the  James  River  haviug  been  de- 
cided upon,  the  army  took  up  its  march,  being  at- 
tacked by  the  enemy  in  the  day  time,  and  however 
successful  in  repelling  those  attacks,  evacuating 
their  positions  during  the  night.    Tne  actions  ot 


Savage's  Station,  Glendale  and  Malvern  were  fought 
during  the  movement  of  the  army  to  the  James,  the 
enemy  being  repulsed  in  eaoh  day's  fighting,  and 
our  army  falling  back,  under  orders,  during  the 
night. 

It  would  appear,  from  all  the  information  your 
Committee  can  obtain,  that  the  battles  were  jought, 
the  troops  handled,  new  dispositions  m/de  and  old 
ones  changed,  entirely  by  the  corps  commanders, 
without  directions  from  the  Commanding  General. 
He  would  place  the  troops  in  the.  morning,  then  halve 
the  field  and  seek  the  position  for  the  next  day,  giv- 
ing no  directions  until  the  close  of  the  day's  fight- 
in g,  when  the  troops  would  be  ordered,  to  fall  back 
during  the  night  to  the  nexo  position  selected  by 
him.  In  that  manner  the  army  reached  the  James 
River. 

BATTLE  OP  MALVERN  HILL. 
The  battle  of  Malvern  Hill,  of  the  1st  of  July, 
was  the  moat  fiercely  contested  of  any  upon  the 
peninsula.  The  troops  were  placed  in  tho  morning, 
under  direction  of  Geo.  McClellan,  who  then  left  the 
field,  returning  to  it  again  in  the  afternoon.  The 
first  action  of  the  day  commenced  about  10  o'clock 
in  the  forenoon,  but  did  not  continue  long.  The 
principal  action,  when  the  enemy  attacked  most 
vigorously  and  persistently,  commenced  late  in  the 
afternoon,  and  continued  till  aft^r  dark,  the  enemy 
being  repulsed  and  beaten  at  every  point.  Many  of 
the  officers  examined  by  your  Committee  are  of  the 
opinion  tbat  the  enemy  were  so  severely  punished 
on  that  day  tbat  they  could  have  been  followed  into 
Richmond  had  our  army  followed  them  up  vigor- 
ously. 

It  is  tru<*  that  our  army  had  been  severely  tried 
during  the  preceding  week,  fighting,  as  they  did, 
nearly  every  day,  and  retreating  every  night.  The 
corps  commanders  and  the  tro  :ps  under  them  fought 
moat  bravely— no  troops  better.  However  disheart- 
ened they  may  have  become  by  wnat  all  must  have 
regarded  as  a'precipitate  retreat  during  the  night, 
they  still  fought  with  the  moat  obstinate  bravery 
when  attacked  in  the  day  time  by  an  exultant  and 
successful  enemy. 

M'CLELLAN  STILL  RETREATS. 
The  commanding  general,  however,  determined  to 
fall  back  from  Malvern  to  Harrison's  Bar,  notwith- 
etanding  the  victory  won  there  by  our  army.  He 
eeems  to  have  regarded  his  army  as  entirely  unfitted 
to  meet  the  enemy,  for  on  toe  day  of  the  battle  at 
Malvern,  evidently  before  that  battle  toak  place,  he 
writes  to  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  army  from 
Haxall's  plantation. 

AND  STILL  WANTS  TROOPS. 
"  My  men  are  completely  exhausted,  and  I  dread  the  result 
if  we  are  attacked  to-day  by  fresh  troops.  If  possible,  I  shall 
retire  to-night  to  Harrison's  Bar,  where  the  gunboats  can  ren- 
der more  aid  in  covering  our  position.  Permit  me  to  urge 
that  not  an  hour  should  be  lo  t  in  sending  me  fresh  troops. 
More  gunboats  are  much  needed." 

On  the  2d  of  Julv  the  President  telegraphs  to  Gen. 
McClellan: 

"  Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  morning  induces  me  to  hope 
your  army  is  having  some  rest.  In  this  hope  allow  me  to 
reason  with  you  for  a  moment.  When  you  ask  for  50,000  men 
to  be  promptly  sent  you,  you  must  surely  labor  under  some 
gross  mistake  of  fact.  Recently  vou  sent  papers  showing 
your  disposal  of  foices  made  last  Spring  for  the  defense  of 
Washington,  and  advising  a  return  to  that  plan.  I  find  in- 
cluded in  and  about  Washington  75,000  men.  Now  please  be 
assured  that  I  have  not  men  enough  to  fill  that  very  plan  by 
15,000.  All  of  Gen.  Fremont's  in  the  valley;  all  of  Gen. 
Banks's;  all  of  Gen.  McDowell's  not  with,  you;  and  all  in 
Washington,  taken  to  gether  do  not  exceed,  if  they  reach,  60,000, 
with  Gen.  Wool  and  Gen.  Dix  added  to  those  mentioned.  I 
have  not  outside  of  your  army  75,000  men  east  of  the  mountains. 
Thus  the  idea  of  sending  you  50,000  men,  or  any  other  con-' 
siderable  force,  promptly,  is  singly  absurd.  If,  in  your  fre- 
quent meutiou  of  responsibility,  you  had  the  impression  that 
1  blame  you  for  not  doing  more  than  yon  can,  please  be  re- 
lieved of  such  impression.  I  only  beg  that  in  like  manner 
you  will  not  ask  impossibilities  of  me. 

"  If  you  thiuk  you  are  not  stroDg  enough  to  take  Richmond 
just  now,  I  do  not  ask  you  to  try  jnst  now.  Save  the  army, 
material  and  personnel,  and  I  will  strengthen  it  for  the  offen- 
sive again  as  fast  I  can." 

On  the  3d  of  J uly,  after  the  army  had  reached 


14: 


Harrison '8  Bar.  Gen.  McClellan  writes  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  War: 

"  I  am  in  hopes  that  the  enemy  is  as  completely  worn  out 
as  we  are ;  he  was  certainly  very  severely  punished  in  the 
last  battle.  *  *  *  *'...'"  * 
It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  estimate  as  yet  our  losses,  but  I 
doubt  whether  there  are  to-day  more  than  50,000  men  with 
their  colors. 

"  To  accomplish  the  great  task  of  capturing  Richmond,  and 
putting  an  end  to  this  rebellion,  re-enforcements  should  be 
sent  me  rather  much  over  than  less  than  100,000  men." 

THE  ARMY  HELPLESS. 

The  retreat  of  the  army  from  Malvern  to  Harri- 
son's Bar  was  very  precipitate.  The  troops,  upon 
their  arrival  there,  were  huddled  together  in  great 
confusion,  the  entire  army  being  collected  within  a 
space  of  about  three  miles  along  the  river.  No  or- 
ders were  given  the  first  day  for  occupying  the 
hights  which  commanded  the  position,  nor  were  the 
troops  so  placed  as  to  be  able  to  resist  an  attack 
in  force  by  the  enemy,  and  nothing  but  a  heavy 
rain,  thereby  preventing  the  enemy  from  bringing 
up  their  a)  tiller y,  saved  the  army  there  from  de- 
struction. The  enemy  did  succeed  in  bringing  up 
some  of  their  artillery,  and  threw  some  shells  into 
the  camp,  before  any  preparations  for  defense  had 
been  made.  On  the  3d  of  July  the  hights  were  taken 
possession  of  by  our  troops  and  works  of  defense 
commenced,  and  then,  aud  not  until  then,  was  our 
army  secure  in  that  position. 

NUMBER  OF  TROOPS. 

By  reference  to  the  testimony  of  Mr.  Tucker,  As- 
sistant-Secretary of  War,  it  will  be  seen  that  prior 
to  the  5th  of  Apiil,  1862,  121,500  men  had  been 
landed  on  the  peninsula.  Shortly  afterward  Gen. 
Franklin's  division  of  Gen.  McDowell's  corp?,  num- 
bering about  12,000  men,  was  sent  down.  In  the 
early  part  of  June  Gen.  McCall's  division>  of  the 
same  corps,  of  about  10,000  men,  wa6  sent  down, 
together  with  about  11,000  men,  from  Baltimore 
and  Fortress  Monroe,  and  about  the  last  of  June, 
some  5.000  men  of  Gen.  Shields's  division  were  also 
sent  down.    Total,  159,500  men. 

On  the  20th  of  July,  1862,  according  to  the  returns 
sent  to  the  Adjutant-General's  office  by  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan, the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  under  bis  com- 
mand, was  as  lollows:  Present  for  duty,  101,691; 
special  duty,  sick,  and  in  arrest,  17,828;  absent,  38,- 
795;  total,  158,314.  This  included  the  corps  of  Gen. 
Dix,  amounting  to  9,997,  present  for  duty,  or  in  all, 
11,778  men. 

M'CLELLAN  IDLE. 

The  army  remained  at  Harri-on's  Bar  during  the 
month  of  July  and  a  part  of  August.  It  engaged 
in  no  active  operations  whatever,  and  was  almost 
entirely  unmolested  by  the  enemy.  The  subject  of 
the  future  operations  of  the  army  was  a  matter  of 
much  deliberation  on  the  part  of  the  Government. 
Gen.  McClellan  claimed  that  the  James  River  was 
the  true  line  of  approach  to  Richmoud,  and  that  he 
should  be  re-enforced  in  order  to  renew  the  cam- 
paign agaiust  that  place.  The  President  visited 
the  army  about  the  8th  of  July,  but  nothing  was 
then  decided  upon. 

HIS  ARMY  ENERVATED. 

On  the  25th  of  July  Gen.  Halleck  vis'ted  the  army 
at  Harrison's  Bar,  accompanied  by  Gen.  Burntide, 
who  hal  come  from  North  Carolina,  with  the  greater 
portion  of  his  force,  to  Fortress  Monroe.  The  gen- 
eral officers  were  called  together,  and  the  question 
of  withdrawing  the  army  was  submitted  to  them. 
The  council  was  of  rather  an  informal  character. 
The  majority  of  the  officers  expressed  tuemselves  in 
favor  of  a  withdrawal  of  the  army.  Gen.  Barneide 
testifies  that,  i*s  he  understood  from  the  officers  there, 
the  army  was  not,  in  a  good  condition,  sickness  was 
increasing,  many  of  the  regiments  were  without 
shelter  and  cooking  utensils,  and  many  of  the  men 
were  without  arms^  The  general  opinion  expressed 
by  the  leading  officers  was  that  the  men  had  become 
very  much  enervated.  One  of  the  leading  officers 
said  that  his  command  could  not,  in  his  opinion, 
march  three  miles  and  fight  a  battle.    This  condition 


of  the  troops  waB  one  of  the  reasons  assigned  for  the 
final  withdrawal  of  the  army  from  the  peninsula. 
M'CLELLAN'S  DEMAND  FOR  RE-ENFORCEMENTS. 

Gen.  McClellan  applied  for  50,000  re-en  forceuientg 
to  enable  him  to  resume  active  operations.  Gen. 
Halleck>  when  be  visited  the  army,  informed  Gen. 
McClellan  that  the  Government  could  furnish  him 
only  20,000  additional  troops.  Gen.  McClellan  con- 
sented to  renew  operations  with  that  numoer  of  re- 
enforcements,  and  Gen.  Halleck  left  with  that  un- 
derstanding. But  the  day  that  he  left  Gen.  McClellan 
wrote  to  him,  a.-king  for  15,000  or  20,000  troops  from 
the^ Western  army,  in  addition  to  those  promised  to 
him,  urging  very  strongly  that  they  should  be 
brought  here  temporarily,  t»  be  returned  to  the  West 
after  Richmond  should  have  been  taken.  As  this 
could  not  be  dote,  the  order  was  given  for  the  with- 
drawal of  the  arm  v  as  rapidly  as  possible,  in  order  to 
co-operate  with  the  forces  under  Gen.  Pope,  then  in 
the  presence  of  a  suDerior  force  of  the  enemy. 

M'CLELLAN'S  TESTIMONY. 

In  regard  to  the  re-enforcement  of  the  army  while 
at  Harrison's  Landing,  the  testimony  of  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellauis  as  follows: 

"  Question.  How  many  available  men  did  you  estimate  that 
you  had  at  Harrison's  Bar,  and  how  many  more  would  you 
have  required  in  order  to  undertake  a  movement  successfully 
upon  Richmoud? 

"Answer.  I  thiuk  I  had  about  85.000  or  90,000  men  at  Har- 
rison's Bar,  and  would  have  undertaken  another  movement  in 
advance  with  about  20,000  more  re-enforcements.  My  view 
was  that  pretty  much  everything  that  the  Government  could 
have  controlled  ought  to  have  been  massed  ou  the  James 
River.  I  did  not  believe  the  enemy  would  trouble  YVashing- 
ton  so  long  as  we  hid  a  powerful  army  in  the  vicinity  of  Rich- 
mond, ajid  did  not  share  the  apprehensions  for  the  safety  of 
Washington  that  were  eutertained  by  a  g>eat  many. 

"I  asked  for  50.000  men  at  first,  on  the  ground  that  I  thought 
the  array  should  be  made  as  strong  as  possible,  and  as  little  as 
possible  left  to  chance.  When  Gen.  Halleck  came  down  to 
Harrison's  Bar,  my  recollection  is  that  he  said  that  20,000 
men,  or  something  about  that  number,  was  alt  that  could  be 
had,  and  I  said  that  1  would  try  it  again  with  that  number. 
I  have  no  recollection  of  having  asked  at  a  subsequent  period 
f 0  r  a  greater  number  than  20,0u0  as  a  necessary  preliminary  to 
a  movement. 

"  Question.  About  how  many  men  had  been  lost  from  the 
25th  of  June  until  you  reached  Harrison's  Bar,  iu  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing  ? 

"Answer.  I  think  the  loss  was  about  14,000;  but  I  could 
not  tell  positively  witbout  looking  at  the  returns. 

"  Question.  Will  you  state  in  what  your  chances  for  success 
would  have  been  greater,  with  the  addition  of  20,000  men  to 
the  number  which  you  had  at  Harrison's  Landing,  than  chey 
wereiu  front  of  Richmond,  and  before  Jackson  had  formed  a 
junction  with  the  rest  of  the  enemy's  forces? 

"  Answer.  I  should  have  counted  upon  the  effect  of  the 
battles,  which  had  just  taken  place,  upon  the  enemy.  We 
had  then  strong  reasons  to  believe  that  the  enemy's  losses  had 
been  very  much  heavier  than  our  own,  aud  that  portions  of 
his  army  were  verv  much  demoralized,  especially  after  the 
battle  of  Malvern  Hill." 

GEN.  BARNARD'S  REPORT. 
In  closing  their  report  upon  the  campaign  of  the 
Peninsula,  your  Committee  would  refer  to  the  report 
of  Gen.  John  G.  Barnard,  Chief  of  Engineers  of  the 
Army  of  the  Pcto-nac  during  that  campaign,  made 
to  Gen.  McClellan.  The  conclusion  of  his  report, 
wbich  he  terms  a  retrospect  pointing  out  the  mis- 
takes that  were  made,  and  thus  tracing  the  causes 
of  its  (the  Peninsular  campaign's)  failure  to  their  true 
soarces,"  is  as  follows: 

CAUSES  OF  M'CLELLAN'S  FAILURE. 
"  One  of  the  prominent  among  the  causes  of  ulti- 
mate failure  was  the  inaction  of  eight  months,  from 
August,  1861,  to  April,  1862.  More  than  &uy  other 
wars,  rebellion  demands  rapid  measures.  In  No- 
vember, 18G1,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  if  not  fully 
supplied  with  all  the  'materiel,'  was  yet  about  as 
complete  iu  numbers,  discipline,  and  organization  as 
it  ever  became.  For  four  months,  the  great  marine 
avenue  to  the  capital  of  the  nation  was  blockaded, 
and  that  capital  kept  in  a  partial  state  of  siege  by  a 
greatlv  inftiior  enemy,  in  face  of  a  movable  army  of 
150,000  men. 

"  In  the  Winter  of  1861  and  1862,  Norfolk  could 
and  should  have  beeu  taken.  The  Navy  demanded 
it,  the  country  demanded  it,  and  the  means  were 
ample.    By  its  capture  the  career  of  the  Merrima  c, 


15 


which  proved  so  disastrous  to  oar  subsequent  opera- 
tions, would  have  been  preveuted.  The  preparation 
of  this  vessel  was  known,  and  the  Navy  Department 
was  not  without  forebodings  of  the  mischief  it 
would  do. 

"  Though  delay  might  mature  more  comprehensive 
plans,  and  promise  greater  results,  it  is  not  the  first 
case  in  which  it  has  baen  shown  that  successful  war 
involves  something  more  than  abstract  military  prin- 
ciples. The  true  question  was  to  seize  the  fir6t  prac- 
ticable moment  to  satisfy  the,  perhaps,  unreasonable 
but  natural  longing  of  an  ambitious  nation  for  re- 
sults to  justify  its  lavish  confidence,  and  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  au  undivided  cornmaud  and  untrammeled 
liberty  of  action  while  they  were  possessed. 

"When  the  army  did  move,  a  plan  was  adopted 
perfectly  certain  to'invite,  nay,  compel,  interference, 
and  when  the  army  was  to  go  by  Aunapolis  to  the 
lower  Chesapeake,  I  felt  confident  that  one-half 
would  scarcely  have  been  embarked  before  the  other 
half  would  have  been  ordered  back  to  Washington. 
The  enemy  was  then  at  Manassas,  and  a  feint,  even 
if  not  reality,  of  an  attack  upon  Washington  was  so 
obvious,  so  certain  to  create  a  panic,  which  no  Ex- 
ecutive could  resist,  that  interference  with  the  re- 
moval of  the  rest  of  the  army  was  certain. 

"  When  the  enemy  fell  back  behind  the  Rappa- 
hannock, and  destroyed  the  railroad  bridges,  the  cir- 
cumstances were  greatly  changed,  aud  there  were 
strong  arguments  for  the  hue  adopted.  Yet,  results 
have  proved  how  many  reasons  there  were  to  be  con- 
sidered, besidd  the  purely  military  ones,  which 
opposed  themselves  to  the  adoption  of  such  a  line. 

"The  facts  connected  with  the  withholding  of  Mc- 
Dowell's corps  have  been  so  completely  exhibited  in 
the  proceedings  of  the  McDowell  Court  of  laquiry, 
that  every  one  who  wishes  can  form  his  own  judg- 
ment. Whether  it  was  wi-:e  or  unwise,  it  was  one 
of  those  things  resulting  from  the  taking  of  a  line  of 
operations  which  did  not  theu  cover  Washington. 

' "  At  the  time  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  landed  on 
the  Peninsula  the  Rebel  army  was  at  its  lowest  ebb. 
Its  armies  were  demoralized  by  the  defeats  of  Port 
Royal,  Mill  Spring,  Fort  Henry,  Fort  Donelson, 
Roanoke  Island,  and  Pea  Ridge;  and  reduced  by 
fcicknese,  loss  in  battle,  expirations  of  periods  of 
service,  &c. ;  while  the  Conscription  law  was  not 
yet  even  passed,  it  seemed  as  if  it  needed  but  one 
vigorous  gripe  to  end  forever  this  rebellion,  so  nearly 
throttled.  How,  then,  happened  it  that  the  day  of 
the  initiation  of  the  campaign  of  this  magnificent 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  the  day  of  the  resuscita- 
tion of  the  Rebel  cause,  which  seemed  to  grow  pari 
passu  with  the  slow  progress  of  its  operations  ? 

V  However  I  may  be  committed  to  any  expression 
of  professional  opinion  to  the  contrary  (I  certainly 
did  suggest  it),  my  opioion  now  is  that  the  lines  of 
Yorktown  should  have  been  assaulted.  There  is 
reason  to  believe  that  they  were  not  held  in  strong 
force  when  our  army  appeared  before  them ;  and  we 
know  that  they  wei'e  far  from  complete.  The  pres- 
tige of  power,  the  morale,  were,  on  our  side.  It 
was  due  to  ourselves  to  confirm  and  sustain  it.  We 
should  probably  have  succeeded.  But  if  we  had 
failed,  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  the  shock  of 
an  unsuccessful  assault  would  be  more  demoralizing 
than  the  labors  of  a  sie.i*e. 

"  Our  troops  toiled  a  month  in  the  trenches,  or 
lay  in  the  swamps  of  Warwick.  We  lost  few  men 
by  the  siege,  but  disease  took  a  fearful  hold  of  the 
army,  and  toil  and  hardship,  unredeemed  by  the  ex- 
citement of  combat,  impaired  their  morale.  We  did 
not  carry  with  us  from  Yorktown  so  good  r.u  army 
as  we  took  there.  Of  the  bitter  fruits  of  that  month 
gained  by  the  enemy  we  have  tasted  to  our  hearts' 
content.    They  are  not  yet  exhausted. 

"The  siege  haviug  been  determined  upon,  we 
should  have  opened  our  batteries  on  the  place  as  fast 
as  they  were  completed.  The  effect  on  the  troops 
would  have  been  inspiring.  It  would  have  light- 
ened the  siege  and  shortened  our  labors;  and,  be- 
sides, we  would  have  had  the  credit  of  driving  the 
enemy  from  Yorktown  by  force  of  arms,  whereas, 


as  it  was,  we  only  induced  him  to  evacuate  for  pru- 
dential reasons. 

"Yorktown  having  fallen,  however,  as  it  did,  it 
was  right  to  pursue  the  enemy  with  our  whole  force. 
But  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  fought,  as  it  was, 
without  reconnoiteringthe  position,  without  concert 
of  action  among  the  different  corpB  and  division 
commanders,  and  almost  without  orders,  was  a  blun- 
der which  ought  not  to  have  Happened. 

"  We  knew  of  this  position  beforehand,  and  we 
knew  it  was  fortified.  We  might  have  been  sure,  if 
the  enemy  made  a  stand  there,  that  it  would  be  a 
strong  one,  for  he  would  be  lighting  for  time  to  get 
his  traiiiB  out  of  our  reach.  We  fought;  we  lost 
several  thousand  men,  and  we  gained  nothing.  If 
we  had  not  fought,  the  next  day  a  battle  would  in 
all  probability  uave  been  unnecessary.  But  if  it  had 
been  necessary,  we  should  have  had  time  to  have 
brought  up  our  resources,  reconnoitered  the  position, 
and  delivered  our  attack  in  such  a  way  that  some 
result  would  have  flowed  from  it. 

"We  had  every  advantage.  Franklin's  division 
landed  at  We6t  Point  on  the  next  day,  and  Sedg- 
wick's division  on  the  day  following.  Those  two 
divisions,  had  the  enemy  waited  another  day  at 
Williamsburg,  could  have  cut  his  communication, 
and  in  that  case  we  would  have  been  superior  in  his 
front  and  have  had  two  divisions  in  his  rear.  His 
hasty  retreat,  aud  perhaps  his  capture  must  inevit- 
ably have  followed,  and  the  great  object  of  keeping 
Franklin  so  long  embarked,  and  finally  sending  him 
to  West  Point,  would  have  been  accomplished. 

"  On  leaving  Williamsburg  we  should  have  crossed 
the  Chickahominy,  and  connected  with  the  navy  in 
the  James  River.  We  should  then  have  had  a  united 
army,  and  the  cooperation  of  the  navy,  and  proba- 
bly would  have  been  in  Richmond  in  two  weeks. 
The  fact  that  we  did  not  know  the  character  of  the 
Chickahominy  as  au  obstacle  (as  it  lay  across  our  di- 
rect road  to  Richmond),  that  our  transports  were  on 
the  York  River,  and  that  the  railroad  furnished  a 
good  means  of  supply  to  the  army,  that  we  wished 
to  connect  with  McDowell  coming  from  Fredericks- 
burg, &.c,  determined  our  route.  In  taking  it  we 
lost  essentially  all  that  was  worth  going  eo  far  to 
gain,  viz:  the  James  River  approach  and  the  coop- 
eration of  the  navy. 

"  The  route  chosen,  two  weeks  should  not  have 
been  spent  in  traversing  the  forty  miles  from  Wil- 
liamsburg to  Bottom's  and  New  Bridges;  and  the 
barrier  of  the  Chickahominy  being  left  unguarded  at 
Bottom's  Bridge,  no  time  should  have  been  lost  in 
making  use  of  the  circumstance  to  turn  and  seize  the 
passage  of  New  Bridge,  which  might  have  been 
done  by  the  28th  of  May,  and  even  earlier,  had 
measures  been  pressed  and  prepared  for  it. 

"  The  repulse  of  the  rebels  at  Fair  Oaks  should 
have  been  taken  advantage  of.  It  was  one  of  those 
occasions  which,  if  not  seized,  do  not  repeat  them- 
selves. We  now  know  the  state  of  disorganization 
and  dismay  in  which  the  Rebel  army  retreated.  We 
now  know  that  it  could  have  been  followed  into 
Richmond.  Had  it  been  so,  there  would  have  been 
no  resistance  to  overcome  to  bring  over  our  right 
wing.  Although  we  did  not  then  know  all  that  we 
now  do,  it  was  obvious  at  that  tims  that  when  the 
Rebels  struck  the  blow  at  our  left  wing,  they  did  not 
leave  any  means  in  their  hands  unused  to  secure  suc- 
cess. It  was  obvious  enough  that  they  struck  with 
their  whole  force,  and  yet  we  repulsed  them  in  dis- 
order with  three-fifths  of  ours.  We  should  have 
followed  them  up  at  the  same  time  that  we  brought 
over  the  other  two-fifths. 

"  After  it  was  known  that  McDowell  was  called 
off  to  another  quarter,  there  was  no  longer  hope  of 
an  increase  of  force  by  the  junction  of  his  corps. 
Tbere  were  no  other  re-enforcements  to  look  for  be- 
yond what  we  received  by  the  middie  of  the  month 
of  June.  The  Rebel  force  was  known  or  supposed 
to  be  constantly  increasing  by  conscription,  by  the 
influx  of  troops  from  other  parts,  and  by  the  breaking 
up  of  Beauregard's  army. 

"  At  last  the  moment  came  when  action  was  im- 


16 


perative.  The  enemy  assumed  the  initiative.  We 
had,  warning  of  when  and  where  he  was  to  strike. 
Had  Porter  been  withdrawn  the  night  of  the  26th  of 
June,  our  army  would  have  been  concentrated  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  River,  while 
Uoo  corps,  at  least,  of  the  enemy's  force  were  on 
the  left  bank.  Whatever  course  we  then  took, 
whether  to  strike  at  Richmond  and  the  portion  of 
the  enemy  on  the  right  bank,  cr  move  at  once  for 
the  James,  we  would  have  had  a  concentrated  army 
and  a  fair  chance  of  a  brilliant  result  in  the  first ; 
and  in  the  second,  if  we  accomplished  nothing,  we 
would  have  been  in  the  same  case  on  the  morning  of 
the  27th  as  we  were  on  that  of  the  2&th,  minus  a  lost 
battle  and  a  compulsory  retreat.  Or  had  the  for- 
tified lines,  tla-own  up  expressly  for  that  object,  been 
held  by  20,00)  men,  as  they  could  have  been,  we 
would  have  'fought  on  the  other  side  with  80,000 
men  instead  of  27,000.  Or,  finally,  had  the  lines 
been  abandoned,  with  our  hold  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Chickahominy,  we  might  have  fought  and 
crushed  the  enemy  on  the  left  bank,  reopened  our 
communication,  and  then  returned  and  taken  Rich- 
mond. 

"As  it  was,  the  enemy  fought  with  his  whole 
force — except  enough  left  before  our  lines  to  keep  up 
an  appearance — and  we  fought  with  27,000  men, 
losing  a  battle  and  9,000  men.  By  this  defeat  we 
were  driven  from  our  position,  our  advance  for  con- 
quest turned  into  a  retreat  for  safety  by  a  force  prob- 
ably not  greatly  superior  to  our  own. 

"  la  view  of  the  length  of  time  which  our  opera- 
tions before  Richmond  consumed,  there  is  now  no 
doubt  that  the  depot  at  the  White  House  should 
have  been  fortified,  as  well  as  one  or  two  points  on 
the  railroad  thence  to  the  Chickahominy;  that  the 
tete-de-pont  at  Bottom's  Bridge  should  "have  been 
completed,  and  likewise  tttes-de-pont,ox  strong  posi- 
tions, prepared  to  cover  the  debouches  from  our 
bridges  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Chickahominy. 
With  these  the  army  would  have  possessed  free- 
dom of  motion  to  concentrate  on  either  side,  and  the 
disastrous  battle  of  the  27th  would  scarcely  have 
occurred. 

44  When  the  army  reached  the  James  River  it 
needed  no  prophet  to  predict  the  disasters  which 
have  6ince  befallen  our  country's  cause.  If  the 
army  bad  sustained  itself  nobly  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  so  much  fruitless  toil,  and  so  much  disaster, 
had  deprived  it  of  the  clan  which  results  from  suc- 
cess alone.  It  was,  moreover,  as  well  as  our  forces 
elsewhere,  sadly  diminished  in  numbers.  On  the 
other  hanii,  the  whole  army,  from  its  first  low  state, 
had  risen  up  an  army  most  formidable  in  numbers, 
excellent  in  organization,  and  inspired  by  a  great 
success.  Had  its  number,  indeed,  approached  to 
that  attributed  to  it— 200,000  men— there  is  little 
doubt  that  a  march  upon  Washington  would  have 
speedily  followed  our  withdrawal  to  the  James. 

"  From  such  considerations,  as  well  as  those  fol- 
lowing from  the  results  of  the  past  operations,  I 
counseled  the  immediate  withdrawal  from  the 
James  to  reunite  with  our  forces  coveiing  Wash- 
ington." 

The  report  of  Gen.  Barnard  is  the  only  report  of 
the  officers  engaged  in  the  campaign  of  the"  Peninsula 
which  your  Comrmtlee  have  obtained.  Tue  report 
by  the  commanding  general  has  not  yet  been  made, 
and  the  reports  of  his  subordinates"  have  not  been 
sent  by  him  to  the  Department. 

CO-OPERATION  WITH  GEN.  POPE. 

Gen.  Burueide,  with  his  command,  was  the  first 
to  leave  the  peninsula.  He  landed  at  Acquia  and 
proceeded  to  Fredericksburg,  relieving  Geu.  King, 
who  proceeded  at  once  to  rejoin  his  corps  (.McDow- 
ell's) then  with  Gen.  Pope.  Soon  after,  Geu.  Barn- 
eide  was  ordered  to  send  all  possible  assistance  to 
Gen.  Pope,  and  at  once  ordered  two  of  his  three 
divisions  (Reno's  and  Stevens's)  up  tbe  Rappahan- 
nock. Sbortly  after  that  tbe  advance  of  the  army  of 
tbe  Potomac,  Fitz  John  Porter's  corps,  reached  Ac- 
quia, and  was  sent  forward  by  Gen.  Burnside  to 
Gen.  Pope.   The  rest  of  the  Army  of  tne  Potomac, 


except  Keye6'8  corps,  left  to  garrison  Yorktown, 
proceeded  to  Alexandria,  and  from  there  joined  Gen. 
Pope.  Geo.  Sumner  stopped  at  Acquia  and  debarked 
a  portion  of  his  corps  there;  but  he  received  orders  to 
re-embark  them  again  and  proceed  to  Alexandria, 
which  he  did. 

The  troops  sent  to  the  assistance  of  Gen.  Pope  were 
sent  by  orders  of  Gen.  Halleck;  for  those  sent  from 
Acquia  the  orders  were  given  through  Gen.  Burn- 
side;  for  those  sent  out  from  Alexandria,  the  orders 
were  given  directly  to  the  corps  commanders,  until 
Gen.  McClellan  arrived,  on  the  26th  of  August;  after 
which  the  orders  were  given  through  him. 

The  circumstances  connected  with  the  campaign 
of  the  Army  of  Virginia  have  been  so  fully  investi- 
gated by  the  military  courts  in  the  cases  of  Gen.  Mc- 
Dowell and  Gen.  Fitz- John  Porter,  the  proceedings 
of  which  were  public,  that  your  Committee  have  not 
deemed  it  necessary  to  make  so  thorough  an  investi- 
gation of  that  campaign  as  they  would  otherwise 
have  done.  They  refer,  therefore,  principally  to  the 
orders  and  correspondence,  in  relation  to  the  delays 
in  tbe  forwardiDg  of  Gen.  Sumner's  and  Gen.  Frank- 
lin's corpa  from  Alexandr  a  to  the  assistance  of  Gen. 
Pope. 

MCCLELLAN'S  DELAYS  IN  SENDING  ASSISTANCE. 

At  10  a.  m.,  Aug.  27,  Gen.  Halleck  telegraphs 
Gen.  McCleltau  that 

"  Franklin's  corps  should  inarch  in  that  direction  ( Manassas) 

as  soon  as  possible." 

At  10:40  a.  m.  Gen.  McClellan  replies: 

"I  have  sent  orders  to  Franklin  to  prepare  to  march  with  his 
corps  at  once,  and  to  repair  here  ( Alexandria)  in  person  to  in- 
form him  as  to  his  means  of  transportation.  Kearney  waa 
yesterday  at  Rappahannock;  Forcer  at  Bealton,  Kelly's,  Bur- 
nett's, &lc.  Sumner  will  commence  reaching  Falmouth  to- 
day." 

At  12  m.  on  the  same  day  Gen.  Halleck  telegraphs 

to  Gen.  McClellan: 

"Telegrams  from  Gen.  Porter  to  Gen.  Burnside,  just  re- 
ceived, say  that  Banks  is  at  Fayetteville.  McDowell,  Sigel, 
and  Ricketts,  near  Warrenton  :  Reno  on  his  right.  Forter  is 
marching  on  Warrenton  to  re-entorce  Pope.  Nothiug  said  of 
Heiutzelaian.  Porter  reports  a  general  battle  imminent. 
Franklin's  corps  should  move  out  by  forced  marches,  carrying 
three  or  lour  days'  provisions,  to  be  supplied,  as  far  as  possi- 
ble, by  railroad." 

From  Gen.  McClellan  to  Gen.  Halleck,  same  day, 
sent  12:5  p.  m.,  received  1:40  p.  m.: 

"  My  aid  has  just  returned  from  Gen.  Franklin's  camp.  Re- 
ports mat  Gens.  Franklin,  Smith,  and  Siocutn,  are  ail  in 
Washington.  He  gave  the  order  to  the  next  in  raukto  place 
the  corps  in  readiness  to  move  at  once." 

From  same  to  same,  sent  1:15  p.  m.,  received 
1:50  p.  m. 

"  Franklin's  artillery  has  no  horses,  except  for  tour  guns 
without  caissons.  I  can  pick  up  no  cavalry.  In  view  of 
these  facts,  will  it  not  be  well  to  push  Sumnar's  corps  here 
by  wdter  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  make  immediate  "arrange- 
ments for  placing  the  works  in  front  of  Wasnington  iu  an  effi- 
cient condition  of  defense.  1  have  no  means  of  knowing  tbe 
enemy's  force  between  Pope  and  ourselves.  Can  Franklin, 
withou;  his  artillery  or  cavalry,  effect  any  useful  purpose  in 
front?  niiould  not  Burnside  at  once  take  steps  to  evacuate 
Falmoutb  and  Acquia,  at  the  same  time  covering  the  retreat 
of  any  of  Pope's  troops  who  may  fall  back  in  that  direction? 
I  do  not  see  thit  we  have  force  enough  on  Laud  to  form  a  con- 
nection witb  Pope,  whose  exact  position  we  do  not  know. 
Are  we  sale  in  the  direction  of  the  valley  V 

At  1:50  p.  m.  Gen.  Halleck  replies: 

"Ye3;  I  think  Sumner's  corps  should  come  to  Alexandria. 
The  enemy  has  appeared  at  Leesburg,  and  the  commanding 
officer  at  Edwardj's  Ferry  asks  for  cavalry.  Have  you  auy 
to  spare  him  1  The  enemy  see ms  to  be  trying  to  turn  Pops'* 
right.    Is  there  no  way  of  communicating  %vith  him?" 

On  he  morning  of  the  2S'Ji  of  August,  Gen.  Hal- 
leck telegraphs  to  Gen.  Fraukliu: 

"  On  pitting  with  Gen.  McClellan,  about  two  o'clock  this 
morning  it  was  understood  that  you  were  to  move  with  your 
corps  to-day  toward  Manassas  Junction,  to  drive  the  eueiny 
from  the  railroad.  I  have  just  learned  that  the  General  has 
not  returned  to  Alexandria.  If  you  have  not  received  his  or- 
der, act  on  this." 

At  1:05  p.  m.  of  the  same  day,  the  23th,  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan telegraphs  to  Gen.  Halleck: 

"Your  dispatch  to  Franklin  received.  I  have  been  doing 
all  possible  to  harry  artillery  and  cavalry.  The  moment 
Franklin  can  be  started  with  a  reasonable  amoant  of  artillery 


IT 


ho  shall  go.  *  *  *  *  *  *  Please  see  Bar- 
nard, and  be  sure  the  wo-h  toward  Chain  Bridge  are  perfect- 
ly secure.  1  look  upon  those  works,  especially  Ethan  Alien 
and  Marcy,  as  of  the  first  importance." 

At  3:30  p.m.  Gen.  Halleck  telegraphs  to  Gen. 
McClellan: 

"Not  a  moment  must  be  lost  in  pushing  as  large  a  force  as 
possible  toward  Mantissas,  so  as  to  communicate  with  Pope 
before  the  enemy  is  re-euforced." 

At  4:45  p.  m.  Gen.  McClellan  replies: 
"  Your  dispatch  received.  Neither  Franklin's  nor  Sumner's 
corps  is  now  in  condition  to  move  and  right  a  batrre.  It 
would  be  a  sacrifice  to  send  them  out  now.  I  have  ssnt  aides 
to  ascertain  the  c  unlit  ion  of  the  commands  of  Cox  and  T>ler, 
but  1  s  ill  think  that  a  premature  movement  in  small  force 
will  accomplish  nothing  but  the  destruction  of  the  troops  sent 
out.  I  repeat  that  i  will  lose  no  time  in  preparing  the  troops 
now  here  for  the  field,  and  that  whatever  orders  you  may 
give,  after  heating  what  I  have  to  say,  will  be  carried  out." 

At  8:40  p.m.  Gen.  Halleck  telegraphs  to  Gen. 
McClellan: 

"  There  mnst  be  no  further  delay  in  moving  Franklin's 
corps  toward  Manassas ;  they  must  go  to-morrow  morning, 
ready  or  not  ready.  If  we  delay  too  long  to  get  reidy  there 
will  be  no  necessity  to  go  at  all,  for  Pope  will  either  be  de- 
feated or  victorious  witftout  our  aid.  If  there  is  a  want  of 
wagons,  the  men  must  carry  provisions  with  them  till  the 
wagons  can  come  to  their  relief." 

At  10  p.  m.  Gen.  McClellan  telegraphs : 
"  Your  dispatch  received.    Frauklin's  corps  has  been  or- 
dered to  imrcb  at  6  o'clock  to-morrow  moruing.    Sumner  has 
abou:  14,000  infdntry,  without  cavalry  or  artillery  here." 

At  10:30  a.  m.  of  the  29th,  Gen.  McClellan  tele- 
graphs to  Gen.  Halleck: 

"  Franklin's  corps  is  in  motion ;  started  about  6  a.  m.  I  can 
gy  e  him  but  two  squadrons  of  cavalry.  *****  If 
yamner  moves  in  support  of  Franklin,  it  leaves  us  without 
Any  trustworthy  troops  in  and  near  Washington.  Yet  Frank- 
/  lin  is  too  much  alone.  What  shall  be  done  ?  Have  but  three 
/  squadrons  belonging  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Franklin 
has  but  forty  rounds  of  ammunition,  aad  no  wagons  to  move 
more.  I  do  not  think  FranKlin  is  in  condition  to  accomplish 
much  if  be  meets  strong  resistance.  1  should  not  have  moved 
him  but  for  your  pressing  orders  of  last  night." 

^    At  12  m.  Gen.  McClellan  telegraphs: 

"  Do  yon  wish  the  movement  of  Franklin's  corps  to  con- 
tinue ?  He  is  without  reserve  ammunition  and  without 
transportation." 

In  another  dispatch  of  same  date  he  telegraphs : 
"  Franklin  has  only  between  10,000  and  11,000  ready  for 
duty.    How  far  do  you  wish  this  force  to  advance  ?" 

At  3  p.  m.  Gen.  Halleck  telegraphs  to  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan: 

"  I  want  Franklin's  corps  to  go  far  enough  to  find  out 
something  about  the  enemy.  Pernaps  he  may  get  such  in- 
formation at  Auandale  as  to  prevent  his  goiog  further; 
otherwise  he  will  push  on  toward  Fairfax.  Try  to  get  some- 
thing from  direction  of  Manassas,  either  by  telegram  or 
through  Franklin's  scouts.  Our  people  must  move  more  ac- 
tively, and  rind  out  where  the  enemy  is.  I  am  tired  of 
guesses." 

At  2:40  p.  m.  the  President  asks  of  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan: 

"What  news  from  direction  of  Manassas  Junction?  What, 
generally?" 

At  2:45  p.  m.,  received  3:30  p.  m.,  Gen.  McClel- 
lan replies: 

"  The  last  news  1  received  from  the  direction  of  Manassas 
was  from  sti  izglers,  to  the  effect  that  the  enemy  were  evacu- 
ating Centr<-ville  and  retiring  toward  Thoroughfare  Gap. 

I  This  is  by  no  means  reliable.  I  am  clear  that  one  of  two 
courses  should  be  adopted:    First,   To  concentrate  ail  our 

[  available  fores  to  open  communication  with  Pope.  Second, 
To  lezre  Pope  to  get  out  of  his  scrape,  and  at  once  use  ail 
meaus  to  make  the  capital  perfectly  safe  No  middle  course 
will  now  auswer.    Tell  me  what  you  wish  me  to  do,  and  I 

I   will  do  all  in  my  power  to  accomplish  it.    1  wish  to  know 

|l  what  my  orders  aad  authority  are.  I  ask  for  nothing,  but  will 
obey  whatever  orders  you  give.  1  only  ask  a  prompt  decision, 

!  that  I  may  at  once  give  the  necessary  orders.  It  will  not  do 
to  delay  longer." 

At  4.10  p.  m.  the  President  replies: 
!  *  "  Yours  of  to-day  just  received.    I  think  vour  first  alterna- 
I  tive,  to  wit:  '  to  eoucen.rate  all  oar  available  forces  to  open 
communication  with  fope,'  is  the  right  one.    But  I  wish  not 
to  control.    That  I  now  leave  to  Gen.  Halleck,  aided  by  your 
counsels." 

FRANKLTN'S  DISOBEDIENCE. 
At  7.50  p.  m.  Gen.  Halleck  telegraphs  to  Gen. 
MoCleilan: 


"  Yon  will  immediately  send  construction  train  and  guards 
to  repair  railroad  to  Manassas.  Let  there  be  no  delay  in  this. 
I  have  just  Wen  told  that  Franklin's  cotps  stopped  at  Anan- 
dale,  and  that  he  was  this  evening  in  Alexandria.  This  is  all 
contrary  to  my  orders.  Investigate  and  report  the  fact  of  this 
disobedience.  That  corps  must  pu«h  forward,  as  I  directed, 
to  protect  the  railroad  and  open  our  commanications  with 
Manassas." 

M'CLELLAN  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  IT. 

To  this  Gen.  McClellan  replies,  at  8  p.  m.,  re- 
ceived 8.50  p.  m.: 

"  It  wa*  net  safe  for  Franklin  to  mova  beyond  Anandale, 
under  the  circumstances,  until  we  knew  what  was  at  Vienna. 
Gen.  Frauklin  remained  here  until  about  1  p.  m  ,  endeavoring 
to  arrange  for  supplies  for  his  command.  1  am  responsible  for 
both  these  circumstances,  and  do  not  sse  that  either  was  in 
disobedience  to  j  our  orders.  Pleate  give  distiuct  orderB  in 
reference  to  Franklin's  movements  of  to-morrow.  *  *  *  *  In, 
regard  to  to-morrow's  movements  I  desire  definite  instructions, 
as  it  is  not  agreeable  to  me  to  be  accused  of  disobeying  orders, 
when  I  have  simply  exercised  the  discretion  you  committed  te 
me." 

At  10  p.  m.  Gen.  McClellan  telegraphs : 
"  Not  hearing  from  you,  I  have  sent  orders  to  Gen.  Franklin 
to  place  himself  in  communication  with  Gen.  Pope,  by  ad- 
vancing as  soon  as  possible,  and  at  the  same  time  cover  tho 
transit  of  Pope's  supplies." 

At  10  p.  m.  Gen.  McClellan  forwards  to  Gen. 
Halleck  a  dispatch  received  from  Gen.  Franklin 
at  Anandale,  dated  7 : 15  p  .m.,  in  which  Gen.  Franklin 
gives  rumors  concerning  the  battle  of  that  day,  clos- 
ing thus: 

"Pope  is  said  to  be  very  short  of  provisions,  and  the  country 
will  not  support  him." 

At  5  a.  m.  of  the  30th  of  August  Gen.  Pope  sent  a 
dispatch  to  Gen.  Halleck,  received  at  3.20  p.  m., 
from  battle-field  near  Groveton.  Virginia,  containing 
an  account  of  the  battle  of  the  day  before,  and  closing 
as  follows: 

M'CLELLAN  REFUSES  SUPPLIES  TO  POPE. 
"  I  think  you  had  best  send  Franklin's,  Cox's,  and  Sturgis's 
regiments  to  Centreville.  as  also  forage  and  subsistence.  1 
received  a  note  this  morning  from  Gen.  Franklin,  written  by 
order  of  Gen.  McClellan,  saying  that  wagons  and  cart  would 
be  loaded  and  sent  to  Fairfax  Station  as  soon  as  I  would  send 
a  cavalry  escort  to  Alexandria  t>  bring  them  out.  Such  a  re" 
quest,  when  Alexandria  is  Jvll  of  troops  and  we  fighting  the 
enemy,  needs  no  comment.  Will  you  have  these  supplies  sent, 
without  the  least  delay,  to  Centreville  ?" 

At  9.40  a.  m.,  August  30,  Gen.  Halleck  telegraphs 
to  Gen.  McClellan: 

"  I  am  by  no  means  satisfied  with  Gen.  Franklin's  march  of 
yesterday,  considering  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  He  was 
very  wrong  in  stopping  at  Anandale.  Moreover,  I  learned  last 
night  that  the  Quartermaster's  Department  could  have  given 
him  plenty  of  transportation,  if  he  had  applied  for  it,  any  time 
since  bis  arrival  at  Alexandria.  He  knew  the  importance  of 
opening  communication  with  Gen.  Pope's  army,  and  should 
have  acted  more  promptly." 

At  11  a.  m.  Gen.  McClellan  telegraphs: 

"  Have  ordered  Sumner  to  leave  one  brigade  in  the  vicinity 
of  Chain  Bridge,  and  to  move  the  rest,  via  Columbia  Pike,  on 
Anandale  and  Fairfax  Court-House,  if  this  is  the  route  you 
wish  them  to  take.  He  and  Franklin  are  both  instructed  to 
join  Pope  as  promptly  as  po&aible.  Shall  Conch  move  also 
when  he  arrives?" 

At  12:20  p.  m.  Gen.  Halleck  telegraphs: 
"I  think  Couch  should  land  at  Alexandria,  and  be  im- 
mediately pushed  out  to  Pope.  Send  the  troops  where  the 
fighting  is.  Let  me  know  when  Couch  arrives,  as  I  may 
have  other  information  by  that  time.  *  *  *  Send  trans- 
ports to  Acquia  to  bring  np  Bnrnfide's  command.  I  nave 
telegraphed  to  him,  and  am  awaiting  his  answer." 

At  2:15  p.  m.  Gen.  Halleck  telegraphs: 
"Frankin's  and  all  of  Sumner's  corps  should  be  pushed  for- 
ward with  all  possible  dispatch.  They  most  use  their  legs  and 
make  forced  marches.    Time  now  is  everything." 

At  5  p.  m.  Gen.  McClellan  telegraphs  to  Gen. 
Halleck: 

"Major  Hammerstein  of  my  staff  reports,  from  two  miles 
this  oicle  of  Cetrevilie,  at  1:30  p.  m.,  tiut  Franklin's  corps 
was  then  advancing  rapidly.  Sumner's  corps  moved  at  1 :45 
p.m.  The  orderly  who  brought  the  dispatch  fiom  Hammer- 
stein states  th  it  he  learned  tbat  the  fighting  commenced  five 
miles  beyond  Centreville,  and  that  our  people  had  been  driv- 
ing them  all  day.  Hammerstein  says  all  he  learns  was  favor- 
able." 

At  10:10  p.  m.  Gen  Halleck  telegraphs  to  Gen. 
McClellan: 

"  All  of  Sumner's  C  irpa  on  the  south  side  of  the  river,  not 
actually  required  in  the  forU,  should  march  to  Pope's  relief 


18 


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Replace  them  with  new  regiments.  Fratklin  should  also  be 
hurried  on  to  re-enforce  Pope." 

On  the  same  day — Aug.  30.  hour  not  given — Gen. 
McClellau  eent  the  fallowing  to  Gen.  Halleck. 

"Ever  since  Gen.  Franklin  received  notice  that  he  was  to 
march  from  Alexandria,  he  has  been  using  erery  effort  to  get 
transportation  for  his  extra  ammunition.  But  he  was  uui- 
formly  told  by  the  Quartermasters  here  that  there  was  noue 
disposable,  and  his  command  marched  without  wagons.  After 
the  departure  of  his  corps,  at  6  a.  m.  yesterday,  he  procured 
20  wagons  to  c^rry  a  portion  of  his  ammunition,  by  unloading 
some  of  Gen.  Banks's  supply  train  for  that  purpote. 

"  Gen.  SumDer  was  one  entire  day  in  endeavoring,  by  ap- 
plication upon  Quartermasters  and  others,  to  get  a  sufficient 
number  of  wagoDs  to  transport  his  reserve  ammuuition,  but 
without  success,  and  was  obliged  to  march  without  it 

"  1  have  this  morning  sent  all  my  headquarters  train  that  is 
landed  to  be  at  occe  loaded  with  ammunition  for  Sumner  aud 
Franklin,  but  they  will  not  go  far  to  ward  supplying  the  defi- 
ciency. 

•'  Eighty-fire  wagons  were  got  together  by  the  Quartermas- 
ter last  night,  loaded  with  subsistence,  and  sent  forward  under 
an  escort  at  1  a.  m.,  via  Alexandria. 

"  Every  effort  hasbeen  made  to  carry  out  your  instructions 
promptly.  The  difficulty  seems  to  consist  in  tne  fact  that 
the  grr-ster  part  of  the  transportation  on  hand  at  Alexandria 
and  Washington  l  a?  been  needed  for  current  supplies  of  the 
garrisons.  At  ail  events,  such  is  the  state  ot  the  case  as  rep- 
resented to  me  by  the  Quartermaster,  and  it  appears  to  be 
true.  I  tdke  it  for  granted  that  this  has  not  been  properly  ex 
plained  to  you." 

At  10:45  a.  m.  of  the  31tt  of  August,  Gen.  Pope 
sends  the  following  to  Gen.  Halleck  Iroui  Centreville : 

"  Our  troops  are  all  here,  and  in  position,  though  much 
used  up  and  worn  out.  1  think  it  wouid.  perhaps,  have  been 
greatly  better  if  Sumner  and  Franklin  had  been  here  three  or 
four  days  aio.  But  you  may  rely  upon  our  sivinj  tnem  (tne 
enemy)  as  desperste  a  fight  as  1  can  force  our  men  to  stand 
up  to.  I  shsu.d  like  to  know  wbe;her  you  feel  s-cure  about 
Washington,  should  this  army  be  des  roytd.  I  shall  nt lit  it 
as  long  as  a  man  will  stand  op  to  the  work.  You  must  judse 
what  is  to  be  done,  having  iu  view  the  safety  of  the  capital. 
The  enemy  is  already  pushing  a  cavalry  reconnoissauce  in  our 
front  at  Cub  Run,  wither  in  advance  of  an  attach  to-day  I 
don't  yet  know.  I  send  jou  this  that  you  may  know  our 
position  and  my  purpose." 

On  the  2d  of  September  Gen.  Pope  was  ordered  to 
fall  back  to  the  vicinity  of  Washington,  where  his 
army  cauie  under  the  command  of  Gen.  McCiellan. 
M'CLELLAN  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  POPE'S  DEFEAT. 

The  following  is  from  the  testimony  of  Gen.  Hal- 
leck : 

"Question.  Bad  the  Army  of  the  Peninsula  been  brought 
to  co-operate  with  the  Army  of  Virginia  with  the  utmost 
energy  that  circumstaices  would  have  permitted,  in  ycur 
judgment,  as  a  mililary  man.  would  it  no:  have  resulted  in  our 
victory  instead  of  <.ur  defeat  ? 

-  Answer.  I  thought  so  at  the  lime,  and  6tLl  think  so." 

In  relation  to  the  command  of  Gen.  McCiellan,  he 
himself  testifies  as  follows: 

"Question.  WhBt  position  did  you  occupv  after  your 
arrival  at  Alexaodiia,  and  you  had  forwarded  the  troops 
which  had  ueen  under  your  command  t:>  the  astistauce  of 
Geu.  Pope  ? 

"  Answer.  I  was  for  some  little  time — one  or  two  davs,  two 
or  three  days,  perhaps — wiihout  any  position:  merely  at  my 
©amp,  without  auy  command  On"  Monday,  the  1st  of  Sep- 
tember, I  received  verbal  instructions  from  Gen.  Halleck  to 
take  command  of  the  defenses  of  Wasaixgt  ju.  I  w*s,  how- 
ever, expressly  prohibited  from,  in  any  wav,  assuming  any 
control  over  tne  troops  ur.drr  Gen.  Po'f  e.  I  think  it  was  on 
the  next  day  after  that  1  was  instructed  veroaiiv  by  the 
President  and  Uen.  Halleck  to  go  out  and  meet  the  armv 
which  was  coming  in,  and  to  assume  command  ot  it  when  it 
approached  the  position  that  1  considered  it  ought  to  occupy 
for  defensive  pa  po^es,  and  to  post  it  properly." 

The  testimony  of  Gen.  Halieck  upon  the  same 
point  is  as  follows: 

"Question.  What  was  the  position  of  Gen.  McClellau  in 
regard  to  the  troops  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  as  they 
landed  at  Acquia  Creek  and  Alexandria  ?  Were  tnev  under 
hiscommsna;  and  it  so,  now  long  did  they  remain  under  his 
command? 

'•Answer.  Gen.  McClellau  retained  the  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  as  it  landed  at  those 
two  points,  except  such  portions  of  it  as  were  sent 
into  the  ;:t:d  ULder  Gen.  Pope.  Those  portions  were  consid- 
erea  as  temporarily  detached  fiooi  his  command,  but  f ti  1  be- 
longing to  his  army,  and  he  was  directed  that  ail  orders  sent 
from  mm  to  the  troops  as  detached,  while  under  Gen.  Pope's 
immediate  command,  DOnN  sent  through  toe  headquaiters 
at  V\  t5-.iLgu.2j.  He  retained  command  of  all  the  t.co;s  of 
his  army  a*  they  landed  at  those  place*  until  sent  into  the 
field,  and  repo.  ted  to  Gen.  Pope;  and  they  continued  to  re- 
main under  hu  command,  with  the  exception  of  his  detach- 
ment, until  Geu.  Pope's  army  fell  back  on  Washington 
when  all  came  unuer  Gen.  McCieUan's  command.    On  his 


(Gen.  McClel'.&n's)  arrival  at  Alexandria  he  waa  to'd  to  take 
immediate,  command  of  all  the  troops  in  and  about  Washing- 
ton, in  addition  to  those  which  properly  beloDjied  to  the  Army 
of  the  Pc  tomac.  Some  davs  after  he  had  bevn  verbally  direct- 
ed to  take  such  command  he  asked  for  a  f  jrmal  order,  which 
was  issued  from  the  Adjutant-General's  ofri.e.  The  order 
issued  from  the  Adjutant-General's  offi  ce  was  after  Gen. 
Pope's  army  commenced  falling  back,  and  was  dated  Sept.  2; 
but  Gen.  McCiellan  had  been  in  command  ever  since  his  arri- 
val in  Alexa-idria. 

"  Question,    At  what  time  did  he  arrive  in  Alexandria  ? 

"Answer.  He  arrived  at  Alexandria  on  the  2'3th  of  August 
The  formal  order  was  i-sued  that  he  might  have  no  difficulty 
with  Gen.  Pope's  forces ;  that  they  might  not  queuiou  bis 
authority." 

THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  MARYLAND. 

Very  soon  after  Geu.  Pope  and  His  army  fell  back 
on  "Washington  the  Rebel  army  entered  Maryland. 
Preparations  were  immediately  made  by  the  author- 
ities in  Washington  to  follow"  them. 

In  relation  to  the  command  of  th9  army  in  Mary- 
land your  Committee  will  quote  from  the  testimony 
of  G,n.  McClallm  and  Gen.  Halleck.  The  testi- 
mony of  Geu.  McCiellan  is  as  follows: 

"Question.  What  position  did  you  occupy  after  your  ar- 
rival at  Alexandria,  and  you  had  forwarded  tue  troops  which 
had  been  under  your  commani  to  the  assistance  of  Gen. 
Pope  ? 

"  Answer.  I  was  for  some  little  time— otie  or  two  days, 
two  or  three  da\s.  perhaps — wiihoat  any  posi  iou;  merely  at 
my  camp,  without  any  commaud.  On  Monday,  the  1st  of 
September,  I  received  verbal  iustiuctions  from  Geo.  Hulleck 
to  take  command  of  the  defenses  of  Washington.  I  was, 
however,  expressly  prohibited  from,  in  any  way,  assuming 
any  control  over  the  troops  under  Gen.  Pop*.  I  think  it  was 
on  the  next  day  after  that  that  I  was  instructed  verbally  by 
the  President  and  Gen.  Hal  eck  to  go  out  and  me«t  the  army 
which  wus  coming  in.  and  to  assume  command  of  it  when  it 
approached  the  position  which  I  considered  it  ought  to  occa- 
py  for  defensive  purposes,  and  to  post  it  properly. 

M'CLELLAN  FORGETS. 

"  Question.  How  long  did  you  remain  in  command  of  the 
defenses  of  Washington,  at.d  what  orders  did  you  next  re- 
ceive, nod  from  whom  ? 

'  A  wwer.  1  do  not  think  that  order,  assigning  the  defenses 
of  Washington,  was  ever  rescinded,  or  any  other  oue  issued  in 
its  place.  I  had  oniy  verbal  communications  with  Gen.  Hal- 
leck before  I  stirted  on  the  Antietam  ca^ipai^n.  And  it  was 
never  definitely  decided,  up  to  the  time  tbat  I  left,  as  to 
whether  I  was  to  go  or  not.  I  asked  the  question  two  or  three 
times  of  Gen.  Halleck,  whether  1  was  to  command  the  troops 
in  the  fi^'d.  and  he  said  it  had  not  been  determined.  And  I  do 
not  think  that  it  ever  was.  /  think  tnat  was  une  of  those  things 
that  grtic  into  shape  ise'f.    When,  the  time  came  1  went  out." 

The  lolloping  u  the  testimony  of  Gen.  Halleck 
upon  that  point: 

"  Question.  By  whose  orders  was  Gen.  McCiellan  placed  in 
commatd  of  the  army  that  left  Washington  to  operate  in 
Maryland;  aud  were  these  orders  verbal  or  iu  writing? 

"Answer.  As  I  -tated  the  ether  day,  the  order  tout  given 
verbally  t)  Geu  McCiellan  by  the  President,  at  G*n.  McClel- 
lajS*  h^usf,  about  9  o'cl  ck  in  th'.  morning, previous  to  Gen.  Mc- 
Ciellan leaving  the  city  for  Rockvrlle. 

■•  1  will  aid  that  Gen.  McCie  Ian,  in  virtue  of  big  being 
placed  in  command  of  the  foitincations  of  Washington  and 
the  troops  lor  defense  within  them,  was  really  in  command  of 
all  the  trooj  s  here  at  that  time.  The  question  was  discussed 
by  the  President  lor  two  or  three  days  ag  to  who  should  take 
command  of  the  troops  that  were  to  go  into  the  field.  The 
decision  teat  made  by  himsdf,  and  announced  to  G-.n.  McCiel- 
lan in  my  pr.stncr.  1  did  n.t  know  wnat  the  decision  was 
unti  I  heard  it  thus  announced." 

M'CLELLAN  FORGETS  AGAIN. 

In  regard  to  the  instructions  giveuto  Gen.  McClel- 
lau his  testimony  is  as  follows: 

"  Qaestion.  Did  you  have  any  interview  with  the  President 
in  relation  to  taking  command  of  the  troops  for  the  Maryland 
campaign,  or  receive  any  instructions  from  him  on  that 
point  ? 

'•Answer.  Id?  not  think  he  gave  me  any  instructions  tfter 
that  morning,  when  I  was  told  to  take  command  of  the  army 
n  front  of  \Vashingtcn.  I  do  not  think  he  gave  me  any  in- 
structions about  the  Maryland  campaign. 

'•  After  you  commenced  the  movement,  did  you  receive  any 
instructions  from  any  one  ? 

"Answer.  I  received  some  telegrams,  that  might  be  locked 
upon  in  the  nature  of  instructions,  from  Gen.  Halleck  and 
Ircm  the  Present,  ihe  general  tenor  of  Halleck's  dis- 
patches was  that  I  was  committing  an  errvr  in  g  >>ng  so  far 
away  frvm  Washington  ;  that  I  was  going  rather  too  fast. 
He  had  tue  impression  tbat  the  main  force  of  the  enemy  was 
on  the  south  eide  of  tLe  Potomac,  and  that  tbey  hod  only  a 
small  force  in  front  cf  me  to  draw  me  on,  and  then  tliey 
would  come  into  Washington  in  rear.  As  late  as  the  13th  of 
September.  I  recai.ect  a  telegram  r,f  Gen.  Halleck:  in  which 
he  press-ed  tha'  Seine  idea,  and  told  me  that  I  was  wron^  in 
goiLg  so  far  away."  r 


19 


by 


The  testimony  of  Gen.  Halleck  upon  that  point  is 
as  follows: 

'•  Question.  What  instruction*,  if  any,  were  given  to  Gen. 
McCleiun  in  regard  to  the  conduct  of  the  campaign  in  Mary- 
land ? 

*  "Answer.  The  diy  the  Pretident  gate  Gen.  McCUilan  di- 
reetio.it  to  take  command  of  the  forces  in  the  field,  we  had  a 

ffeng  conversation  in  regard  to  the  campaign  in  Maryland.  I; 

[was  agreed  between  u»  that  the  troops  should  move  np  the 
Potomac,  and,  if  p-ssible.  separate  that  portion  o:"  Gen.  Lee's 
army  wnich  bad  crosiei  the  Potomac  from  the  remainder  on 

'  the  Virginia  side.  There  were  no  definite  instructions,  fur- 
ther than  that  understanding  between  us,  as  to  the  general 

1  flan  of  the  campaign. 

"I submit  Herewith  copies  of  di«patche?  to  and  from  Gen. 
MeClellan.  after  be  left  Washington  to  take  coram  at  d  of  op- 

[••rations  in  Maryland,  to  the  time  thst  he  was  relieved  from 
command.  Ttiese  papers  comprise  aH  the  dispatches  sent  to 
and  received  fr<  m  Gen.  MeClellan,  so  far  as  I  know,  except  a 
letter  datrd  October  13,  addressed  to  him  by  the  President, 
and  wbicb  was  shown  to  me  j  ist  as  the  President  was  about 
to  dispatch  it  to  G-n.  MeClellan,  and  Gen.  McClellan's  reply, 
dated  October  17."  [The  letter  of  the  Presiden-,  with  the 
reply  of  Gen.  McCleLan,  is  incorporated  in  another  part  of 
this  reoott-J 

"  In  regard  to  Gen.  SIcClel'an's  going  too  /tutor  too  far 
from  Wa\hint.tm.  there  can  be  found  no  tuch  telegram  from 
me  to  him.    He  has  mistaken  the  meaning  of  t&e  trlezrams  I 

'  seat  him.  I  telegraphed  him  that  he  was  goins  too  far,  not 
from  Washington,  bat  from  the  Potomac,  leaving  Gen.  Lee 
the  opportunity  to  come  down  the  Potomac  and  get  between 
him  and  Washington.  I  thought  Gen.  MeClellan  should  keep 
more  upon  the  Potomac,  and  press  forward  his  left  rather  than 
his  right,  so  as  the  more  readily  to  relieve  Harper's  Ferry, 
which  was  the  point  then  in  most  immediate  dinger;  that  he 
was  pushing  forward  his  right  too  last  relatively  to  the  move- 

PMntB  of  his  left — not  that  the  army  was  moving  tso  fast  or 
too  far  from  Washington." 

The  letter  of  Gen.  Halleck  of  Sept.  13,  referred  to 
Gen.  MeClellan,  is  as  follows: 
"  Sent  10:45  a.  m. 

■•  Wak  Department.  } 
"  Washington.  D.  C>S-pt.  13,  1862.  5 
"Major-Gbn.  McClbixan:  Yours  of  5:30  p.  m.,  yester- 
vday,  is  just  received.  Gen.  Banks  cannot  safely  spare  eight 
Bew  regiments  from  here.  You  must  remember  that  very 
few  tr  :ops  are  now  received  from  the  North,  nearly  all  being 
stopped  to  guard  the  railroad.  Four  regiments  were  ordered 
.to  Gen.  Dix  to  replace  Peck's  division.  Porter  to-jk  away 
yetterdiy  oxer  20.00U.  Until  you  know  more  certainly  the 
enemy's  force  south  of  the  Potomac  you  are  wrong  in  thus 
■■covering  the  capital  I  am  of  opinion  that  the  enemy  will 
sesd  a  small  column  to  Pennsylvania,  so  as  to  draw*  your 
forces  in  that  direction,  then  suddenly  move  or.  Washington 
wit !_  the  forces  eo&tn  o:  the  Potomac,  and  those  he  may  cross 
ever. 

*•  In  your  letter  of  the  lltfc  yoo  attach  too  little  importance 
to  the  capital.  I  assure  you  that  you  are  wrong.  Tee  capture 
of  this  place  will  throw"  us  oack  six  mor.tcs.~if  it  should  not 
destroy  us.  Beware  of  the  evils  I  now  point  out  to  you.  You 
saw  them  when  nsre.  bat  yoa  seem  to  i"  j.-ge:  them  in  the  dis- 
tance. No  mnre  troops  can  be  sent  from  here  till  we  nave 
fresh  arrivals  from  the  North." 

M  CLELLAN    PROPOSES    TO    SACRIFICE  WASH- 
INGTON. 

The  let  er  from  Gen.  MeClellan.  of  the  11th,  to 
which  Gen.  Halleck  here  refers,  contains  the  fol- 
lowing: 

'"I  believe  this  army  fully  appreciates  the  importance  of  t 
victory  a:  this  time,  and  will  figat  well;  but  the  result  of  a 
general  battle,  with  such  edds  as  the  euemy  now  appears  to 
have  against  us,  might,  to  say  the  least,  be  doubtful;  and,  if 
we  shoald  be  defeated,  the  consequences  to  the  country 
would  be  disastrous  in  the  extreme.  Coder  these  circum- 
stances, I  would  recommend  that  one  or  two  of  the  three 
army  corps  now  or.  the  Potomac,  opposite  Washington,  be  at 
once  withdrawn,  and  sent  to  re-er.force  this  army."  I  would 
also  auvt.-e  that  the  force  of  CoL  Miles  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
where  it  can  be  of  little  use.  and  is  continually  exposed  to  be 
''cot  off  by  the  enemy,  be  immediately  ordered  here.  This 
woulu  add  about  21. 0,0  old  troops  to  our  present  force,  and 
would  grea  ly  Btrei  gthen  u;. 

"  If  tnere  are  any  Rebel  forces  remaining  on  the  ether  side 
of  the  Potomac,  they  must  be  so  few  that  the  troops  left  in 
the  fort?,  af.er  the  two  co  ps  shall  have  been  withdrawn,  will 
be  sufficient  to  check  them :  and  with  the  large  cavalry  force 
now  on  that  side.  sept  well  out  in  front  to  give  warning  of 
the  distant  approach  of  any  very  large  army,  a  part  of  this 
army  might  be  sent  back  within  the  intrenciiments  to  assist 
in  repelling  au  attack.  But  even  if  Washington  should  be  taken 
while  these  armies  are  confronting  each  other,  this  would  not, 
in  my  judgmenf.  bear  comparison  with  the  ruin  and  disasters 
whica  would  follow  a  s  ngle  defeat  of  this  army.  If  we  should 
he  successful  in  conquezing  the  gigantic  Rebel  army  before  as, 
we  would  have  no  diriicuity  in  recovering  it.  On  the  other 
hand,  shoald  their  force  prove  sufficiently  powerful  to  defeat 
■a,  could  all  the  forces  now  around  Wasningon  oe  sufficient 
to  prevent  such  a  victorious  army  from  carrying  the  woiks  cn 
this  side  of  tte  Potomac  after  taey  are  uncovered  by  cur 
army?   I  thkk  not." 


Your  Committee  having  gone  eo  fully  into  the  de- 
tails of  the  Peninsula  campaign,  do  not  deem  it 
necessary  to  devote  eo  much  space  to  the  campaign 
in  Maryland.  The  same  mind  that  controlled  the 
movements  upon  the  Peninsula  controlled  those  in 
Maryland,  and  the  same  general  features  character- 
ize the  one  campaign  that  characterized  the  other. 
In  each  may  be  seen  the  same  unreadiness  to  move 
promp:ly  and  act  vigorously ;  the  same  desire  for 
more  troops  before  advancing;  and  the  same  refer- 
ences to  the  great  superiority  of  numbers  on  tbe 
part  of  the  enemy.  Your  Committee,  therefore,  con- 
tent themselves  with  referring  briefly  to  the  leading 
operations  of  the  campaign. 

HARPER'S  FERRY. 

In  relation  to  the  surrender  of  Harper's  Ferry, 
your  Committee  have  not  deemed  it  necessary  to 
take  much  testimony  apon  that  subject.  Tue  mili- 
tary commission  which  was  convened  in  this  city  in 
October  last  fally  investigated  that  subject,  and  their 
report  has  been  given  to  the  public.  Attention  is 
called  merely  to  two  telegrams  of  Sept.  11.  which 
passed  between  Gen.  MeClellan  and  Gen.  Halleck, 
and  which  are  as  follows : 

•'  Rockvillb,  Sept.  11 — 9:45  a.  m 

"  CoL  Miles  is  at  or  near  Harper's  Ferry,  I  understand, 
with  9,000  troops.  He  can  do  nothing  where'  he  is,  but  could 
be  of  great  service  if  ordered  to  join  me.  I  suggest  that  be  be 
ordered  at  once  to  join  me  by  the  most  practicable  route. 

"  GEO.  B.  Mc  ILELL  AN. 

"  Major-General  Commanding. 
•*  Maj  r-Gea.  H.  W.  Hai.t.ecs-  Ger-eral-iE-CMef." 

"  Was  Dspaet»bxt.  ) 
•'  Washtvgtox.  D.  C  ,  Sept.  11.  18o2— Sent  2:20  p  m.  i 

"  There  is  no  way  for  Col.  Miles  to  join  you  at  present. 
The  only  chance  1b  to  defend  His  works  until  you  can  open  a 
communication  with  him.  When  you  d">  so,  he  will  be  tab- 
ject  is  your  orders.  EL  W.  HALLECK. 

■■  Generii-i'-C^irf. 

"  Major-Gen.  McClell^.v  R:  :>v-:..r." 

SOUTH  MOUXTADf. 
On  the  14th  of  September  tbe  battle  of  Sooth 
Mountain  was  fought — the  troops  at  Turner's  Gap 
being  under  command  of  Gen.  Burnside,  and  those 
at  Crampton  s  Gap  being  under  the  command  of 
Gen.  Franklin — resulting  in  the  enemy  retiring  to 
the  vicinity  of  Shepaerdstown. 

ANTIETAM. 

On  the  17th  of  September  the  battle  of  Amietam 
was  fought.  It  was  commenced  by  Gen.  Hooker  oa 
the  right,  at  dawn,  our  troops  driving  the  ejemy 
before  them,  aDd  gaining  an  important  poskion. 
When  Gen.  Hooker  was  wounded  and  taken  from 
the  field,  Gen.  Sumner  took  command  of  our  right. 
Gen.  Sumner  ha i  teen  ordered  to  hold  his  corps  in 
readiness  to  advance  an  hour  before  daylight,  bat 
did  no:  receive  the  order  to  advance  ujtil  7:20  in 
the  morning.  Gen.  Mansfield,  who  had  come  up  to 
the  support  of  Gen.  Hooker,  had  been  killed.  Our 
troops,  seeing  their  leaders  fall,  and  being  very 
heavily  pressed  by  the  enemy,  were  forced  Dack  for 
some  "distance  from  the  advanced  position  Gen. 
Hooker  had  reached;  but  finally,  With  the  assistance 
of  the  troops  brought  up  by  Gen.  Sumner,  checked 
the  enemy's  progress  and  maintained  taeir  position. 

On  the  left,  Gen.  Burnside,  about  10  o'clock,  was 
ordered  to  attack  the  enemy  a:  the  bridge  across  the 
Antietam  in  his  front,  and  to  effect  a  crossing  there. 
Tne  advance  of  Gen.  Burnside  was  met  by  a  most 
obstinate  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  and  it 
was  not  until  lj  o'clock  that  the  bnlge  was  carried. 
By  3  o'clock  Gen.  Burnside's  whole  command  had 
crossed  and  taken  position  on  some  elevated  ground 
just  above  the  bridge.  He  was  then  ordered  to  take 
the  bights  commaucing  the  town  of  Shep  herds  to  wtj, 
which  was  done  after"  desperate  fighting.  By  that 
time  the  enemy  on  our  left  had  been  re-enforced  by 
withdrawing  some  of  their  troops  from  opposite  our 
right,  where  our  advance  had  been  checked,  and 
Gen.  Burnside  was  compelled  to  give  up  some  of 
the  ground  he  hid  succeeded  in  occupying.  He  had 
sent  to  Gen.  MeClellan  for  re-enfereements,  but  re- 
ceived in  reply  that  there  were  none  to  be  had.  but 
he  must  hold  the  bridge  at  all  hazards. 


20 


The  corps  of  Gen.  Fitz  John  Porter,  in  the  center, 
wasnot  brought  into  action  at  all.  Gen.  Hooker  testi- 
fies that  he  had  been  given  to  understand  that  there 
were  to  be  attacks  made  simultaneously  on  the  right, 
center,  and  left  of  our  army.  He  attacked  at  dawn ; 
but  Gen.  Burnside  on  the  left  was  not  ordered  to  at- 
tack until  10  o'clock.,  and  there  was  no  attack  made 
in  the  center  by  Gen.  Porter. 

M'CLELLAN  ATTACKS  BY  DRIBLETS. 

In  regard  to  the  manner  of  conducting  the  attack 
at  Antietam,  Gen.  Sumner  testifies: 

"  I  have  always  believed  that,  instead  of  sending  these 
troops  into  that  action  in  driblets  as  they  were  sent,  if  Gen. 
McClellan  had  authorized  me  to  march  these  40,000  men  on 
the  left  flank  of  the  enemy,  we  could  not  have  failed  to  throw 
them  right  back  in  trout  of  the  other  divisions  of  our  army  on 
our  left— Bumside's,  Frauklin's.  and  Porter's  corps.  As  it 
was,  we  went  in,  division  after  division,  until  even  one  of  my 
own  divisions  was  forced  out.  The  other  two  drove  the 
enemy  and  held  their  position.  My  intention  at  the  time 
was  to  have  proceeded  entirely  on  by  their  left  and  move 
down,  bringing  them  right  in  front  of  Burnside,  Franklin  and 
Porter. 

"  Question.  And  all  escape  for  the  enemy  would  have  been 
impossible  ? 

"  Answer.    I  think  so." 

The  battle  closed  at  dark,  our  army  having  gained 
some  little  advantages,  at  a  heavy  loss,  bnt  nothing 
decisive.  The  attack  was  not  renewed  the  next 
day,  the  two  armies  occupying  the  positions  held  by 
them  at  the  close  of  the  yesterday's  battle. 

WHY  THE  ATTACK  WAS  NOT  RENEWED. 

In  relation  to  the  policy  of  renewing  the  aUo$k 
on  the  day  after  the  battle,  Gen.  McClellan  testifies: 

"The  next  morning  (the  18th)  I  found  that  our  loss  had 
been  so  great,  and  the  e  wes  so  much  disorganization  in  some 
of  the  commands,  that  I  did  not  consider  ic  proper  to  reuew 
the  attack  that  day.  especial  y  as  1  was  sure  of  the  arrival  that 
day  of  two  fresh  divisions,  amounting  to  about  15,000  man. 
As  an  instance  of  the  condition  of  some  of  the  troops  that 
morning,  I  happened  to  recollect  tbe  returns  of  the  Fir.-t 
Corps — lien.  Hooker's— mado  the  morning  of  the  18th,  by 
which  there  were  about  3,500  men  reported  present  for  duty. 
Four  days  after  that  the  returns  of  the  same  corps  showed 
13,500. 

THE  REBELS  ELUDE  M'CLELLAN. 
"  I  had  arranged,  however,  to  renew  the  attack  at  daybreak 
on  the  19th,  but  (  1-arned  some  time  during  the  night  or  early 
in  the  morning,  that  the  enemy  had  abandoned  his  position. 
It  af;e:ward  proved  that  he  moved  with  great  rapidity,  and, 
not  being  incumbered  by  wagons,  was  enabled  to  get  his 
troops  across  the  river  before  we  could  do  him  any  serious  in- 
jury. 1  think  that,  taking  iuto  consideration  what  tne  troops 
had  gone  through,  we  got  as  much  out  of  them  in  this  Antie- 
tam campaign  as  human  eudurance  would  bear." 

WHAT  BURNSIDE  THOUGHT. 

The  testimony  of  Gen.  Burnside,  on  the  subject 
of  renewing  the  attack  upon  the  enemy  the  day 
after  the  battle,  is  as  follows; 

"Question.  Did  you  expresi  any  opinion  to  Gen.  McClel- 
lan, or  to  any  one  at  headauarters,  in  relation  to  renewing  the 
attack  the  next  day  ;  and  if  so,  what  opinion  did  you  express  ? 

"  Answer.  I  did  express  an  opinion  to  Gen.  McClellan  on 
the  subject.  After  my  com mand  was  all  in  position— say  8V 
o'clock  at  night — I  went  over  to  Gen.  McClellan's  headquar- 
ters, at  Cadysvilie,  and  expressed  the  opinion  to  Gen.  Marcy, 
his  chief  of  stair",  that  the  attack  ought  to  be  renewed  the  next 
morning  at  5  o'clock.  I  also  expressed  the  tame  opinion  to 
other  members  of  Gen.  McClellan's  staff.  Gen.  Marcy  told 
me  that  1  ought  to  see  Gen.  Mc'Jlellau  and  tell  him  what  I 
thought  of  tne  matter.  1  went  iato  Gen.  McClellan's  tent, 
and  in  the  coarse  of  the  conversation  I  expressed  the  same 
opinion  to  him,  and  told  him  that  if  I  could  have  5,000  fresh 
troops  to  pass  in  advance  of  mine  I  would  be  willing  to  com- 
mence the  attack  on  the  next  morning.  He  sbid  that  he  had 
been  thinking  the  matter  over  and  would  make  up  his  mind 
during  the  night,  and  if  I  would  send  a  staff"  officer  to  his 
headquarters,  to  remain  there  over  night,  he  would  seud  me 
orders  early  in  the  morning;  arid  if  he  concluded  to  renew  the 
attack,  he  would  send  me  the  necessary  men.  1  did  send  the 
staff  officer  over,  but  G^u.  McClellan  concluded  not  to  renew 
the  attack  the  next  day. 

"  Questiorj.  Would  tnere  have  been  any  difficulty  in  fur- 
nishing the  5,000  fresh  troops  which  you  df>ired,  as  the  corps 
of  Gen.  Fitz-John  Porter,  some  15,000  or  20,000  men,  had  not 
been  engaged  ? 

"'Answer.  There  would  have  been  no  difficulty  in  furnish- 
ing tbe  5,000  trefh  troops.  In  fact,  Gen.  McClellan  did  send 
Gen.  Morell's  division,  of  quite  that  strength,  to  report  to  me, 
but  not  with  orders  to  me  to  renew  the  attack." 

FRANKLIN'S  OPINION. 
Gen.  Franklin  testifies: 

"  Question.  Were  you  oonsulted  in  relation  to  reaewing 
the  attack  the  next  day  ? 


"  Answer.  When  Gen.  McClellan  visited  the  right  In  the 
afternoon.  I  showed  him  a  position  on  the  right  of  this  wood 
I  have  already  mentioned,  in  which  was  the  Dunker  Church, 
which  I  thought  commanded  the  wood,  and  that  if  it  could  be 
taken,  we  could  drive  the  enemy  from  the  wood  by  merely 
holding  this  point.  I  advised  that  we  should  make  the  attack 
on  that  place  the  next  morning,  from  Gen.  Sumner's  position. 
I  thought  there  was  no  doubt  about  our  being  able  to  carry  it. 
We  had  plenty  of  artillery  bearing  upon  it.  We  drove  the 
enemy  from  there  that  afternoon,  and  I  Had  no  doubt  that  we 
could  take  that  place  ths  next  morning,  and  1  thought  that 
would  uucover  the  whole  lefc  of  tiie  enemy. 

"  Question.  If  that  had  been  made,  and  that  point  had  been 
carried,  what  would  have  been  the  effect  upon  the  enemy  1 

"  Answer.  It  would  have  been  very  disastrous  to  them". 

"Question.  What  reasons  were  given  for  not  making  the 
attack  the  next  morning  1 

"  Answer.  I  did  not  hear  the  direct  ressou  of  the  General 
Commanding,  but  I  have  understood  that  the  reason  was,  that 
he  expected  some  fifteen  thousand  new  troops — those  which 
would  make  the  thing  a  certain  thing — and  he  preferred  to 
wait  to  make  this  attack  ou  the  right,  until  these  new  troopa 
came. 

"Question.  And  that  di  lay  gave  thi  enemy  an  opportunity 

to  escape  ? 
"  Answer.  J  think  it  did." 

On  the  night  of  the  18th  of  September  the  enemy 
abandoned  their  position  and  retired  across  the  Poto- 
mac into  Virginia,  without  molestation.  Our  army 
slowly  followed,  and  took  up  a  position  along  the 
Potomac,  on  the  Maryland  side,  occupying  Maryland 
Hights  on  the  20th,  and  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  23d. 
LOSSES  ON  BOTH  SIDES. 

Gen.  McClellan,  on  the  29th  of  September,  re- 
ports our  losses  at  South  Mountain  at  2,325;  at  An* 
tietam,  12.469 — total  losses  in  both  battles,  14,794. 
In  relation  to  the  losses  of  the  enemy  in  both  those 
battles,  in  killed,  wounded,  prisoners  and  stragglers, 
Gen.  McClellan  says: 

"  It  may  be  safely  concluded,  therefore,  that  the  Rebel 
army  lost  at  least<j0.000  of  their  best  troops  in  thou  brief  cam- 
paign in  Maryland." 

M'CLELLAN  WANTS  MORE  RE-ENFORCEMENTS. 

After  the  battle  of  Antietam  Gen.  McClellan 
called  for  re-enforcements,  and  announced  his  deter- 
mination to  fortify  Maryland  Highte,  making  a  re- 
quisition on  Gen.  VVadsworlh,  then  in  Washington, 
lor  2,000  contrabands  lor  that  purpose.  On  the  27th 
or  September  he  writes  to  Gen.  Halleck: 

AND  PROPOSES  TO  FORM  A  MILITARY  SCHOOL. 

"  My  present  purpose  is  to  hold  the  army  about  as  it  now 
is,  rendeiing  Harper's  Ferry  secure,  and  watching  the  river 
closely,  inttnding  to  attack  the  enemy  should  he  attempt  to 
cross  to  this  side.  Our  posses.-iou  of  Harper's  Ferry  gives  us 
the  great  advantage  of  a  secure  debouche ;  but  we  cannot  avail 
ourselves  of  it  until  the  railroad  bridge  is  finished,  because  we 
cannot  otherwise  supply  a  greater  number  of  troops  than  we 
now  have  on  the  Virginia  side  at  that  point.  When  the  river 
rises  so  that  the  enemy  cannot  cross  in  force,  I  purpose  con- 
centrating the  army  somewhere  near  Harpei's  Ferry,  and  then 
acting  according  to  circumstances,  viz:  Moving  ou  Winches- 
ter if.  from  the  position  and  attitude  of  the  enemy,  we  are 
likely  to  gain  a  great  advantage  by  doing  so ;  or  else  devoting 
a  reasonable  time  to  the  organization  of  the  army  and  instruc- 
tion of  the  new  troops  preparatory  to  an  advance  on  what- 
ever line  may  be  determined.  In  any  event,  I  regard  it  as 
absolutely  necessary  to  send  new  regiments  at  once  to  the  old 
corps  for  purposes  of  instruction,  and  that  the  old  regiments 
be  tilled  at  once. 

*  *  *  *  *  * 

'•  My  own  vie<v  of  the  proper  policy  to  he  pursued  is  to  re- 
tain in  Washington  merely  the  force  nece.-sary  to  garrison  it, 
and  to  send  everything  else  available  to  re-enforce  this  Brmy. 
The  railroads  give  us  the  means  of  promptly  re-enforcing 
Washington,  should  it  be  necessary.  If  1  am  re-enforced  as  I 
ask,  and  am  allowed  to  take  my  own  course,  I  will  hold  my- 
self responsible  for  the  safety  of  W ashington." 

M'CLELLAN  KEEPS   HIS  MEN  IN  CAMP. 

On  the  7th  of  October  Gen.  Halleck  replies.  Af 
ter  referring  to  the  draft  expected  in  some  of  the 
Northern  ScateB  he  says: 

"  But  you  cannot  delay  the  operations  of  the  army  for  these 
drafts.  It  must  move,  and  the  old  Tegiinents  must  remain  in 
their  crippled  condition.  The  convalescents,  however,  will 
help  a  little.  The  country  is  becoming  very  impatient  at  the 
waut  of  activity  in  your  army,  aud  w«  must  push  it  on. 

"  I  am  satisfied  that  the  enemy  are  falling  back  toward  Rich- 
mond. We  must  follow  them  and  seek  to  puouh  them. 
Tnere  is  a  decided  want  of  legs  in  our  troops.  They  have  too 
much  immobility,  aud  we  must  try  to  remedy  t!ie  defect.  A 
reduction  of  Damage  and  baggage-trains  will  etfect  something ; 
but  the  real  difficulty  is  they  are  not  sufficiently  exercised  in 
marching-,  they  lie  still  in  camp  too  long. 

"After  a  hard  march  one  day  is  time  enough  to  rest ;  lying 
still  beyond  that  time  does  not  rest  the  men.     If  we  comparo 


21 


the  average  distance  marched  per  month  by  our  troops  for 
the  la«t  year  with  that  of  the  Rebels,  or  with  European 
armies  in  the  field,  we  will  see  why  our  troops  march  no  bet- 
ter. They  are  not  sufficiently  exorcised  to  make  them  good 
and  efficient  soldiers." 

On  the  1st  of  October  Gen.  McCleilan  asked  for 
authority  to  build  a  double  track  suspension  bridge 
and  a  permanent  wagon  bridge  across  the  Potomac 
at  Harper's  Ferry,  which  Gen.  Halleck  declined  to 
give.  About  that  time  the  President  visited  the 
army.  Alter  his  return  to  Washington  the  follow- 
ing order  was  sent  to  Geo.  McClellau  by  Gen.  Hal- 
leck: 

M'CLELLAN  ORDERED  TO  MOVE. 

•'  Wau  Department.  I 
-  Washington,  D.  C  ,  Oct.  6.  1862.  $ 

"lam  instructed  to  telegrauh  you  as  follows:  The  Presi- 
dent directs  that  you  cross  the  Potomac  and  give  battle  to  the 
enemy  or  drive  him  South.  Your  army  must  move  now 
while  the  roads  are  good. 

"  If  you  cross  the  river  between  the  enemy  and  Washing- 
ton, and  cover  the  Utter  by  your  line  of  operations,  you  can 
be  re-enforced  with  30,000  men.  If  you  move  up  the  valley 
of  the  Shenandoah,  not  more  than  12,000  or  15,000  cm  be  sent 
to  you.  The  President  advises  the  interior  line  between 
Washington  and  the  enemy,  but  does  not  order  it.  He  is 
very  desirous  that  your  army  move  as  soon  as  possible.  You 
will  immediately  report  what  time  yoa  adopt,  and  where  you 
intend  to  cros*  the  river ;  also,  to  what  point  there-enforce- 
ments are  to  be  sent.  It  is  necessary  that  a  plan  of  your 
operations  be  positively  determined  on  before  ordeis  are  given 
for  building  bridzes  or  repairing  railroads. 

"Iam  directed  to  add  tbat  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the 
G en eral-ia -Chief  fully  concur  with  the  President  in  these 
instructions. 

"  W.  H.  HALLECK,  Genera'-in-Chief. 
"  Maj.-Gen.  McClellan." 

To  this  Gen.  McCleilan  replies  on  the  same  day: 
"  It  is  important,  in  making  my  decUion  regarding  the 
route  to  be  taken  by  the  army,  that  I  should  know,  first, 
what  description  of  troops  I  am  to  be  re-enforced  with  upon 
the  Shenandoah  route,  and  also  upon  the  other  route  between 
the  enemy  and  Washington  ;  whether  they  are  to  be  old  or 
new  troops,  or  what  proportion  of  each.  If  possible,  I  should 
be  glad  to  have  Ptck's  divisiou  sent  to  me,  if  it  can  be  got  here 
within  a  reasonable  time. 

"  Second.  Will  you  iuform  me  what  the  present  condition 
of  the  Alexandria  and  Leesburg  Railroadas ;  also  the  Manassas 
Gap  Railroad;  and  what  time  it  would  require  to  put  them  in 
working  order  ?  It  is  believed  that  the  Harper's  Ferry  and 
Winchester  Railroad  is  not  materially  injured." 

To  this  Gen.  Halleck  replies  on  the  7th: 
"  The  Manassas  Gap  Road  can  he  repaired  in  a  few  days. 
The  Leesburg  Road  is  much  more  injured.  You  can  reach 
the  former  iu  less  time  than  would  be  required  to  repair  the 
latter.  The  troops  to  be  sent  you  will  be  partly  new  and 
partly  old— mostly  new." 

HIS  PLANS  AND  FEARS. 
On  the  same  day  Gen.  McClelkn  telegraphs : 

"After  a  full  consultation  with  the  corps  commanders  in  my 
vicinity,  I  have  determined  to  adopt  the  line  of  the  Shenau- 
doah  for  immediate  operations  against  the  enemy  now  near 
Winchester.  On  no  other  line  north  of  Washington  can  the 
army  be  supplied,  nor  can  it  on  any  other  cover  Maryland  and 
Pennsylvania.  Were  we  to  cross  the  river  below  the  mouth 
of  the  Shenaudoah,  we  would  leave  it  in  the  power  of  the  en- 
emy to  recross  into  Maryland,  and  thus  check  thp  movements. 
In  the  same  case  we  would  voluntarily  give  him  the  advantage 
of  the  strong  line  of  the  Shenandoah,  no  point  of  which  could 
be  reached  by  us  in  advance  of  him.  I  see  no  objective  point 
of  strategical  value  to  be  gained  or  sought  for  by  a  movement 
between  the  Shenandoah  aud  Washington. 

"  I  wish  to  state  distinctly  that  I  do  not  regard  the  line  of 
the  Shenandoah  Vulley  as  important  for  ulterior  objects.  It  is 
important  only  so  long  as  the  enemy  remains  near  Winches- 
ter. And  we  cinuot  follow  that  line  far  beyond  that  point, 
simply  because  the  country  is  destitute  of  supplies,  ani  we 
have  not  sufficient  means  of  transformation  to  enaoie  us  to  ad- 
vance more  than  20  or  35  milts  bevoud  a  railroad  or  canal  ter- 
minus. If  the  enemy  abandon  Winchester  and  fall  back  upon 
Staunton,  it  will  be  impossible  for  us  to  pursue  him  by  that 
route,  and  we  must  then  take  a  new  line  of  operations  baaed 
upon  water  or  railway  communication. 

"  The  only  possible  o'oject  to  be  gained  hy  an  advance  from 
this  vicinity  is  to  fight  the  enemy  near  Wiochester.  If  they 
retreat,  we  have  nothing  to  gain  by  pursuing  them,  and,  in 
fact,  cannot  do  so  to  any  great  distance.  The  objects  I  pro- 
posed to  myself  are — to  ligut  the  enemy,  if  they  remain  near 
Winchester;  or,  failing  in  that,  to  force  them  to  abandoii  the 
Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  there  to  adopt  a  new  aud  decisive 
line  of  operations  which  shallstrike  at  the  heart  of  the  Rebellion 

"I  have  taken  a;l  possible  measures  to  insure  the  most 
prompt  equipment  ot  the  troops.  But,  from  all  that  I  can 
learn,  it  will  be  at  least  three  days  before  the  first,  fifth,  and 
sixth  corps  are  in  readiness  to  move  from  their  present  camps. 
Tfley  need  shoes  and  other  indispensable  article.s  of  clothing, 
as  well  as  shelter  tent*,  &c.  I  beg  to  assure  you  that  not  an 
hour  shall  be  lost  in  carrying  your  instructions  into  effect. 


"  Please  send  the  re-enforcements  to  Haiper'B  Ferry.  > 
would  prefer  that  the  new  regiments  be  %ent  as  regiments,  not 
brigaded,  unless  already  done  so  with  old  troop*.  I  would 
aaain  ask  for  Peck's  division,  and,  if  possible,  Heintzelman's 
corps.  If  the  enemy  give  fight  near  Winchester,  it  will  be  a 
desperate  sflair,  requiring  all  our  resources.  I  hope  that  no 
time  will  be  lost  in  sendiug  forward  the  re  enforceuie»ts,  that 
I  may  get  them  in  hand  as  soon  as  possible." 

STUART'S  CAVALRY  RAID. 

On  the  10th  of  October  the  Rebel  General,  Stuart, 
made  his  raid  into  Pennsylvania,  returning  into  Vir- 
ginia, having  made  the  entire  circuit  of  our  army. 
On  the  13th  Geu.  McClellau  reported  to  Gen.  Hal- 
leck the  result  of  the  raid,  and  ascribed  its  success  to 
the  deficiency  of  our  cavalry,  and  urged  "the  imper- 
ative necessity  of  at  once  supplying  this  army,  in- 
cluding the  command  of  Gen.  Banks,  with  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  horses  to  remount  every  dismounted 
cavalry  soldier  within  the  shortest  possible  time.  It 
this  is  not  done  we  shall  be  constantly  exposed  to 
Rebel  cavalry  raids." 

To  this  Gen.  Halleck  repliee :  "  Your  telegram  of 
7  p.  m.  yesterday  ie  just  received.  As  I  have  already 
informed  you,  the  Government  has  been  aT>d  is  mak- 
ing every  possible  effort  to  increase  the  cavalry 
force.  Remounts  are  sent,  to  you  as  rapidly  as  they 
can  be  procured.  The  President  has  read  your  tel- 
egram, and  directs  me  to  suggest  that  if  the  enemy 
had  more  occupation  south  of  the  river,  his  cavalry 
would  not  be  so  likely  to  make  raids  north  of  it." 

THE  PRESIDENT  TO  M'CLELLAN. 

On  the  13th  of  October  the  Precideot  wrote  to 
Gen.  McCltllan  concerning  the  operations  of  the 
army.  And  on  the  17th  of  October  Gen.  McCleilan 
wrote  in  reply.  The  letter  of  the  President  and  the- 
reply  of  Gen.  McCleilan  are  as  follows; 

"  Executive  Mansion,  Washington,  Oct.  13,  1862. 

"  My  Dear  C>ir  :  You  remember  my  speakiog  to 
yon  of  what  I  called  your  overcautiousness.  Are 
you  not  overcautious  when  you  assume  that  you 
cannot  do  what  the  enemy  is  constantly  doing 
Should  you  not  claim  to  be  at  least  his  equal  in 
prowess,  and  act  upon  the  claim  ? 

"  As  I  understand,  you  telegraphed  Gen.  Halleck 
that  you  cannot  subsist  your  army  at  Yv'incuester, 
unless  the  railroad  from  Harper's  Ferry  to  that 
point  be  put  in  working  order.  But  the  enemy 
does  now  subsist  bis  army  at  Winchester  at  a  dis- 
tance nearly  twice  as  great  from  railroad  transporta- 
tion as  you  would  have  to  do  without  the  railroad 
last  named.  He  now  wagons  from  Culpepper 
Court-House,  which  is  just  about  twice  as  lar  as 
you  would  have  to  do  from  Harper's  Ferry.  Ha  is 
certainly  not  more  than  half  as  well  provided  with 
wagons  as  you  are.  I  certainly  should  be  pleased 
for  you  to  have  the  advantage  of  the  railroad  from 
Harper's  Ferry  to  Winchester;  but  it  wastes  all 
the  remainder  of  Autumn  to  give  it  to  you,  aud  in 
fact  ignores  the  question  of  time,  which  cannot  and 
mas',  not  be  ignored. 

"  Again,  one  of  the  standard  maxims  of  war,  as 
vou  know,  is,  '  to  operate  upon  the  euemy'a  commu- 
nications as  much  as  possible  without  exposing  your 
own.'  You  seem  to  act  as  if  this  applies  against 
you,  but  cannot  apply  iu  your  favor.  Change  posi- 
tions with  the  enemy,  and  think  you  not  he  would 
break  your  communication  with  Richmond  within 
the  next  twenty-four  hours  ?  You  dread  his  going 
into  Pennsylvania.  But  if  he  does  so  in  fall  lorce, 
he  gives  up  his  communications  to  yon  absolutely, 
and  you  nave  nothing  to  do  but  to  follow  and  ruin 
him;  if  he  does  so  with  less  than  full  force,  fall  upon 
aud  beat  what  is  left  behind  all  the  easier. 

"  Exclusive  of  the  water  line,  you  are  now  nearer 
Richmond  than  the  enemy  is  by  thy  route  that  you 
can  and  he  must  take.  Yvrhy  can  you  not  reach 
there  before  him,  unless  you  admit  tuat  he  is  more 
than  your  equal  on  a  march  ?  His  roate  is  the  arc 
of  a  circle,  wtdie  yours  is  the  chord.  The  roads  are 
as  good  on  yours  as  on  his. 

You  know  I  desired,  but  did  not  order,  you  to 
cross  the  Potomac  below  instead  of  above  the  Shen- 
andoah aud  Blue  Ridge.    My  idea  wae,  that  this 


22 


would  at  once  menace  the  enemy's  communications, 
which  I  would  seize  if  he  would  permit.  If  he 
should  move  northward,  I  would  follow  him  closely, 
holding  his  communications.  If  he  should  prevent 
our  seizing  his  communications,  aud  move  toward 
Richmond,  I  would  press  closely  to  him,  fight  him  if 
a  favorable  opportunity  should  present,  aud  at  least 
try  to  beat  him  to  Richmond  on  the  iusidd  track.  I 
Bay  'try;'  if  we  never  try,  we  shall  never  succeed. 
If  he  make  a  stand  at  Winchester,  moving  neither 
north  nor  south,  I  would  fight  him  there,  on  the  idea 
that  if  we  cannot  beat  him  when  he  hears  the  wast- 
age of  coming  to  us,  we  never  can  wheu  we  bear  the 
wastage  of  going  to  him.  This  proposition  is  a  simple 
truth, "and  is  too  important  to  be  lost  si^ht  of  for  a 
moment.  In  coming  to  us,  he  teuders  us  an  advan- 
tage which  we  should  not  waive.  We  should  not  so 
operate  as  to  merely  drive  him  away.  As  we  must 
beat  him  somewhere,  or  fail  finally,  we  can  do  it,  if 
at  all,  easier  near  to  us  than  far  away.  If  we  can- 
not beat  the  enemy  where  he  now  is,  we  never  cau, 
be  again  being  within  the  intrenchments  of  Rich- 
mond. 

"  Recurring  to  the  idea  of  going  to  Richmond  on 
the  inside  track,  the  facility  of  supplying  from  the 
side,  away  from  the  enemv,  is  remarkable,  as  it 
were  by  the  different  spokes  of  a  wheel,  extending 
from  the  hub  toward  the  rim,  and  this,  whether  you 
move  directly  by  the  chord  or  on  the  inside  arc, 
hugging  the  Blue  Ridge  more  closely.  The  chord- 
line,  as  you  se?,  canies  you  by  Aid  ie,  Hay  market 
and  Fredericksburg,  and  you  see  how  turnpikes, 
railroads,  and  finally  the  Potomac,  by  Acquia  Creek, 
meet  you  at  all  points  from  Washington.  Tbe 
same,  only  the  lines  lengthened  a  little,  if  you  press 
closer  to  the  Blue  Ridge  part  of  the  way.  The 
gaps  through  the  Blue  Ridge  I  understand  to  be 
about  the  following  distances  from  Harper's  Ferry, 
to  wit:  Vestal's,  five  miles;  Gregory's,  thirteen; 
Snicker's,  eighteen;  Ashbj's,  twenty-eight;  Man- 
assas, thirty-eight;  Chester,  forty-five,  and  Tuorn- 
ton's,  fiity-three.  I  should  thiak  it  preferable  to 
take  the  route  nearest  the  enemy,  disabling  him  to 
make  an  important  move  without  your  knowledge, 
and  compelling  him  to  ke9p  his  forces  together  for 
dread  of  you.  The  gaps  would  enable  you  to  attack 
if  you  should  wish.  For  a  great  part  of  the  way 
you  would  be  practically  between  the  enemy  and 
both  Washington  and  Richmond,  enabling  us  to 
spare  you  the  greatest  number  of  troops  from  here. 
When,  at  length,  running  for  Richmond  ahead  of 
him  enables  him  to  move  this  way;  if  he  does  so, 
turn  and  attack  him  in  the  rear.  But  I  think  he 
should  be  engaged  long  before  such  poitt  is  reached. 
It  is  all  easy  if  our  troops  march  as  well  as  the  ene- 
my, and  it  is  unmanly  to  say  they  caunot  do  it. 
This  letter  is  in  no  sense  an  order. 

"  Yours,  truly,  "  A.  LINCOLN. 

"  Mej.-Gen.  McClellan." 


'*  Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac,  ) 
•'  Camp  in  Pleasant  Valley,  Oct  17,  1862.  J 

"Sir:  Your  letter  of  the  13th  inst.  reached  me  yesterday 
morning,  by  the  hands  of  Col.  Perkins 

"  I  had  seat  out  strong  reconnoissance*,  early  in  the  morn- 
ing, in  the  direction  of  Chariestown.  Leetown.  &.O.,  and,  as 
sharp  artillery  firing  was  heard,  I  felt  it  incumbent  to  go  to 
the  front.  1  did  not  leave  Chariestown  until  dark,  &o  that  I 
have  been  unable  to  give  to  your  Excellency's  letter  that  full 
and  re-pectful  consideration  which  it  merits  at  my  hands. 

"  I  do  Dot  wish  to  detain  Col.  Perkins  beyond  thii  morn- 
ing's train.  I  therefore  think  it  best  to  send  him  back  with 
this  simple  acknowledgment  of  the  receipt  ol  your  Excel- 
lency's letter.  I  am  not  wedded  to  any  particular  plan  of 
operations.  I  hope  to  have,  to-day,  reliable  information  as 
to  tbe  position  of  the  ene  ny,  whom  I  still  believe  to  be  be- 
tween Bunker  Hill  and  Winchester.  I  promise  you  that  I 
will  tiive  to  your  views  the  fullest  and  most  unprejudiced 
consideration,  and  that  it  is  my  intention  to  advance  the  mo- 
ment my  men  are  shod,  and  my  cavalry  are  sufficiently  reno- 
yated  to  be  available. 

"  Your  Exctlle  icy  may  be  assured  that  I  will  not  adopt  a 
course  which  differs  at  all  from  your  views,  without  first 
fully  expl-rining  my  reasons,  and  giving  you  lime  to  issue 
such  instructions  as  may  seem  best  to  you. 

"  1  am,  Sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant. 

"GEO.  B.  McCLELLAN, 
"  Major-General  United  States  Army. 

"  His  Excellency  the  President." 


MORE  RE-ENFORCEMENTS  WANTED. 
Gen.  McClellan  continue  1  to  ask  for  ra-enforce- 
ments — for  horses — raying  that  the  is^ue  to  his  army 
was  only  150  per  week;  and  for  clothing,  stating 
that  his  arrny  needed  shoes  and  other  articles  of 
clothing,  and  "  had  for  some  time  past  been  suffering 
for  the  want  of  it,"  and  that  he  was  "  constra'ned  to 
believe  that  it  was  in  a  great  degree  owing  to  the 
want  of  proper  action  on  the  Dart  of  the  Qartermaa- 
ter's  Department."  The  subject  was  referred  to  the 
Quartermaster-General,  and  he  was  ca  lei  upon  for 
a  statement  in  regard  to  the  matter.  There  waa 
much  correspondence  upon  the  subject  between  Gen. 
Halleck,  Gen.  McClellan,  and  Gen.  Meigs.  The  re- 
sult of  the  examination  is  fully  stated  ia  the  follow- 
ing communication  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  of  the 
27th  of  October,  and  the  reply  of  Gen.  Hilleck,  of 
the  28th  of  October: 

M'CLELLAN'S  MISREPRESENTATIONS. 

"  War  Dkpaktment,  ) 
"  Washington  City,  Oct.  27,  1862. ) 

"General:  It  has  been  publicly  stated  thit  the  army 
under  Gi  n.  McClellau  has  been  unable  to  move,  during  the 
fine  weather  of  this  Fall,  for  want  of  shoes,  clothing,  and  other 
supplies.  You  will  please  report  to  this  Department  upon 
the  following  points: 

"  First :  To  whom,  and  in  what  manner,  the  requisitions  for 
supplies  to  tl.e  army  under  Gen.  McClellan  have  been  made 
siuce  you  a-sumed  command  as  Ceneral-in-Chief;  and  whether 
any  requisition  for  supplies  of  any  kind  has  since  tbat  time 
been  made  upon  the  Secretary  of  War,  or  communication  had 
witn  him,  except  through  you? 

"Second:  If  you,  as  General-in-Chief,  have  taken  pains  to 
ascertain  tbe  condition  of  the  army  in  respect  to  the  supplies 
of  shoes,  clothing,  arms,  and  other  necessaries :  an  ■  whether 
there  has  been  any  neglect  or  delay,  by  any  Department  or 
Bureau,  in  filling  the  requisitions  lor  supplies;  and  what  has 
been,  and  is,  the  condition  of  that  army,  as  com!  ared  with 
other  armies,  iu  respect  to  supplies? 

"Third:  At  what  date,  after  the  battle  of  Antietam,  the 
orders  to  advance  egiinat  the  enemy  were  given  to  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan, and  bow  often  hive  they  been  repeated? 

"Fourth:  Whether,  in  your  opinion,  there  bas  been  any 
want  in  the  army  under  Gen.  McClellan  of  shoes,  clothing, 
arma,  or  other  equipments  or  supplies,  that  ought  to  have  pre- 
vented its  advance  against  the  enemy  when  the  order  was 
given? 

'•  Fifth :  How  long  was  it  after  the  orders  to  advance  were 
given  to  Gun.  McClellan  before  he  informed  you  that  any 
shoes  or  clothing  were  wanted  in  his  army,  and  what  are  his 
means  of  promptly  communicating  the  wauts  of  the  army  to 
you,  or  to  the  proper  bureaus  ol  the  War  Department? 

"  EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

"  Secretary  of  War. 

"Maj  -Gen.  Halleck,  General-in-Chief." 

"Washington.  Oct.  28,  1862. 

"Sir:  In  reply  to  the  several  interrogatories  containsd  in 
your  letter  of  yesterday,  I  have  to  reporc: 

"First:  That  requisitions  for  supplies  to  the  army  under 
Gen.  McClellan  are  made  by  his  staff  officers  on  the  chiefs  of 
bureaus  here ;  that  is,  for  Quartermasters  supplies  by  his 
Chief  Quartermaster  on  the  Quartermaster-Geneiai  j  for  Com- 
missary supplies  by  his  Cnief  Commifl3ary  oa  the  Commis- 
sary-General, &c.  No  such  requisitions  have  been,  to  my 
knowledge,  made  upon  tne  Secretary  of  War.  aud  noue  upon 
the  General-in-Chief. 

"  Second:  On  several  occisiong  Gen.  McClellan  has  tele- 
graphed to  me  that  his  army  was  deficient  ia  certain  supplies. 
All  these  telegrams  were  immediately  referred  to  the  heads  of 
bureaus,  with  orders  to  report.  It  was  ascertained  that  in 
every  instance  the  requisitions  had  been  immediately  filled, 
except  one,  where  the  Quanermaster-Geaeral  had  been 
obliged  to  send  from  Philadelphia  certain  articles  of  clothing, 
tents,  &.c,  not  having  a  full  supply  here. 

"  There  has  not  been,  so  far  as  I  could  ascertain,  any  neg- 
lect or  delay  in  any  department  or  bureau  in  issuing  all  sup- 
plies asked  for  by  Gen.  McClellan,  or  by  the  officers  of  his 
staff.  Delays  L ave  occasionally  occurred  in  forwarding  sup- 
plies by  raii,  on  account  of  the  crowded  condition  of  the  de- 
pots or  of  a  want  ot  cars ;  but  whenever  notified  of  this,  agents 
have  been  sent  out  to  remove  the  difficulty.  U"der  the  ex- 
cellent superintendence  of  Gen.  Haupt  I  think  these  delays 
have  been  less  frequent  and  of  shorter  dnration  t:ian  i«  usual 
with  freight  trains.  Any  army  of  the  size  of  that  of  Gen. 
McCiellau  will  frequently  be  for  some  days  without  the  sup- 
plies asked  for,  on  account  of  neglect  in  maaing  timely  requi- 
sitions, and  unavoidable  delays  in  fotwaraiug  them  and  in 
distributing  them  to  the  different  brigades  and  regimeuts. 
From  all  tne  information  I  can  obtain,  I  am  of  the  opinion 
that  the  requisitions  from  ttiat  army  have  been  lit  ed  more 
prompt  y.  and  that  trie  men,  as  a  general  rule,  bave  been 
better  supplied  than  our  armies  operating  in  tbe  West.  The 
latter  have  operated  at  much  greater  distances  lrom  the 
scurces  of  supply,  and  have  had  lar  less  facilities  for  transpor- 
tation. In  fine,  I  believe  tnat  no  armies  in  the  world,  wnile 
in  compaign,  have  been  more  promptly  or  better  supplied 
than  ours. 

"  Third:  Soon  after  the  battle  of  Antietam  Gen.  McClellan 
was  uiged  to  give  me  information  of  his  iutended  movements 


23 


in  order  that,  if  he  moved  between  the  enemy  and  Washing- 
ton, re-enforcements  could  be  sent  from  this  place.  On  the 
let  of  October,  finding  that  he  proposed  to  operate  from 
Harper's  Ferry ,  I  urged  Mm  to  oross  the  river  at  euce  and 
give  battle  to  the  enemy,  pointing  out  to  him  the  disadvan- 
tage of  delaying  till  the  autumn  rains  had  swollen  the  Poto- 
mac m<i  impaired  the  roads.  On  the  6th  of  October  he  was 
peremptorily  ordered  '  to  cross  the  Potomac  and  give  battle  to 
the  enemy,  or  drive  bim  south.  Your  army  must  move  now 
while  the  roads  are  good.'  It  will  be  observed  that  three 
weeks  have  elapsed  since  this  order  was  given. 

"  Fourth:  In  my  opinion  there  has  been  no  such  want  of 
supplies  in  the  army  under  Gen.  McClellan  as  to  prevent  his 
compliance  with  tbe  oiders  to  advance  against  the  enemy. 
Had  he  moved  to  the  south  side  of  the  Potomac  he  could 
have  received  bis  supplies  almost  as  readily  as,  by  remaining 
inactive,  on  tbe  north  side. 

"  Fifth:  On  the  7th  of  October,  in  a  telegram  in  regard  to 
his  intended  movements,  Gen.  McClellan  stated  that  it  would 
require  at  least  three  days  to  supply  the  First,  Fifth  and  Sixth 
Corps;  that  they  needed  shoes  and  other  indispensable 
articles  of  clothing,  as  well  as  shelter  tents.  No  complaint 
Was  made  that  any  requisitions  had  not  been  filled;  aud  it  was 
inferred  from  his  language  that  he  was  only  waiting  for  the 
distribution  of  his  supplies, 

"  On  the  11th  he  telegraphed  that  a  portion  of  his  supplies, 
sent  by  rail,  had  been  delayed.  As  already  stated,  agents 
were  immediately  sent  from  here  to  investigate  this  complaint ; 
and  they  reported  that  everything  had  gone  forward.  On  the 
•ame  date  (the  11th)  he  spoke  of  many  of  his  horses  having 
broken  dowu  by  fatigue.  On  the  12th  he  complains  that  the 
rate  of  supply  wa>  only  150  horses  per  week  for  the  entire 
army,  there  and  in  front  of  Washington.  I'immediately  di- 
rected the  Quarterrna-aer-General  to  inquire  into  this  matter, 
and  to  report  why  a  larger  number  was  not  furnished.  GeD. 
Meigs  reported  on  the  14th  that  tbe  average  issue  of  horses  to 
Gen.  McClellan's  army,  in  the  field  aud  in  frout  of  Washing- 
ton, for  the  previous  six  weeks,  had  been  1,450  per  week,  or 
8,754  in  all;  in  addition,  that  a  large  number  of  mules  had  been 
supplied  ;  aud  that  the  number  of  animals  with  Gen.  McClel- 
lan's army,  on  the  Upper  Potomac,  was  over  31,000.  He  also 
reported  that  he  was  then  sending  to  the  army  all  the  horses 
he  could  procure. 

"On  the  18th  Gen.  McClellan  states,  in  regard  to  Gen. 
Meigs's  report,  that  he  had  filled  every  requisition  for  shoes 
and  clothing:  '  Gen.  Meigs  may  have  ordered  those  articles  to 
be  forwarded,  but  they  have  not  reached  our  depots;  and  un- 
less greater  effort  to  iusure  prompt  transmission  is  made  by 
the  departmeut  of  which  Gen.  Meigs  is  the  head,  they  might 
as  well  rem;  in  in  New-York  or  Philadelphia,  so  far  as  this 
army  is  concerned.'  1  immediately  called  Gen.  Meigs's  atten- 
tion to  this  apparent  neglect  of  his  department.  On  the  25th 
he  reported,  as  the  result,  of  his  investigation,  that  48,000  pairs 
of  boots  and  shoes  had  been  received  by  the  quattermaster  of 
Gen.  McClellan's  army  at  Harper's  Ferry,  Frederick,  and 
Hagerstown;  that  20,000  pairs  were  at  Harper's  Ferry  depot 
on  tbe  21st;  that  10,000  more  were  on  their  way  ;  and  15,000 
more  ordered.  Col.  Ii  galls,  aide-dt-camp  and  chief  quarter- 
master to  Gen.  McClellan,  telegraphed  on  the  25th  ;  '  The  suf- 
fering for  want  of  clothing  is  exaggerated  1  think;  and  cer- 
tainly might  have  been  avoided  by  timely  requisitions  of  regi- 
mental aud  brigade  quartermasters.'  On  the  24th  he  tele- 
graphed to  the  quartermaster-general  that :  'the  clothing  was 
not  detained  in  the  cars  at  the  depots;  such  compla  ntsare 
rrouadless.  The  fact  is,  the  clothing  arrives  end  is  issued ; 
but  more  is  stil  needed.  I  have  ordered  more  than  would 
seem  necessary  from  any  dsta  furnished  me;  and  I  beg  to  re- 
mind you  that  you  have  always  very  promptly  met  all  my 
requisitions  as  far  as  clothing  is  concerned.  Our  department 
i9  not  at  fault.  It  provides  as  soon  as  due  notice  is  given.  I 
foresee  no  time  when  an  army  of  over  100,t00  men  will  not 
Oall  for  clothing  and  other  articles.' 

"  In  regard  to  Gen.  McClellan's  means  of  promptly  commu- 
nicating the  wants  of  his  army  to  me,  or  to  the  pioper  bureaus 
of  the  War  Department.  I  repeat  that,  in  addition  to  the  ordi- 
nary imils.  he  has  been  in  hourly  communication  with  Wash- 
ington by  telegraph. 

"  It  is  due  to  Gen.  Meigs  that  I  should  submit  herewith  a 
copy  of  a  telegram  received  by  him  from  Gen.  McClellan. 
TSee  documents.] 

"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 
"  Hon.  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War." 

m'clexlan  still  delays. 
On  Oct.  21,  Gen.  McClellan  informs  Gen.  Halleck 
that  be  has  nearly  accomplished  supplying  his  army 
with  the  clothing  absolutely  necssary 'for  marching. 
He  complains,  however,  of  his  want  of  cavalry,  and 
concludes: 

"  Without  more  cavalry  horses  our  communications,  from 
the  moment  we  march,  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  large 
cavalry  fores  of  the  enemy,  and  it  would  not  be  possible  for 
us  to  cover  our  rlanks  properly,  or  to  obtain  the  necessary  in- 
formation of  the  position  and  movements  of  the  enemy  in 
such  a  way  as  to  insure  success.  My  experience  has  shown 
the  necessity  of  a  large  and  efficient  cavalry  foice.  Under  the 
foregoing  circumstances.  I  beg  leave  to  ask  whether  the  Presi- 
dent desires  me  to  march  on  the  enemy  at  once  or  to  await 
the  reception  of  the  new  horses,  every  possible  step  having 
been  taken  to  iusure  their  prompt  arrival." 

To  this  Gen.  Halleck  replies  on  the  same  day.  at 
3:30  p.m.: 


"  Your  telegram  of  12  m.  has  been  submitted  to  the  Presi- 
dent. He  directs  me  to  say  that  he  hps  no  change  to  make  in 
his  order  of  the  6th  inst.  If  you  have  not  been,  and  are  not 
now,  in  condition  to  obey  it,  you  will  be  able  to  show  such 
want  of  ability.  'Ihe  President  doeb  not  expect  impossibili- 
ties, but  is  very  anxious  that  all  this  good  weather  should 
not  be  wasted  In  inactivity." 

On  the  22dof  October  Gen.  McClellan  telegrapba: 

"  Alter  full  consultation,  I  have  decided  to  move  upon  th« 
line  indicated  by  the  President  in  his  letter  of  the  13th  inst., 
and  have  accordingly  taken  steps  to  execute  the  movement. 
I  will  inform  you,  from  time  to  time,  of  the  occupation  of 
Leesburg,  Hillsborough,  Suickersville,  fee.  I  shall  need  all 
the  cavalry  and  other  re-enforcements  you  can  send  me  from 
Washington." 

On  the  23d  Gen.  Halleck  replies: 

"  Should  you  move  as  proposed  in  your  telegram  of  yester- 
day, I  can  send  about  20,000  men  from  Washington  to  re-en- 
force you." 

ABOUT  CAVALRY. 

On  the  25th  of  October  Gen.  McClellan  transmits 
to  Gen.  Halleck  a  report  of  Col.  Robert  Williams, 
commanding  a  detachment  of  cavalry,  in  which  it  is 
stated  that  nearly  half  his  horses  are  unsound,  from 
"  sore  tongue,  grease,  and  consequent  lameness  and 
sore  backs,"  and  that  "the  horse3  which  are  still 
sound  are  absolutely  broken  down  from  fatigue  and 
want  of  flesh." 

To  this  the  President  replies  to  Gen.  McClellan 
on  tte  same  day: 

"  I  have  just  read  your  dispatch  about  sore  tongue  and  fa- 
tigued horses.  Will  you  pardon  me  for  asking  what  the 
horses  of  your  army  have  done  since  the  battle  of  Antietam 
that  fatigues  anything?" 

Gen.  McClellan  replies  on  the  same  day: 
"  In  reply  to  your  telegram  of  this  date,  I  have  the  honor  to 
state,  from  the  time  this  army  left  Washington,  on  the  7th  of 
September,  my  cavalry  has  been  constantly  employed  in  mak- 
ing recoanoissances,  scouting  and  picketing.  Since  the  battle 
of  Antietam  six  regiments  have  made  a  trip  of  200  miles,  march- 
ine  55  miles  in  one  day,  while  endeavoring  to  reach  Stuart's  cav- 
alry. Gen.  Pleasauton,  in  his  official  report,  states  that  he, 
with  the  remainder  of  our  available  cavalry,  while  on  Stuart's 
track,  marched  78  miles  in  24  honurs.  Beside  th^se  two  re- 
markable expeditions,  our  cavalry  has  been  engaged  in  picket- 
inn  and  scouting  150  miles  of  river  front  since  the  battle  of 
Ail tietam,  and  haV  made  repeated  reconnoissances  since  that 
time,  engaging  the  enemy  on  every  occasion,  and,  indeed,  it 
has  performed  harder  service  since  the  battle  than  before.  I 
beg  that  you  will  also  consider  that  this  same  cavalry  was 
brought  from  tbe  peninsul",  where  it  encountered  most  la- 
borious service,  and  was,  at  the  commencement  of  this  cam- 
paign, in  low  condition,  and  from  that  time  to  the  present  has 
had  no  time  to  recruit.  If  any  instance  can  be  foutid  where 
overworked  cavalry  has  performed  more  labor  than  mine 
since  the  battle  of  Antietam  I  am  not  conscious  of  it." 
The  following  is  the  reply  of  the  President: 
"  Yours,  in  reply  to  mine,  about  horses,  received.  Of 
course,  you  know  the  facts  better  than  I.  Still,  two  considera 
tions  remain:  Stuaii's  cavalry  outmarched  ours,  having  cer- 
tainly done  more  marked  service  on  the  peninsula  aid  every- 
where since.  Secondly,  will  not  a  movement  of  our  anny 
be  a  relief  to  the  cavalry,  compelling  the  enemy  to  concen- 
trate  nstead  of  'foraging'  in  squads  everywhere?" 

MORE  MEN  WANTED. 

On  the  27th  of  October,  Gen.  McClellan  tele- 
graphed to  the  President: 

•'Your  excellency  is  aware  of  the  very  great  reduction  of 
numbers  that  has  taken  place  in  most  of  the  old  regiments  of 
this  command,  and  how  necessary  it  is  to  fill  up  these  skele- 
tons before  taking  them  again  into  action.  1  have  the  honor, 
therefore,  to  request  that  the  order  to  till  up  the  old  regiments 
with  drafted  men  may  at  once  be  issued." 

To  this  the  President  replies  as  follows  on  the 
same  day: 

"  Your  dispa'ch  of  3  p.  m.  of  to-day.  in  regard  to  filling  up 
old  regiments  with  drafted  men,  is  received,  and  tte  request 
therein  shall  be  complied  with  as  far  as  practicable. 

'And  now  I  ask  a  distinct  answer  to  the  question:  Is  it  your 
purpose  not  to  go  into  action  again  until  the  rxen  now  being 
drafted  in  the  States  are  incorporated  in  the  old  regiments?" 

The  following  is  Gen.  McClellan's  reply— after  re- 
ferring to  previous  communications  in  relation  to  fill- 
ing up  the  old  regiments,  he  says: 

"  In  the  press  of  business,  I  then  called  an  aide, 
and  telling  him  1  had  conversed  with  you  upon  the 
subjected,  1  directed  him  to  write  for  me  s  dispatch, 
asking  your  excellency  to  have  the  necessary  order 
given.  I  regret  to  say  that  this  officer,  after  wriiing 
the  dispatch,  finding  me  still  engaged,  sent  it  to  the 
telegraph  office  witnout  first  submitting  it  to  me, 
under  the  impression  tbat  he  had  communicated  my 


views.  He,  however,  unfortunately  added,  1  before 
taking  them  into  action  again.'  Tnia  phrase  was  not 
authorized  or  intended  by  me.  It  has  conveyed  al- 
together an  erroneous  impression  as  to  my  plans  and 
intentions.  To  your  excellency's  question  I  answer 
distinctly  that  1  have  not  had  any  idea  of  postponing 
the  advance  until  the  old  regiments  are  filled  by 
drafted  men.  I  commenced  crossing  the  army  into 
Virginia  yesterday,  and  shall  push  forward  as  rap- 
idly as  possible  to  endeavor  to  meet  the  enemy." 

Your  Committee  would  say  tuat,  in  their  opinion, 
a  stall'  officer  who  could,  f  rom  negligence  or  other 
cause,  add  to  a  dispatch  from  the  General  command- 
ing an  army  to  the  President,  that  which  tl  was  not 
authorized  or  intended,"  should  at  least  be  assigned 
to  some  Ooher  duty. 

m'clellan  takes  four  weeks  to  cross  the 

POTOMAC. 

The  movement  of  the  army  across  the  river,  which 
was  commenced  upon  the  2(ith  of  October,  coulinued 
slowly,  uutil  on  the  5th  of  November  Gen.  McClel- 
lan  announced  to  the  President  that  the  last  corps 
of  his  army  finished  crossing  on  the  3d  of  Novem- 
ber, just  four  weeks  from  the  time  the  order  to  cross 
was  given. 

In  the  letter  to  the  President,  of  the  17th  of  Oc- 
tober, Gen.  McClellan  writes: 

"  Your  Excellency  may  be  assured  that  1  will  not  adopt  a 
coarse  which  differs  at  all  from  your  views  without  first  fully 
explaining  my  reasons  aud  giving  you  time  to  issue  such  in- 
structions as  niay  seem  best  to  you." 

THE  END  OF  M'CLELLAN. 
Gen.  McClellan  was  relieved  from  the  command 
of  tne  Army  of  the  Potomac,  in  pursuance  of  the 
following  orders: 

"Headquarters  of  the  Army.  ) 
"  Washington,  D.  C,  Nov.  5,  1862.  5 
"  General:  On  receipt  of  the  order  of  the  President,  sent 
herewith,  you  will  immeJiately  turn  over  your  command  to 
Major-Gen.  Buruside,  aud  repair  to  Treutou.  New-Jersey, 
reporting  ou  your  arrival  at  that  place  by  telegraph  for  further 
orders.    Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant. 

"  H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 
"Major-Gen. McClellan.  Commauuing,  &c,  &c." 

"War  Department,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  i 
"  Washington,  Nov.  5,  1862.  J 
"General  Orders,  No.  182. — By  direction  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  it  is  ordered  that  Maior-Gen. 
McClellan  be  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  that  Major-Gen.  Burn»ide  take  th<j  command  of 
that  army. 

"  By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

"E.  D.  TOWNSEND,  Assistant  Adjutant-General." 

OPERATIONS  UNDER  GEN.  BURNSIDE. 

Upon  assuming  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac, Gen.  Burnside  at  once  determined  to  follow 
the  line  of  operations  which  be  had  previously  sug- 
gested to  Gen.  McClellan;  that  is,  to  make  Fred- 
ericksburg the  base  of  his  operations.  He  assumed 
command  ou  the  7th  or  8th  of  November,  aud  on  the 
9tb  forwarded  to  Washington  his  proposed  plan  of 
operations.  On  the  12th  of  November  Gen.  Halleck 
came  to  Warrenton,  and,  with  Gen.  Meigs,  had  a 
conversation  with  Gen.  Burnside  upon  tne  future 
movements  of  the  army. 

Gen.  Buruside  stated  that  his  plan  was  "  to  con- 
centrate the  army  in  the  neighborhood  of  Warren- 
ton; to  make  a  small  movement  across  the  Rappa- 
hannock, as  a  feint,  with  a  view  to  divert  the 
attention  of  the  enemy,  and  lead  them  to  believe 
that  we  were  going  to  move  in  the  direction  of  Gor- 
donsville,  and  then  to  make  a  rapid  movement  of  the 
whole  army  to  Fredericksburg;"  for  the  reason 
that  "  we  would  all  the  time  be  as  near  Washington 
as  would  the  enemy,  and  after  arriving  at  Freder- 
icksburg we  would  be  at  a  point  nearer  to  Kich- 
mond  than  we  would  be  even  if  we  should  take 
Gordonsville." 

THE  PONTOONS — WHO  IS  RESPONSIBLE  FOR 
THEIR  DELAY? 
Gen.  Burnside  desired  to  have  provisions  and 
forage,  together  wich  pontoons  to  enable  the  army 
to  cross  the  liappuhaunock.  Gen.  Meigs  testifies 
that  while  at  Warrenton  he  wrote  an  order  to  Gen. 
Woodbury,  in  VVcis'iiugtou,  to  call  on  the  Quarter- 
master at  Washington  for  transportation  for  the 


24- 


pontoons  to  Acquia  Creek,  which  order  Gen.  Halleck 
bigned,  and  it  was  sent  off'  to  the  telegraph  office. 

WOODBURY  SAYS  HE  WAS  NOT.  » 

Gen.  Woodbury  states  that  he  received  that  order 
on  the  morning  of  the  13th  of  Nov.   He  testifies: 

"  Gen.  Halleck's  order  to  me  of  the  13th  mad*  it  apparent 
that  the  army  was  preparing  to  march  to  Fredericksburg.  As 
to  the  time  when  the  movement  would  be  mude  I  never  re- 
ceived ar.y  information.  Fearing,  however,  that  the  move- 
ment wo  iid  be  precipitate.  I  weat  to  Gen.  Halleck's  office, 
and  urged  him  to  delay  the  movement  some  five  days,  in  order 
that  the  necessary  preparations  might  be  made  to  insure 
succes?.  To  this  he  replied  that  he  would  do  nothing  to 
deliy  for  au  instant  the  advance  of  thearmy  oa  Rich- 
mond. I  rejoiued  that  my  suggestion  was  not  intended  to 
cause  deliy,  but  rather  to  prevent  r.  In  making  this  sugges- 
tion I  had  reference  not  only  to  the  pontoon  traia,  but  the 
landiugs  still  to  be  created  lor  the  Quartermaster  and  Com- 
missary Departments." 

HALLECK  SAYS  HE  WAS  NOT. 
Gen.  Halleck  testifies: 

"  I  will  state  that  all  the  troops  in  Washington  and  its  vi- 
cinity were  under  the  command  of  Gen.  McClellan  when  he 
was  relieved,  and  be  issued  his  orders  directly  to  the  com- 
manding officer  of  Washington,  with  one  single  restriction: 
that  no  troops  should  be  moved  from  the  comojand  of  Wash- 
ington until  I  was  notified  by  Gen.  McClellan  or  the  com- 
manding officer  here.  In  all  other  respects  thej'  were  all  un- 
der bib  direction.  Gen.  Burnsi  ie,  when  he  relieved  him,  was 
told  that  they  lemained  precisely  the  same  as  before.  On  my 
visit  to  Gen.  Burnside,  at  Warrenton,  on  the  12th  of  Novem- 
ber, in  speaking  about  the  boats  and  things  that  he  required 
from  here,  I  repeated  to  him  that  they  were  all  subject  to  his 
oiders  with  that  single  exception.  To  prevent  the  necessity 
of  the  commanding  officer  here  reporting  the  order  lor  the 
boats  here,  the  order  was  drawn  up  upon  hi*  table,  and  signed 
by  me,  directly  to  Gen.  Woodbury,  ou  the  evening  of  the 
12th,  1  think— the  evening  that  I  was  there.  I  saw  Gen. 
Woodbury  on  my  return,  and  he  told  me  he  had  received  the 
order.  I  told  him  that  in  all  these  matters  he  was  under  Gen. 
Burnside's  direction.  I  had  nothing  further  to  give  him,  ex- 
cept to  communicate  that  order  to  him.  In  conversation  with 
him  and  Gen.  Meigs,  it  was  proposed  that  the  train  of  pon- 
toous  should  go  down  by  laud,  as  they  could  be  gotten  down 
sooner  in  that  way,  without  interfering  with  the  supplies 
which  had  to  be  sent  to  Acquia  Creek.  1  gave  no  other  o'rder 
or  direction  in  relation  to  the  matter  than  that  all  other  mat- 
ters were  under  Gen.  Burnside's  direction,  lie  also  informed 
me,  while  at  Warrenton,  that  Capt.  Duane,  Chief  of  the  Engi- 
neers, had  also  sent  an  order  to  Harper's  Ferry  for  the  pon- 
toon traiu  there  to  go  down.  The  order  had  been  issued. 
They  being  under  Gen.  Burnside's  immediate  and  direct  com- 
mand, I  did  not  interfere  at  all  in  relation  to  them. 

"  Question.  Do  you  know  whether  there  was  any  delay  in 
etartina  them,  or  in  their  progress  there? 

"  Answer.  I  heard  that  there  was  a  delay  from  the  steam- 
ers getting  aground  with  the  pontoons;  aud  there  was  a  delay, 
as  1  understood,  in  the  train  going  down  by  laud,  on  account 
of  the  difficulty  of  the  roads,  and  the  inexperience,  perhaps, 
of  the  officers  in  command,  and  it  had  to  be  taken  by  water 
part  of  the  way  ;  it  could  not  get  get  through  by  land.  I  con- 
sidered, from  tne  reports  I  received,  that  these  delay s  resulted 
mainly  from  accident  aud  the  elements,  that  no  man  had  any 
control  over.  Gpn.  Burnside  telegraphed  to  me  in  relation  to 
Gen.  Woodbury,  thinking  that  he  had  not  used  due  diligence  j 
but  afterward  told  me  he  was  perfectly  satisfied  with  what 
Geu.  Wooabury  had  done,  and  tuat  he  did  not  know  but  what 
the  commanding  officer  of  the  train  that  went  devvn  had  done 
his  duty  also;  that  he  was  disposed  to  make  no  further  in- 
vestigation of  that  matter;  that  he  was  pretty  well  satisfied. 

"  Question.  Was  there  any  request  for  you  to  delay  the 
advance  of  the  men  until  the  boats  arrived,  or  anything  of 
that  kind  1 

"Answer.  No,  Sir.  I  remember  this,  that  Gen.  Wood- 
bury, in  conversation  with  me,  said  that  Gen.  Buruside  could 
not  get  down  for  several  days  alter  I  told  him,  and  that  he 
coulu  not  land  the  boats  until  Gen.  Burnside  arrived;  1  think 
I  remarked  to  him  that  I  did  not  know  exactly  the  day  when 
Gen.  Burnside  would  move;  but  1  could  not  tell  him,  as  the 
General  did  not  know  himself.  Wliile  I  was  ar  Warrenton  he 
proposed  this  movement,  and  he  was  directed  to  brake  all 
preparations  for  it.  but  not  to  begin  it  until  the  President 
was  consulted.  1  returned  on  the  afternoon  of  the  13tb,  and, 
1  think,  ou  the  morning  of  the  14th,  I  had  an  interview  with 
the  President,  in  which  he  consented  to  Gen.  Burnside's 
plans,  and  I  ioiiuediateiy  telegraphed  to  him  to  go  ahead  as  he 
had  proposed.  1  understood  that  there  was  considerable 
deiay  in  getting  the  boats  from  Acqiia  down  to  the  Rappa- 
baunock  River,  on  account  of  the  bad  roads,  difficulty  of 
transportation,  &c,  but  no  other  delay  than  that  whica  would 
naturally  occur  over  a  rough  couutry  lite  that;  aud  acci- 
dental delay  in  laying  the  biidges  was  reported  to  me,  from 
the  inexperience  of  the  poutouiers  who  laid  the  upper 
bridges ;  there  was  considerable  delay  in  that.  We  could  not 
commence  the  repair  of  the  rtilroad  until  Gen.  Burnside  took 
po.-session  of  it,  as  it  was  all  in  the  possession  of  the  enemy, 
'i hat  was  understood  betweeu  him  and  Gen.  iiaupt,  in  my 
pieseuce.  Geu.  Haupt  went  out  with  me  to  make  the  ar- 
rangement for  repairing  the  roads  as  early  as  pos»ible.  I  re- 
member the  conversation  ;  he  could  not  laud  anything,  but 
would  have  everything  down  ready  as  ooon  as  he  could,  and 


25 


when  he  found  Gen.  Burnside  was  in  possession,  he  would 
cominence." 

BURNSIDE    EVIDENTLY  WAS  NOT. 

Gen.  Burnside  testifies  in  relation  to  the  forward- 
ing of  the  pontoons: 

"  I  understood  that  Gen.  Halleck  was  to  ?ive  the  necessary 
orders,  and  then  the  officers  who  should  receive  those  orders 
were  the  ones  responsible  for  the  pontoons  coming  here 
(Fredericksbun?).  I  could  have  earned  out  that  part  of  the 
plan  through  officers  of  my  own;  but,  having  just  taken  the 
command  of  an  army  with  which  I  was  but  little  acquainted, 
it  W88  evident  that  it  wa*  as  much  as  I  could  attend  to,  with 
the  assistance  of  all  my  officers,  to  change  its  position  from 
Warren  ton  to  Fredericksburg ;  and  I  felt,  indeed  I  expected, 
that  all  the  parts  of  the  plan  which  were  to  be  executed  In 
Washington  would  be  attended  to  by  the  officers  at  that 
place,  under  the  direction  of  the  different  departments  to 
which  those  parts  of  the  plan  appertained. 

"  Question.  Did  you  or  not  understand  thaf  you  yourself 
were  to  be  responsible  for  seeing  that  those  orders  were  car- 
ried out  ? 

"Answer.  I  did  not.  I  never  imagined  for  a  moment  that 
I  had  to  carry  out  anything  that  required  to  be  done  in  Wash- 
ington." 

On  the  16th  of  November  Gen.  Burnside  started 
the  columns  of  his  army  from  Warrenton  to  Freder- 
icksburg, not  having  heard  anything  of  the  delay  of 
the  pontoons  from  Washington.  The  telegram  an- 
nouncing the  delay  did  not  reach  Gen.  Burnside 
until  the  19th  of  November.  The  corps  of  Gen. 
Sumner  was  in  the  advance,  and  it  was  the  intent  on 
that  he  should  cross  over  to  Fredericksburg  and  take 
possession  of  the  place.  But  the  non-arrival  of  the 
pontoons  in  time  prevented  the  movement  which 
had  been  contemplated,  and  necessitated  the  adop- 
tion of  other  measures. 

THE  BATTLE    OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 

Gen.  Burnside  then  began  to  make  preparations 
for  another  movement,  bringing  up  the  pontoons  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  to  euuble  his  forces  to  cross  the 
river  j 

The  plan  determined  upon  was  to  cross  the  river 
at  two  points;  the  right  wing  to  cross  opposite  Fred- 
ericksburg, and  the  left  win«  to  cross  from  three  to 
four  miles  below  the  city.  The  left  wing  was  com- 
posed of  the  Left  Grand  Division,  with  a  corps  from 
the  Center  Grand  Division,  making  a  force  of  from 
50,000  to  60,000  men,  the  whole  being  under  com- 
mand of  Maj.-Gen.  Franklin.  The  crossing  was 
made  successfully  at  both  points,  but  with  much  op- 
position from  sharpshooters  on  the  right. 

PLAN  OF  BATTLE. 

Gen.  Burnside  states  the  following  in  regard  to 
his  plan  of  attack: 

"  The  enerny  had  cut  a  road  along  in  the  rear  of  the  line  of 
hights  where  we  made  our  attack,  by  meaos  of  which  they 
connected  the  two  wings  of  their  army,  and  avoided  a  long 
detour  around  through  a  bad  country.  1  obtained  from  a 
colored  man,  from  the  other  side  of  the  town,  information  in 
regard  to  this  new  road,  which  proved  to  be  correct.  I  wanted 
to  obtain  possession  of  that  new  road,  and  that  was  my  reason 
for  making  an  attack  on  the  extreme  left.  I  did  not  intend 
to  make  the  attack  on  the  right  until  that  position  had 
been  taken,  which  I  supposed  would  stagger  the  enemy, 
cutting  their  line  in  two;  and  then  1  proposed  to  make  a 
direct  attack  on  theirfront  and  drive  them  out  of  their  works." 
ORDERS  TO  FRANKLIN. 

The  following  is  the  order  to  Gen.  Franklin,  who 
commanded  the  left: 

"  Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac,  ? 

"  December  13,  5:55  a.  m.  i 

"  Gen.  Hardie  will  carry  this  dispatch  to  you  and  remain 
with  yon  during  the  day.  The  general  commanding  directs 
that  you  keep  your  whole  command  in  position  for  a  rapid 
movement  down  the  old  Richmond  road,  and  you  will  send 
out  at  once  a  division,  at  lea^t,  to  pass  below  Smithfield,  to 
seize,  if  possible,  the  bights  near  Capt.  Hamilton's,  on  this 
side  of  the  Massaponax,  taking  care  to  keep  it  well  supported, 
and  its  line  of  retreat  open.  He  ha3  ordered  another  column 
of  a  division  or  more  to  be  moved  from  Gen.  Sumner's  com- 
mand up  the  plank  road  to  its  intersection  of  the  telegraph 
road,  where  they  will  divide,  with  a  view  to  seizing  the 
bights  on  both  of  those  roads.  Holding  these  higbts,  with  the 
hights  near  Capt.  Hamilton's,  will,  1  hope,  compel  the  enemy 
to  evacuate  the  whole  ridge  between  these  points.  He  makes 
these  moves  by  columns,  distant  from  each  other,  with  a 
view  of  avoiding  the  possibility  of  a  collision  of  our  own 
forces,  which  might  occur  in  a  general  movement  during  the 
fog.  Two  of  Gen.  Hooker's  divisions  are  in  your  rear  at  the 
bridges,  and  will  remain  there  as  supports.  Copies  of  instruc- 
tions to  Gens.  Suomer  and  Hooker  will  be  forwarded  to  you 
by  an  orderlv  very  soon.  Yoa  will  keep  your  whole  com- 
mand in  readiness  to  move  at  once  as  soon  as  the  fog  lifts. 
The  watchword  which,  if  possible,  should  be  given  to  every 
company,  will  be  '  Scott.' 


"  1  have  the  honor  to  he.  General,  very  respectfully,  your 
obedient  servant,  JOHN  G.  PAttKE,  Chief  ot  Staff. 

''  Major-Gen.  Fkanrmn,  Commanding  Department,  Grant! 
Division  Army  of  Potomac." 

FRANKLIN'S  INCONSISTENT  STATEMENTS. 

Gen.  Franklin  states,  when  last  examined,  that 
he  received  the  above  order  at  about  7:30  a.  m.,  and 
that  he  at  once  took  measures  to  carry  out  what  he 
considered  to  be  the  meaning  of  the  order,  that  is, 
*'  an  armed  observa'.ion  to  ascertain  where  the  enemy 
was."  In  his  testimony,  given  when  your  Commit- 
tee were  at  Falmouth,  he  says:  *'I  put  in  all  the 
troops  that  I  thought  it  proper  and  prudent  to  put  in. 
I  fought  the  whole  strength  of  my  command,  as  far 
as  I  could,  and  at  the  same  time  keep  my  connection 
with  the  river  open." 

FRANKLIN  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  THE  DEFEAT. 

From  the  testimony  it  would  appear  that  the  at- 
tack was  in  reality  made  by  one  of  the  smallest  di- 
visions in  Gen.  Franklin's  command — the  division 
of  Gen.  Meade,  numbering  about  4,500  men.  This 
division  was  supported  on  its  right  by  Gen.  Gibton'a 
Division  of  about  5,000  men.  On  the  left  was  Gen. 
Doubleday's  Division,  forming  the  extreme  left  of 
our  line,  nearly  at  right  angles  with  Gen.  Meade's 
Division,  and  extending  to  the  river.  Just  as  Gen. 
Meade's  Division  advanced  to  the  attack,  Gen.  Bir- 
ney's  Division,  of  Gen.  Stoneman's  corps,  numbering 
about  7,000,  came  up  and  took  position  immediately 
in  rear  of  Geo.  Meade. 

GEN.  BIRNEY  FAILS  TO  SUPPORT  MEADE'S  AT- 
TACK. 

The  division  of  Gen.  Meade  succeeded  in  piercing 
the  first  line  of  the  enemy,  and  gaining  the  crest  of 
the  hill.  Gen.  Gibbon,  seeing  Gen.  Meade  advanc- 
ing to  the  attack,  ordered  his  division  forward.  Af- 
ter his  last  brigade  had  advanced,  driving  the  enemy 
with  the  bayonet,  and  he  was  preparing  his  batter- 
ies to  open  upon  a  Rebel  regiment  that  made  their 
appearance  on  his  left,  Gen.  Gibbon  was  wounded 
and  taken  from  the  field.  Gen.  Meade's  division 
having  reached  the  crest  of  the  hill,  formed  them- 
selves in  the  presence  of  the  reserves  of  the  enemy, 
who  opened  fire  upon  them  in  front,  and  they  also  re- 
ceived a  fire  upon  their  flank.  The  superiority  of 
the  enemy  was  so  overwhelming  that  Meade's  divis- 
ion was  forced  back,  as  was  also  Gibbon's  divMon. 
The  enemy  pursued  uniil  checked  by  Birney's  divis- 
ion. Our  lorces  continued  to  hold  their  position, 
without  renewing  the  attack,  until  they  were  or- 
dered to  withdraw  across  the  river. 

The  losses  sustained  in  the  attack,  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,  were  as  follows:  Meade's 
division,  1,760;  Gibbon's  division,  1,249;  Birney's 
division,  961. 

FRANKLIN  DISOBEYS  A  DDRECT  ORDER  TO 
ATTACK. 

Gen.  Burnside,  upon  hearing  of  the  small  force 
ordered  to  attack  the  enemy,  sent  an  order  to  Gen. 
Franklin  to  make  a  vigorous  attack  with  his  whole 
force.  Several  of  the  witnesses  testify  that  had  the 
attack  been  renewed  with  all  the  available  force 
tinder  Gen.  Franklin's  command  it  would  have  been 
successful.  Gen.  Franklin  testifies  that  it  was  not 
an  order,  but  a  request,  and  that  when  he  received  it 
it  was  too  late  to  renew  the  attack,  and  therefore  he 
did  not  do  H. 

Gen.  Franklin  testifies  as  follows: 

"  The  order  under  which  1  was  acting  directed  that  the  line 
of  retreat  should  be  kept  open.  It  also  directed  that  I  snould 
hold  my  troops  in  position  lor  a  rapid  march  down  the  Rich- 
mond road.  I  never  dreamed  that  this  was  considered  as  a 
strong  attack  at  all,  until  since  the  battle  took  place.  At  that 
time  1  had  no  idea  that  it  was  the  main  attack,  but  supposed 
it  was  an  armed  observation  to  ascertain  where  the  enemy 
was.        *         *  *  *  *        *       I  was 

strengthened  in  this  opinion  by  the  staff  officer  who  brought 
it,  (the  order).         \*         *****  * 

"  Question.  Did  you  not  understand,  from  this  order,  that 
you  were  to  use  all  the  troops  necessary  to  seize  and  bold  the 
higbts  near  Capt.  Hamilton's,  and  that  the  General  command- 
ing considered  that  that  was  necessary  to  be  done  in  order  to 
secure  success? 

"  Answer.  No  ;  I  did  not.  I  should  suppose  that  the  crder 
would  not  have  limited  me  to  '  at  least  a  division,'  as  the  word- 
ing of  it  shows,  had  such  beeu  his  intention  ;  and.  besides,  he 
directs  me  to  keep  my  whole  command  is  position  to  move 


26 


along  the  old  Richmond  road.  If  he  had  intended  me  to  rise 
my  whole  force,  if  necessary,  to  hold  that  hill,  he  hardly 
would  have  coupled  it  with  the  condition  to  keep  my  com- 
mand in  readiness  for  this  other  movement. 

"  Question.  Was  the  other  movement  feasible  until  after  the 
possession  of  those  hi^hts  by  our  troops  ? 

'•  Answer.  1  think  that  the  other  movement,  if  it  had  been 
ordered  with  my  whole  force,  would  have  necessarily  involved 
the  possession  of  those  hights.  Had  I  been  ordered  to  move  my 
whole  force  along  the  Richmoud  road,  I  should  have  been  com- 
pelled to  take  all  that  would  be  found  in  the  road,  and  those 
hights  would  have  been  in  the  road. 

"Question.  As  it  was  indispensable  that  we  should  have 
possession  of  tho^e  hights  in  order  to  move  down  the  old 
Richmond  road,  and  as  you  were  ordered  to  send  out  at  least 
one  division  to  pass  below  Smithfield  and  seize,  if  possible, 
those  bights,  did  jou  not  deem  that  the  order  required  of  you 
that  you  should,  when  repulsed  in  the  first  attempt,  renew 
the  attack  ? 

"  Answer.  1  think  it  did ;  but  by  the  time  the  Rebels  were 
driven  back  into  the  woods  by  Birney's  division  and  Sickles'* 
division,  it  was  past  3  o'clock.  It  was  dark,  at  that  time,  by 
5  o'clock,  and  it  was  too  late  then  to  make  such  aa  attempt 
with  the  slightest  hope  of  success." 

The  testimony  of  all  the  witnesses  before  your 
Committee  proves  most  conclusively  that,  had  the 
attack  been  made  upon  the  left  with  all  the  force 
which  Gen.  Franklin  could  have  used  for  that  pur- 
pose, the  plan  of  Gen.  Burnside  would  have  been 
completely  successful,  and  our  army  would  have 
achieved  a  most  brilliant  victory. 

After  the  attack  on  Saturday,  our  army  remained 
in  position  until  Monday  night,  when  it  was  with- 
drawn across  the  rivef  without  loss. 

Your  Committee  have  not  considered  it  essential 
to  report  upon  the  operations  of  the  right  wing  of 
our  army  in  this  battle,  for  the  reason  that  the  suc- 
cess of  the  movement  evidently  depended  to  a  very 
great  extent  upon  the  successful  operation  of  the 
left.  Although  our  troops  on  the  ri.'ht  fought  most 
gallantly,  making  repeated  attacks,  r,:e  strength  of 
the  eEemy's  position  "was  such  that  our  forces  were 
compelled  to  retire. 

AFTER  FREDERICKSBURG. 

On  Jan.  26,  1863,  the  following  resolution  was 
adopted  by  the  Senate,  and  referred  to  your  Com- 
mittee: 

"  Resolved,  That  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War 
be  instructed  to  inquire  whether  Major-Gen.  A.  E.  Burnside 
has,  since  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  formed  any  plans  for 
the  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  or  any  partion  of 
the  same :  and  if  so,  whether  any  subordinate  Generals  of  said 
army  have  written  to  or  visiied  Washington,  co  oppose  or 
interfere  with  the  execution  of  such  movements,  and  whether 
such  proposed  movements  have  been  arrested  or  interfered 
with,  and  if  so.  by  what  authority." 

Under  that  resolution,  your  Committee  proceeded 
to  take  the  testimony  of  Major-Gene.  A.  E.  Burn- 
side aud  John  G.  Parke,  and  Brig.-Gens.  John  New- 
ton, John  Cochrane,  aud  William  W.  Averill.  Tnat 
testimony  brings  to  light  the  following  facts: 
"burnside's  plans. 

Shortly  after  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  Gen. 
Burnside  devised  a  plan  for  attacking  the  enemy  in 
his  front.  Tbe  main  army  was  to  cross  at  a  place 
some  six  or  seven  miles  below  Fredericksburg.  The 
positions  for  the  artillery  to  protect  the  crossing 
were  all  selected,  the  roads  were  all  surveyed,  and 
the  corduroy  was  cut  for  preparing  the  roads.  At 
the  same  time  a  feint  of  crossing  was  to  be  made 
some  distance  above  Falmouth,  which  feiLt  could 
be  turned  into  a  positive  attack  should  the  enemy 
discover  the  movement  below;  otherwise  the  main 
attack  was  to  be  made  below. 

A  GRAND  CAVALRY  EXPEDITION. 

In  connection  with  this  movement  of  the  main 
army,  a  cavalry  expedition  was  organized,  consist- 
ing of  2  500 of  tne  best  cavalry  in  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomaa,  1,000  of  whom  were  picked  men.  The  plan 
of  that  expedition  was  as  loDows:  Accompanied  by 
a  brigade  of  inlantiy  detailed  to  protect  the  crossing 
of  the  Rappahannock,  it  was  to  proceed  up  to 
Kelly's  Ford;  there  the  1,000  picked  men  were  to 
cross",  and  to  proceed  to  the  Rapidan  and  cross  that 
river  at  Raccoon  Ford;  then  to  go  onward  and  cross 
the  Virginia  Central  Kail  road  at  Louisa  Court- 
House;  the  James  River  at  Goochland  or  Carter's, 
blowing  up  the  locks  of  the  Jamts  River  Canal  at 
the  place  ef  crossing;  cross  the  Richmond  and 
Lynchburg  Railroad  at  a  point  south  of  there,  blow- 


ing up  the  iron-bridge  at  the  place  of  crossing;  crota 
the  Richmond.  Petersburg  and  Weldon  Riilroad 
where  it  crossed  the  Nottoway  River,  destroying  the 
railroad  bridge  there;  and  then  proceed  on  by  Gen. 
Pryor's  command,  and  6ffect  a  junction  with  Gen. 
Peck,  at  Suffolk,  were  steamers  were  to  be  in  wait- 
ing to  take  them  to  Ac  quia  Creek. 

To  distract  the  attention  of  the  enemy,  and  de- 
ceive them  in  regard  to  which  body  of  cavalry  wai 
the  attacking  column,  at  the  time  the  thousand 
picked  men  crossed  the  Rappahannock,  a  portion  of 
the  remaining  l,5'-)0  was  to  proceed  toward  W^rren- 
ton;  another  portion  toward  Culpepper  Cjurt- 
House;  and  the  remainder  were  to  accompany  the 
thousand  picked  men  as  far  as  Raccoon  Ford,  and 
then  return.  While  this  country  expedition  was  in 
progress,  the  general  movement  was  to  be  made 
across  the  river. 

On  the  26th  of  December,  an  order  was  issued  for 
the  entire  command  to  prepare  three  days' cooked 
rations;  to  have  their  wagons  filled  with  ten  days' 
small  rations,  if  possible;  to  have  from  ten  to  twelve 
days'  supply  of  beef  cattle  with  them;  to  take 
forage  for  their  teams  and  their  artillery  and  cavalry 
horses,  and  the  requisite  amount  of  ammunition — in 
fact,  to  be  in  a  condition  to  move  at  twelve' hours' 
notice. 

GENS.  COCHRANE  AND  NEWTON  TRY  TO  PRE- 
JUDICE THE  PRESIDENT  AGAINST  BURN- 
SIDE. 

Shortly  after  that  order  was  issued  Gen.  John 
Newton  and  Gen.  John  Cochrane — the  one  com- 
manding a  division  and  the  other  a  brigade  in  the 
left  Grand  Division,  under  Gen.  Wm.  B.  Franklin 
came  up  to  Washington  on  leave  of  absence.  Pre- 
vious to  obtaining  leave  of  absence  from  Gen. 
Franklin,  they  informed  him  and  Gen.  Wm.  F. 
Smith  that  when  they  came  to  Washington  they 
should  take  the  opportunity  to  represent  to  some 
one  in  authority  here  the  dispirited  condition  of  the 
army,  aud  the  danger  there  was  in  attempting  any 
movement  against  the  enemy  at  that  time. 

When  they  reached  Washington,  Gen.  Cochrane, 
as  he  states,  endeavored  to  find  certain  members  of 
Congress,  to  whom  to  make  the  desired  communica- 
tion. Failing  to  find  them,  he  determined  to  seek 
an  interview  with  the  President  for  the  purpose  of 
making  the  communication  directly  to  nim.  On 
proceeding  to  the  President's  house,  he  there  met 
Secretary  Seward,  to  whom  he  explained  the  object 
of  his  being  there  and  the  general  purport  of  bis  pro- 
posed communication  to  the  President,  and  requested 
him  to  procure  an  interview  for  them,  whtcu  Mr. 
Seward  promised -to  do,  and  which  he  did  do. 

THE  GENERALS  PREVARICATE. 

That  day  the  interview  took  place,  and  Gen. 
Newton  opened  the  subject  to  the  President.  At 
first  the  President,  as  Gen.  Newton  expresses  it, 
"  very  naturally  conceived  that  they  hud  co  j»e  there 
for  the  purpose  of  injuriug  Gen.  Burnside,  a;,d  sug- 
gesting some  other  person  to  fill  his  place."  Gen. 
Newton  states,  that  while  he  firmly  believed  that 
tne  principal  cause  of  the  dispirited  conaition  of  the 
army  was  the  want  of  confidence  in  the  military  ca- 
pacity of  Gen.  Burnside,  he  deemed  it  improper  to 
say  so  to  the  President  "  right  square  out, "  and 
therefore  endtavoied  to  convey  the  same  idea  indi- 
rectly. When  asked  if  he  cousideieu  it  any  less  im- 
proper to  do  such  a  thing  indirectly  than  it  was  to 
dout  directly,  he  qualified  his  previous  acs  rtioo.  by 
saying  that  his  object  was  to  imormthe  P*»si  lent  of 
wnat  he  considered  to  be  the  condition  ot  the  aiiny, 
in  the  hope  that  the  President  wo'.ild  mase  inquiry 
and  learn  the  true  cause  for  himteif.  Upon  perceiv- 
ing this  impression  wt  on  the  miud  of  the  President, 
Gens.  Newton  aui  Cochrane  state  that  they  hast- 
ened to  assure  the  President  that  he  was  entirely 
mistaken,  and  so  far  succeeded  that  at  the  close  of 
the  interview  ihe  President  said  to  them  he  wai 
glad  they  had  called  upon  him,  at  d  tnat  he  hoped 
that  good  would  result  from  the  interview.  / 
THE  PRESIDENT  INTERFERES. 

To  return  to  Gen.  Bnrnude.    The  cavalry  expe 


27 


dition  had  started ;  the  brigade  of  infantry  detailed 
to  accompany  it  had  crossed  the  Rappahannock  at 
Richard's  Ford  and  returned  by  way  of  Ellis's  Ford, 
leaving  the  way  clear  for  the  cavalry  to  cross  at 
Kelly's  Ford.  The  day  they  had  arranged  to  make 
the  crossing  Gen.  Barnside  received  from  the  Presi- 
dent the  following  telegram: 

"  I  have  good  reason  for  saying  that  you  must  not  make  a 
general  movement  without  letting  me  know  of  it" 

Gen.  Burnside  states  that,  be  could  not  imagine,  at 
the  time,  what  reason  the  President  could  have  for 
sending  him  6uch  a  telegram.  None  of  the  officers 
of  his  command,  except  one  or  two  of  his  staff  who 
had  remained  in  camp,  had  been  told  anything  of 
his  plan  beyond  the  simple  fact  that  a  movement 
was  to  be  made.  He  could  only  suppose  that  the 
dispatch  related  in  some  way  to  important  military 
movements  in  other  parts  of  the  country,  in  which  it 
was  necessary  to  have  cooperation. 

THE  CAVALRY  HALTING. 

Upon  tba  receipt  of  that  telegram,  steps  were  im- 
mediately taken  to  halt  the  cavalry  expedition 
where  it  then  was  (at  Kelly's  Ford)  until  further 
orders.  A  portion  of  it  was  shortly  afterward  sent 
off  to  intercept  Stuart,  who  had  just  made  a  raid  to 
Dumfries  and  the  neighborhood  of  Fairfax  Court- 
House,  which  it  failed  to  do. 

BURNSIDE   COMES  TO  WASHINGTON. 

Gen.  Burnside  came  to  Washington  to  ascertain 
from  the  President  the  true  state  of  the  case.  He 
was  informed  by  the  President  that  some  general 
officers  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  whose  names 
he  declined  to  give,  had  called  upon  him  and  repre- 
sented that  Gen.  Burnside  contemplated  soon  mak- 
ing a  movement,  and  that  the  army  was  so  dispirited 
and  demoralized  that  any  attempt  to  make  a  move- 
ment at  that,  time  must  result  in  disaster;  that  no 
prominent  officers  in  toe  Army  of  the  Po-omac  were 
in  favor  of  any  movement  at  that  time. 

Gen.  Burnside  informed  the  President  that  none 
of  his  officers  had  been  informed  what  his  plan  was, 
and  then  proceeded  to  explain  it  in  detail  to  the 
President.  He  urged  upon  the  President  to  grant 
him  permission  to  carry  it  out,  but  the  President  de- 
clined to  do  so  at  that  time.  Gen.  Halleck  and  Sec- 
retary Stanton  were  sent  for,  and  then  learned,  for 
the  first  time,  of  the  President's  actiou  in  stopping 
the  movement;  although  Gen.  Hall-ck  was  pre- 
viously aware  that  a  movement  was  contemplated 
by  Gen.  Burneide,  Gen.  Halleck,  with  Gen,  Burn- 
side, held  tuat  the  officers  who  had  nude  those  repre- 
sentations to  the  President  should  be  at  once  dis- 
missed the  service.  Gen.  Burnside  remained  here 
at  tbat  time  for  two  days,  but  no  conclusion  was 
reached  upon  the  subject. 

HIS  PLANS  BECOME  KNOWN  TO  THE  REBELS. 

When  he  returned  to  his  camp  he  learned  that 
many  of  the  details  of  the  general  movement, 
and  the  details  of  the  cavalry  expedition,  had 
become  known  to  the  Rebel  sympathizers  in  Wash- 
ington, thereby  rendering  that  plan  impracticable. 
When  asktd  to  whom  he  had  communicated  his 
plans,  he  stated  that  he  had  told  no  one  in  Wash' 
ington,  except  the  President,  Secretary  Stanton, 
and  Gen.  Halleck;  and  in  his  camp  none  knew  of  it, 
except  one  or  two  of  his  staffi  officers,  who  remained 
in  camp  all  the  time.  He  professed  himself  unaole 
to  tell  how  his  plans  had  become  known  to  the 
enemy. 

HE  ASKS  FOR  ORDERS  BUT  GETS  NONE. 
A  correspondence  then  took  place  between  the 
President,  Gen.  Halleck  and  Gen.  Burnside.  Gen. 
Burnsnie  desired  distinct  authority  from  Gen.  Hal- 
leck, or  some  one  authorized  to  give  it,  to  make  a 
movement  across  the  river.  While  urging  the  im- 
portance and  necessity  for  such  a  movement,  he  can- 
didly admitted  tnat  there  was  hardly  a  general  officer 
in  his  command  wno  approvea  of  it.  Wniie  willing 
to  take  upon  himself  all  the  responsibility  of  the 
movement,  and  promising  to  keep  in  view  the  Presi- 
dent's caution  concerning  any  risk  of  destroying  the 
army  of  the  Potomac,  he  desired  to  have  at  least 
Gen.  Halleck's  sanction  or  permission  to  make  the 
movement.    Gen.  Halleck  replied  that  while  he  had 


always  favored  a  forward  movement,  he  could  not 
take  the  responsibility  of  giving  any  directions  as  to 
how  and  when  it  should  be  made. 

HE  TAKES  THE  RESPONSIBILITY. 

Gen.  Burnside  then  determined  to  make  a  move 
ment  without  any  further  correspondence  on  the 
subject.  He  wa6  unable  to  devise  any  as  promising 
as  the  one  just  thwarted  by  this  interference  of  his 
subordinate  officers,  which  interference  gave  the  ene- 
my tue  time,  if  not  the  means,  to  ascertain  rvhat  he 
had  proposed  to  do.  He,  however,  devised  a  plan 
of  movement,  and  proceeded  to  put  it  in  execution. 
As  is  well  kuown,  it  was  rendered  abortive  in  con- 
sequence of  the  severe  storm  which  took  place 
shortly  after  the  movement  began. 

Gen.  Burnside  states  that,  besides  the  inclemency 
of  the  weather,  there  was  another  powerful  reason 
for  abandoning  the  movement,  viz:  the  almost  uni- 
versal feeling  among  his  general  officers  against  it. 
Some  of  those  officers  freely  gave  vent  to  their  feel- 
ings in  the  presence  of  their  inferiors. 

GENERAL  ORDER  NO.  8. 

In  consequence  of  this,  and  also  what  had  taken 
place  during  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  &c.  Gen. 
Burnside  directei  an  order  to  be  issued,  which  he 
styled  general  order  No.  8. 

That  order  dismissed  same  officers  from  the  ser- 
vice, subject  to  the  approval  of  the  President,  re- 
lieved others  from  duty  with  the  army  of  the  Poto- 
mac, and  also  pronounced  sentence  of  death  upon 
some  deserters  who  had  been  tried  and  convicted. 

Gen.  Burnside  states  that  he  had  become  satisfied 
that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  that  some  such,  ex- 
amples should  be  made,  in  order  to  enable  him  to 
maintain  the  proper  authority  over  the  army  unler 
his  command.  The  order  was  duly  siguea  and  is- 
sued, and  only  waited  publication. 

Two  or  t  hree  of  his  most  trusted  staff  officers  rep- 
resented to  Gen.  Burnside  that  should  he  then  pub 
lish  that  order,  he  would  force  upon  the  President 
the  necessity  of  at  once  sanctioning  it,  or,  by  refus- 
ing his  approval,  assume  an  attitude  of  hostility  to 
Gen.  Burnsid".  The  publication  of  the  o.der  was 
accordingly  delayed  for  the  time. 

THE  PRESIDENT    REFUSES  TO  SUSTAIN  BURN- 
SIDE. 

Gen.  Burnside  came  to  Washington  and  laid  the 
order  before  the  President,  with  the  distiuct  assur- 
ance that  in  no  other  way  could  he  exerc  se  a  proper 
command  over  the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  and  he 
asked  the  President  to  sanction  the  order,  or  accept 
his  resignation  as  major-general.  The  President 
acknowledgtd  that  Gen.  Burnside  was  right,  but 
declined  to  decide  without  consulting  with  some  of 
his  advisers.  To  this  Gen.  Burnside  replied  that,  if 
the  President  took  time  for  consultation,  he  would 
not  be  allowed  to  publish  that  order,  and  therefore 
asked  to  have  his  resignation  accepted  at  once. 
This  the  President  declined  to  do. 

HOW  BURNSIDE  CAME  TO  BE  RELIEVED. 

Gen.  Burnside  returned  to  his  camp  aud  came 
again  to  Washington  that  night  at  the  request  of 
the  Presideuc,  aud  the  next  morning  called  upon  the 
President  for  his  decision.  He  was  informed  that 
the  President  declined  to  approve  his  order  No.  8, 
but  had  concluded  to  relieve  him  from  the  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  aud  to  appoiut  Gen. 
Hooker  in  "his  place.  Thereupon  Geu  Burnside 
again  insisted  that  his  resignation  be  accepted.  This 
the  President  declined  to  do;  and,  afier  some  urg- 
ing, Gen.  Burnside  consented  to  take  a  leave  of  ab- 
sence for  thirty  days,  with  the  understanding  that 
at  the  end  of  that  "lime  he  should  be  assigned  to 
duty,  as  he  deemed  it  impioper  to  hold  a  commission 
as  major-general  and  receive  his  pay  without  ren- 
dering service  theretor.  Gen.  Burnside  objectea  to 
the  wording  of  ttte  order  which  relieved  him  from 
his  command,  and  which  stated  that  it  was  4>  at  his 
own  request,"  as  being  unjust  to  him  and  unfound- 
ed in  fact;  but  upon  the  representation  that  any 
other  order  would  do  injury  to  the  cause,  he  con- 
sented to  let  it  remain  as  it  then  read. 

The  foregoing  statement  of  the  facts  proved,  to- 


28 


gether  with  the  testimony  herewith  submitted,  so 
fully  and  directly  meet  ilae  requirements  of  the 
resolution  referred  to  them,  that  your  Committee 
deem  any  comment  by  them  to  be  entirely  unne- 
cessary. 

CONCLUSION. 

Your  committee  think  it  better  to  submit  the  testi- 
mony which  they  have  taken  in  relation  to  the  con- 
duct of  the  war,  without  criticism  to  any  consider- 
able extent  of  military  plans  or  movements,  leaving 
each  reader  to  form  his  own  conclusions  from  the 
testimony,  and  such  opinions  of  competent  military 
men  as  it  mav  contain. 

As  they  look  back  over  the  struggle  of  the  past 
two  years,  thev  feel  that  although  we  have  not,  ac- 
complished all  that  we  hoped  and  expected  within 
the  time,  still  the  great  progress  made  gives  us  full 
assurance  of  final  success. 

When  the  Government  took  its  first  active  steps 
toward  resisting  the  Rebellion  the  Rebels  had  been 
for  more  than  five  months  actively  and  openly 
making  preparations  to  resist  its  authority  and  defy 
its  jurisdiction.  They  had  usurped  the  control  of 
the  machinery  of  one  State  government  after  another, 
and  thus  overawed  the  loyal  people  of  those  States. 
They  had  even  so  far  control  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment itself  as  to  make  it  not  only  acquiesce,  for  the 
time  being,  in  measures  for  its  own  destruction,  but 
contribute  to  that  end.  They  had  seized  and  taken 
into  their  possession  the  arms  and  muuitious  of  war 
of  the  government.  They  had  scattered  and 
demoralized  the  army,  and  "sent  the  navy  to  the 
most  distant  parts  of  the  world. 

There  was  treason  in  the  Executive  maneion, 
treason  in  the  Cabinet,  treason  in  the  Senate  and 
the  House  of  Representatives,  treason  in  the  army 
and  navy,  treason  in  every  department,  bureau  and 
office  connected  with  the  Government.  When  the 
new  Administration  came  into  power  it  was  neces 
earily  obliged  to  adopt  its  measures  with  the  greatest 
caution,  scarcely  knowing  friend  from  foe.  An  army 
and  navy  had  to  be  created.  There  was  scarcely  a 
battalion  of  loyal  national  troops  to  protect  the  capi- 
tal; and  the  first  sense  of  security  felt  in  the  capital 
was  when  the  volunteer  troops  entered  it,  summoned 
from  their  homes  for  its  protection.  At  the  same 
time  it  was  with  great  difficulty  that  the  loyal  peo- 
ple could  make  themselves  believe  that  any  serious 
resistance  to  the  authority  of  the  Government  would 
be  attemped.  There  were  not  wanting  those  who 
confidently  asserted  that  it  was  but  an  outburst  of 
disappointed  partisan  spirit,  which  they  predicted 
would  yield  to  jan  exhibition  of  force,  and  a  deter- 
mined and  united  spirit  on  the  part  of  the  people  of 
the  loyal  States  to  suppress  it.  Instead  of  such  an 
easy  suppression,  we  have  spent  two  years,  almost, 
in  warfare.  We  have  thrown  into  the  field  a  mil- 
lion of  men.  We  have  poured  out  our  resources 
like  water,  and  we  find  cu;.-  Ives  still  ^engaged  in 
the  fearful  struggle. 

But  the  national  cause  is  not  the  only  one  for 
which  false  anticipations  were  formed — for  which 
the  present  condition  of  things  presents  a  striking 
contrast  with  the  early  visions  of  its  supporters. 
Those  who  heard,  in  Congress  and  elsewhere,  the 
extravagances  of  the  conspirators  will  knoAV  what 
wrere  their  hopes,  what  their  expectations. 

A  speedy  march  upon  the  capital ;  a  speedy  over- 
throw of  the  legal  Government;  a  speedy  submis- 
sion of  a  people  too  pusillanimous  to  maintain  their 
rights;  aud  a  speedy  subjection  of  the  whole  country 
to  the  assumptions  of  the  South,  were  the  prominent 
features  of  their  delusion. 

The  conspirations  taught  their  people  to  believe 
that  if  war  came  it  would  not  be  on  their  soil.  As 
yet,  the  hostile  foot  has  scarcely  trod  the  soil  of  a 
free  State,  and  it  is  upon  the  soil  of  the  States  in 
open  rebellion  that  tiie  contest  has  mainly  been 
waged. 

The  Rebels  found  themselves,  almost  without 
resistance,  in  possession  of  every  fort  and  harbor  on 
the  sea-coast  of  the  revolted  States,  except  Fort 
Pickens,  Pensacola  harbor,  and  the  isolated  fortifica- 
tion* and  harbors  of  Tortugas  and  Key  West. 


They  were,  for  the  time  being,  masters  of  the  terri- 
tory of  the  revolted  States,  of  the  depots,  ar*enala_ 
and  fortifications  of  the  Government,  and  had  high 
hopes  that  all  the  slaveholding  Border  States 
would  soon  be  united  with  them.  The  fact  that  so 
many  of  these  States  hold  to-day  their  true  and 
loyai  position  in  the  Government  demonstrates  that 
true  patriotism  and  loyalty  is  not  confined  to  any 
section  of  the  country,  and  gives  lull  assurance 
that  the  Government  will  be  maintained,  its  juris- 
diction over  every  foot  of  our  territory  established, 
and  our  nationality  vindicated. 

The  events  of  the  past  two  years  are  too  fresh  in 
the  memories  of  all  to  require  recapitulation. 

WHAT  THE  WAR  HAS  ACCOMPLISHED. 

Your  Committee  will,  however,  briefly  call 
attention  to  the  fact  that,  from  the  commencement 
of  active  military  and  naval  operations  in  the 
Winter  and  Spring  of  1862,  almost  uninterrupted 
success  for  eight  months  attended  all  our  operations, 
resulting  in  va6t  conquests.  The  triumphs  of  the 
navy  at  Hatterae,  Port  Royal  and  Fort  Henry, 
were  followed  by  the  victories  and  conquests  of  the 
army  at  Mill  Spring,  Fort  Donelaon  and  Roanoke 
Island.  Missouri  was  wrenched  from  the  Rebel 
grasp,  and  the  Rebel  armies  driven  iuto  Arkansas, 
where  thev  were  defeated  in  a  pitched  battle  at  Pea 
Ridge.  * 

By  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson  Kentucky  was 
permanently  redeemed,  the  capital  of  one  of  the 
largest  revolted  States  seized,  her  great  rivers  laid 
open  to  our  flotillas,  and  the  war  carried  to  the  bor- 
ders of  the  Gulf  States.  The  Rebel  stronghold  on 
the  Mississippi,  Columbus,  Island  No.  10,  Fort  Pil- 
low, together  with  Memphis,  the  most  important 
commercial  city  of  the  State,  fell  into  our  hands. 

The  autumn  of  1861  had  witnessed  the  important 
capture  of  Hatteras  and  Port  Royal  by  the  navy. 
These  successes  were  followed  through  the  combined 
operations  of  the  army  and  navy,  in  the  Winter  and 
Spring  of  1862,  by  the  capture  of  Roanoke  island 
and  Newbern,  Beaufort  and  Fort  Macon,  and  by 
the  reduction  of  the  important  fort,  Pulaski,  con- 
trolling the  entrance  to  the  Savannah  river;  of  Fort 
Clinch,  cont- oiling  the  harbor  and  railroad  depot  of 
Fernandina;  of  Fort  Marion,  at  St.  Augustine.  By 
the  first-nan -d  operations  we  acquired  control  of  the 
spacious  inhiud  wraters  of  North  Carolina  (Albemarle 
and  Pamlico  sounds),  and  their  adjacent  shores,  and 
of  one  of  her  two  important  seaports — Beaufort. 
By  the  last,  we  made  ourselves  masters  of  the  rich 
sea  islands  and  important  harbors  extending  along 
the  coast  from  Charleston  to  St.  John's;  leaving  in 
the  possession  of  the  Rebels,  on  the  Atlantic  coast, 
but  two  harbors,  Charleston  and  Wilmington. 

But  the  brilliant  triumphs  of  our  army  and  navy 
elsewhere  were  surpassed  by  the  capture  of  the 
great  city  of  the  Gulf,  the  depot  of  the  great  Valley 
of  the  Mississippi — New-Orleans;  an  achievement 
which,  estimated  by  the  importance  of  the  conquest 
and  the  noble  daring  of  its  execution,  is  scarcely  sur- 
passed in  history.  By  this  important  conquest  we 
obtained  control  of  a  large  portion  of  Louisiana,  and 
accomplished  the  mo3t  important  and  difficult  step 
toward  obtaining  the  entire  control  of  the  Missis- 
sippi River,  and  caused  the  surrender  of  the  harbor 
of  Pensacola,  with  the  forts  yet  held  by  the 
Rebels. 

In  these  hastily  sketched  military  and  naval  ope- 
rations, extending  in  the  West  through  the  States  of 
Arkansas,  Missouri,  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  and 
on  the  Atlantic  seaboard  from  Hatteras  to  Florida, 
and  ou  the  Gulf  from  Pensacola  to  the  mouths  of  the 
Mississippi,  we  really  made  conquests  as  vast  as  it 
often  fails  to  the  lot  "of  the  most  powerful  and  war- 
like nations  to  make  in  so  short  a  period  of  time. 
We  pushed  our  conquests  by  land  through  Missouri, 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee  to  the  very  boundaries  of 
the  Gulf  States;  obtained  control  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  except  about  200  miles;  occupied  the  coasts  of 
North  Carolina,  South  Carolina  and  Georgia — a 
large  portion  of  Louisiana;  seized  every  important 
fort  and  harbor  in  the  Rebel  territory,  save  three 
(Wilmington,  Charleston  and  Mobile,)  reducing  to  a 


29 


corresponding  extent  the  labors  of  the  blockading 
squadron;  captured  fourteen  permanent  sea-coast 
forts,  among  winch  were  the  largest  on  the  South- 
ern coaBt,  such  as  Pulaski,  Barrancas,  McKae,  Jack- 
son, and  St.  Philip.  Following  these  conquests  was 
the  reduction  of  Yorktowu  and  the  evacuation  of 
Norfolk,  by  which  the  waters  of  the  James  and 
York  Rivera  were  laid  opeu  to  our  lleets,  and  the 
Rebels  deprived  of  the  facilities  furnished  by  a  great 
navy-yard,  and  compelled  to  destroy  their  only  means 
of  menacing  our  lleets  in  Hampton  Roads — the  Mer- 
rimac. 

WHAT  MIGHT  HAVE  BEEN. 

Had  the  success  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  dur- 
ing this  period  corresponded  with  the  success  of  our 
arms  in  other  parts  oi  the  country,  there  is  reason 
to  believe  that  the  termination  of  the  campaign  of 
1862  would  have  seen  the  Rebellion  well-nigh,  if 
not  entirely,  overthrown. 

Had  Norfolk  been  captured  during  the  Winter  of 
1861-62,  and  the  Merrimac  taken  possession  of  or 
destroyed,  the  way  to  Richmond,  by  means  of  the 
James  River,  would  have  been  open,  and  the  fatal 
delays  of  the  Peninsula  avoided;  or  had  the  enemy, 
wheu  at  Manassas,  some  time  during  the  Autumn  of 
1861  or  Wiuter  of  1S61-62,  have  been  compelled  to 
come  out  from  bis  iutrenchments  and  give  us 
battle,  as  he  might  have  been,  by  threatening  or 
actually  interrupting  his  communication  between 
Richmond  and  Manassas,  on  which  he  wholly  de- 
pended for  supplies — a  liue  so  long  and  difficult  to 
maintain  that  we  subsequently  did  not  deem  it 
practicable  for  us — we  could  have  met  him  with  an 
army  greater  than  it  was  ever  proposed  to  take 
against  Richmond,  and  either  have  opened  the  way 
to  the  Rebel  capital  or  made  it  unnecessary  to  go 
there. 

In  military  movements  delay  is  generally  bad — in- 
decision is  almost  always  fatal.  In  our  movements 
we  seem  to  have  too  often  forgotten  that  momentum 
is  made  up  of  weight  andvelocity  ;  that  the  force  of 
the  blow  may  depend  as  much  upon  the  celerity  of 
the  movement  as  upon  the  weight  of  t'ae  body  moved. 
The  world's  history  shows  that  the  successful 
General  has  met  his  enemy  the  day  before  he  waa 
expected — not  the  week'  or  niontn  after.  Some  of 
our  points  of  attack  have  been  so  clearly  indicated 
to  the  enemy  beforehand,  and  our  movements  made 
with  so  much  delay  and  hesitation,  that  he  has  been 
able  not  only  to  fortify  his  positions  and  concentrate 
his  forces,  but  even  to  call  into  the  field  new  armies 
to  meet  ua.   At  such  points  we  have  failed. 

It  is  particularly  worthy  of  note  that,  in  the  re- 
verses which  followed  the  failure  of  the  Peninsula 
campaign,  at  the  time  when  the  army  of  the  Rebels 
had  reached  its  greatest  strength  and  its  highest  state 
of  enthusiasm,  they  did  not  permanently  regain  any 
territory  or  recapture  and  hold  any  of  the  important 
or  controlling  points  before  held  by  us  on  Rebel  soil. 
Their  marches  upon  Washington,  Maryland,  and 
also  Louisville,  were  little  more  than  raids,  from 
which  they  were  obliged  to  retire  before  our  oppos- 
ing forces.  This  fact  clearly  shows  that  while  it  is 
impossible  for  us  to  constantly  retain  military  pos- 
session of  all  the  vast  Rebel  territory  over  which  we 
may  be  called  upon  to  pass  in  our  operations  against 
their  armies,  still  the  territory  once  held  or  occupied 
by  us  cannot  be  permanently  regained  by  them — a 
sure  indication  of  our  ultimate  success. 

The  past,  notwithstanding  its  errors  and  reverses, 
is  full  of  encouragement,  and  gives  full  assurance  of 
final  success.  No  great  war  was  ever  oonducted  by 
any  people  or  Government  without  great  mistakes — 
giving  to  the  critics  of  the  time  and  those  of  suc- 
ceeding generations  a  wide  and  ample  held  for  their 
labors.  No  people  on  earth  were  ever  called  sud- 
denly into  a  great  war  more  totally  unprepared  than 
were  the  loyal  people  of  this  Government.  We  felt 
so  well  assured  of  our  position  among  the  powers  of 
the  world  that  we  had  almost  concluded  we  had 
fought  our  last  battle,  and  our  army  and  navy  had 
come  to  be  regarded  by  many  as  useless  appendages 
to  the  Government.  We  had  concluded  that,  doing 
justice  to  the  nations  of  the  world,  we  should  re- 
ceive justice  in  return;  and  the  loyal  portion  of  the 


people  were  devoting  all  their  energies  and  powera 
to  the  arts  of  peace,  the  advancement  of  civiliza- 
tion, the  development  of  the  rich  and  varied  re- 
sources of  our  new  and  great  country;  and  in  these 
every  man  found  full  occupation  lor  his  talents  and 
a  wide  field  for  his  ambition — no  man  ever  dreaming 
that  the  parricidal  arm  would  ever  be  raised  against 
a  Government  so  mild  in  its  sway,  so  benignant  in 
its  influence  over  all  its  subjects. 

It  was  indeed  difficult  lor  a  people  thus  engrossed, 
suddenly  and  almost  without  warning,  to  turn  its 
attention  to  war.  The  Rtbels  believed  us  to  be  so 
entirely  devoted  to  the  pursuits  of  peace  that  we 
should  yield  to  their  demands  rather  than  be  di- 
verted from  them;  and  hence  their  nefarious  at- 
tempt to  overthrow  this  fair  Government,  and 
erect  on  its  ruins  that  horrid  deformity,  a  free  Gov- 
ernment with  human  Slavery  for  its  coruer-stone. 
How  terribly  they  have  been  mistaken,  the  past  has 
already  shown ;  and  yet  the  energies  and  powera 
and  resources  of  the  loyal  people  have  hardly  be- 
gun to  be  applied  to  the  suppression  of  the  Re- 
bellion. They  must  meet  and  contend  in  battle 
with  that  strength  and  power  and  intelligence 
which  has  built  factories  and  workshops,  railroads 
and  steamboats,  covered  the  ocean  with  ships,  and 
filled  the  markets  of  the  world  with  the  product  of 
its  brain  and  hands;  and  they  will  find  these  no  less 
powerful  for  destruction  than  for  production,  when 
when  once  fully  applied  in  that  direction. 

All  the  great  industrial  intsrests  of  the  loyal 
States  were  never  more  active,  more  prosperous, 
than  at  this  time.  All  that  has  been  lost  by  the 
supply  of  men  to  the  army  bas  been  made  up  by  in- 
creased activity  and  energy,  and  the  adaptation  of 
machinery  to  work  heretofore  done  by  the  human 
hand.  There  is  only  this  marked  difference:  here- 
tofore all  these  great  forces  have  been  applied  for 
the  benefit  of  the  arts  of  peace;  now  they  all  look 
primarily  to  the  prosecution  of  war;  aDd  years 
would  have  to  elapse — far  more  than  would  be  re- 
quired to  crush  out  the  Rebellion — before  we  should 
develop  our  full  strength  for  war. 

Within  less  than  two  years  we  have  thrown  into 
and  sustained  in  the  field  an  army  of  a  million  of 
men.  We  have  created  a  navy  with  which  we  have 
blockaded  a  coast  greater  in  extent  than  was  ever 
attempted  by  any  Government  before,  and  by  our 
inventions  and  improvements  so  completely  revolu- 
tionized naval  warfare  as  to  render  the  navies  and 
sea-coast  defenses  of  the  world  wTell  nigh  useless. 

The  efficiency  of  this  blockade  is  attested  not  only 
by  the  destitution  of  the  Rebels  in  every  article  of 
foreign  production,  but  by  the  cry  that  comes  to  ua 
every  day  from  all  parts  of  the  world,  in  any  degree 
dependent  upon  the  products  of  the  blockaded  terri- 
tory, stimulating  us  to  still  greater  exertion  to  crush 
out  this  Rebellion,  that  the  blockaded  ports  may  be 
thrown  open  to  the  legitimate  commerce  of  the 
world. 

And  while,  in  our  efforts  to  maintain  our  Govern- 
ment and  vindicate  free  institutions,  we  neither 
asked  nor  desired  the  aid  of  any  foreign  nation  or 
Government,  we  did  at  least  expect  of  the  leading 
Powers  of  Europe  that  they  should  refrain  from  ex- 
tending aid  and  encouragement  to  a  Rebellion  against 
a  friendly  Government,  thereby  prolonging  a  strug- 
gle which  can  only  bring  misery  and  suffering  upon 
the  whole  civilized  world,  and  may  in  the  end  lead 
to  a  war  between  our  Government  and  some  of 
those  Powers,  the  full  effects  of  which  the  future 
alone  can  cisclose. 

OUR  RESOURCES. 

We  have  carried  on.  shall  carry  on  and  conclude 
this  war,  without  touching  one  dollar  of  the  accumu- 
lated capital  of  tbe  country.  We  are  already  aston- 
ished at  the  revenue  now  being  raised  from  the  tax- 
ation of  our  daily  productions,  and  yet  we  do  not  be- 
gin to  realize  the  amount  to  be  yielded  by  the  sys- 
tem already  adopted,  or  the  extent  to  wbich  that 
system  may  be  enlarged,  without  imposing  any 
grievous  burdens  upon  the  people — any  burden  to 
which  they  will  not  cheerfully  submit  to  accomplish 
the  object  intended. 

No  Government  can  long  carry  on  a  war  wkick 


30 


must  be  sustained  by  the  accumulated  capital  the  of 
country,  and  there  is  scarcely  a  limit  to  the  time  war 
may  be  prosecuted  by  a  Government  whose  credit 
is  sustained  by  the  revenues  derived  from  the  accu- 
mulating wealth  of  the  country. 

REBEL  DEFICIENCIES. 

Every  dollar  the  Rebels  have  expended  or 
can  expend  in  this  Rebellion  has  been  and 
must  continue  to  be  drawn  from  their  accumu- 
lated captal.  Their  intercourse  with  foreign  nations 
has  been  almost  wholly  suspended,  all  their  indus- 
trial interests  have  been  paralyzed,  and  there  is  no 
source  from  which  they 'can  derive  revenue  or  means 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  war,  except  by  depriving 
the  people  of  their  property,  day  after  day,  and 
year  after  year,  so  long  as  the  war  shall  continue, 
thus  reducing  them  to  poverty  and  want.  This  is 
a  truth  which  the  people  in  the  revolted  States  are 
already  beginning  to  realize.  They  had  been  made 
to  believe  that  an  export  duty  on  cotton,  which  the 
world  would  be  obl'ged  to  pay,  would  yield  them 
the  richsst  revenue  ever  realized  by  any  Govern- 
ment, and  that  if  the  Federal  Government  should 
attempt  interference  with  its  exportation,  they 
could  command  the  armies  and  navies  of  Europe  to 
fight  their  battles  for  them.  How  bitter  must  be 
their  disappointment  as  they  apply  with  their  own 
hands  the  torch  which  consigns  it  to  ashes,  and  then 
are  compelled  to  supply  to  their  leaders,  from  their 
other  property,  the  means  to  sustain  the  Rebellion  ! 
Their  curretcy  has  almost  ceased  to  be  regarded, 
even  by  themselves,  as  the  representative  of  value. 

Conscription  has  exhausted  their  people,  and  the 
wealth  which  long  years  of  uninterrupted  prosperity 
under  the  best  government  the  world  ever  saw,  had 
placed  in  their  haads,  has  already  been  expended, 
aud  they  are  now  struggling  on  with  the  vain  hope 
that  dissensions  among  ourselves  or  foreign  interven- 
tion may  save  them  from  that  ruin  which  they  see 
clearly  impending  over  them.  Every  day  must  show 
them  more  and  more  clearly  that  on  neither  of  these 
sources  can  they  rely  for  help.  The  utter  scorn  and 
contempt  with  which  every  man  in  the  ljyal  States 
who  proposes  any  adjustment  of  this  contest  except 
the  absolute,  uuqualilied,  and  unconditional  subju- 
gation of  every  Rebel  in  the  land  to  the  Constitution 
and  the  laws,  is  held  by  every  officer  and  soldier  in 
our  army,  aud  every  loyal  man  in  the  country,  must 
banish  irom  their  minus  the  last  ray  of  hope  from 
that  source.  The  reaction  wtrich  followed  the  recent 
slight  manifestations  of  a  willingness  on  the  part  of 
a  few  Secession  sympathizers  to  offer  terms  of  com- 
promise must  convince  them  that  they  have  no  allies 
in  the  loyal  States  on  whom  they  can  rely;  and  the 
present  condition  of  affairs  ia  Europe  must  forever 
crush  that  false  and  delusive  hope  which  they  have 
heretofore  entertained,  that  the  intervention  of 
European  powers  might  enable  them  to  accomplish 
what  they  know  full  well  they  can  never  attain  un- 
aided. 

THE  TASK  BEFORE  US. 

We  now  see  clearlv  what  we  have  to  do.  We 
must  obtain  uninterrupted  control  of  the  Missis- 
sippi. We  must  reach  those  great  railroad  arteries 
— the  one  bordering  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  the  other 
stretching  through  the  Virginia  and  Tennessee  val- 
leys to  the  west  aud  south.  We  must,  as  soon  as 
possible,  take  the  few  fortified  seaports  remaining 
in  posststion  of  the  Rebels,  cut  it  off  from  all  ex- 
ternal sources  of  food  and  arms,  and  have  surround- 
ed it  by  forces  which  can  press  upon  it  from  any 
quarter,  iit  the  same  time  severing  into  isolated  por- 
tions the  Re:>el  territory  and  destroying  their  means 
of  intercommunication,  by  which  alone  they  have 
hitherto  been  enabled  to  meet  us  in  force  wherever 
we  have  presented  ourselves,  aud  by  which  alone 
they  have  been  able  to  feed  and  buppiy  their  armies. 

By  possessing  ourselves  of,  and  keeping  open,  the 
great  natural  highways  alone  (and  a  possession  of  a 
navy  by  us  should  have  early  sugested  this),  we 
sever  parts  of  their  territory  mutually  dependent, 
and,  while  crippling  them,  enable  ourselves  to 
speedily  concentrate  our  forces  at  any  point  where 
it  may  be  advisable  to  strike. 


These  decisive  measures  we  are  actually  execut- 
ing or  preparing,  to  execute.  The  successes  and  con- 
quests we  have  already  described  have  carried  ua 
through  the  preliminary  stages,  and  the  blows  we 
now  strike — each  one  of  them  that  succeeds — will 
reach  the  very  vitals  of  the  Rebellion.  Let  any  one 
cast  his  eye  upon  the  map,  and  these  truths  will  be 
apparent. 

It  may  be  in  the  future,  as  in  the  past,  we  shall 
meet  with  reverses:  they  are  the  inevitable  inci- 
dents of  a  great  war  extending  over  so  vast  a  terri- 
tory, and  requiring  great  armies  at  so  widelv  sepa- 
rated points.  We  have  already  seen  that  it"  is  not 
our  true  policy  to  attempt  an  actual  military  occu- 
pation of  the  Rebel  territory,  except  at  a  few  and 
important  controlling  points.  We  must  destroy 
their  armies,  and  to  do  this  we  must  concentrate, 
not  scatter,  our  forces.  It  is  better  to  operate  suc- 
cessfully against  one  stronghold  or  one  army  than  to 
attempt  three  and  fail.  The  indications  now  cleariy 
are  that,  both  in  the  East  aud  West,  the  campaign  of 
1863  will  give  us  bril  iant  achievements- — decisive 
victories.  Our  Generals  now  in  the  field  have  the 
full  confidence  of  the  soldiers  and  the  people,  and 
the  armies  will  go  forth,  knowing  that  their  ranks 
are  to  be  made  full;  that  every  day  that  passes  will 
add  to,  not  diminish,  their  strength  or  numbers. 
Never  before  did  the  world  see  such  an  army  in  the 
field;  never  before  did  Generals  iead  such  men  to 
battle.  Each  man  goes  forth  feeling,  not  only  that 
he  has  a  soldier's  reputation  to  maintain,  but  also 
that  he  has  a  country  to  defend  in  which  hi3  inter- 
est is  as  great  a6  that  of  the  highest  officer  in  the 
land.  Such  an  army,  with  its  energy,  power,  intel- 
ligence and  will,  properly  directed,  must  be  invin- 
cible. The  past  has  already  demonstrated  that  the  true 
American  soldier  can  be  relied  upon,  to  dare,  do, 
and  endure  all  that  human  power  "can  attempt,  ac- 
complish, or  sustain. 

Let  no  men  be  placed  or  kept  in  commaud  of  such 
men  who  have  uot  the  ability  to  command  aud  the 
will  to  do;  thus  the  errors  and  mistakes  of  the  past 
will  be  avoided  in  the  future,  the  fond  hopes  and 
anticipations  of  a  true  and  loyal  people  realized,  the 
Government  vindicated  and  rebellion  speedily  and 
forever  crushed. 

We  know  that  this  contest  has  cost  U9  and  will 
cost  us  treasuiesand  blood — the  best  blood  ever  shed 
by  any  people  in  maintenance  of  their  Government 
and  in  dTlense  of  free  institui ions — the  blood  of  the 
flower  of  our  land.  Lei,  us  not  make  their  lives  a 
vain  offeriug,  by  for  a  moment  entertaining  the  idea 
of  a  partition  of  our  territory,  which  womd  forever 
involve  us  in  anarchy  and  border  wars,  or  by  any 
base  compromise  with  Rebels. 

We  owe  it  to  the  noble  dead  who  have  shed  their 
blood  in  founding  and  defending  this  Government; 
we  owe  it  to  ourselves;  we  owe  it  to  the  couutless 
millions  who  are  to  come  after  us,  to  maintain  this 
Government  and  the  institutions  we  have  inherited 
from  our  fathers — the  richest  legacy  ever  bequeathed 
by  one  generation  to  another — and  to  transmit  them 
to  our  posterity,  if  not  improved,  certainly  unim- 
paired. 

In  conclusion,  your  Committee  will  only  say,  that 
all  the  men  who  hold  high  positions  in  the  army  and 
navy,  and  have  renderei  valuable  services  to  the 
country,  with  whom  they  have  held  intercourse, 
unite  in  the  opinion  that  fighting,  and  only  fighting, 
can  end  this  Rebellion ;  that  every  traitor  in  the 
land  must  and  shall  be  made  to  acknowledge  and 
yield  absolute,  unqualified  and  unconditional  obe- 
dience-, to  the  Constitution  and  laws. 

Aud  your  Committee  believe  this  to  be  the  senti- 
ment, not  only  of  the  army  and  navy,  bat  of  every 
man  in  the  country — traitors  and  cowards  alone  ex- 
cepted. 

B.  F.  WADE, 
Z.  C.  CHANDLER, 
On  the  part  of  the  Senate. 

D.  W.  GOOCH, 
JOHN  CO  </  U DE, 
VV.  JULIAN, 
M.  F.  ODELL, 
Ob  the  part  of  the  Howe. 


